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ABSTRACT
ON THE PLURALITY OF ACTUAL WORLDS
MAY 1994
ANDREW L. BLAIS
B.A.
,
SOUTHEASTERN MASSACHUSETTS UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff
In this dissertation, I articulate and defend the
claim that there are many actual worlds
,
and so there are
many truths. My point of departure is an argument
presented and criticized by Donald Davidson: (1) reality
is relative to conceptual scheme, (2) there are many
conceptual schemes, therefore, (3) there are many
realities or worlds. Although it might seem that the weak
premise is (1), Davidson's strategy is to attack (2). 1
maintain that in doing this, he isolates the scheme idea
from the ontological background that gives it sense, and
so he attacks a straw man. I aim to provide an account of
the ontology underlying the scheme idea, which may be
summarized in the thesis that there are many actual
worlds. It follows, I argue, that there are many truths.
My argument for these theses is based on the conception
of what it is to be an object that Kant presents in the
Transcendental Deduction of his first Critique. (I also
discuss the work of Whorf , Quine, Goodman and Putnam, not
to mention many others.) My argument has five premises.
(1) There are many representing beings. (2) The set of
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representing beings partitions into many non-empty
classes. (3) For each such class of representing beings,
there is a set of purposes, and each set of purposes is
incompatible with every other such set. ( 4 ) For each
class of representing beings, there is an ideal sum of
representations that has an asymmetric structure that is
imposed by the set of purposes that is associated with
the class of representing beings in question. (5) For
each ideal sum of representations, there is an actual
world. My argument proceeds as follows. (6) Given, (3)
and (4), there is no ideal sum of representations that
includes or subsumes all the ideal sums of
representations that are associated with the various
classes of representing beings. (7) Given (1), (2), (4)
and (6), there are many ideal sums of representations.
(8) Given (7) and (5), there are many actual worlds. (9)
Given (7) and (8), there are many truths.
vm
PREFACE
Even if a metaphor cannot be the basis of a
serious philosophical argument, a metaphor may certainly
introduce such an argument. Accordingly, consider the
following metaphor due to Otto Neurath:
There is no way of taking conclusively
established pure protocol sentences as the
starting point of the sciences. No tabula
rasa exists. We are like sailors who must
rebuild their ship on the open sea, never
able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to
reconstruct it there out of the best
materials. Only the metaphysical elements
can be allowed to vanish without trace.
Vague linguistic conglomerations always
remain in one way or another as components
of the ship. If vagueness is diminished at
one point, it may well be increased at
another
.
1
Here, Neurath likens our beliefs, or the sentences we
take to be true, to a ship on the open sea. When
Neurath 7 s ship needs repairs, dry-dock is not an option,
and so it is necessary for repairs to proceed on a plank
by plank basis. Similarly, when our system of beliefs
needs repairs, i.e., when it is discovered to contain
false or vague beliefs, there is no epistemic position
equivalent to dry-dock, and so it is necessary for our
epistemic repairs to proceed on a belief by belief basis.
One of his central points is that it is, consequently,
impossible for us to replace all of our beliefs at one
time
.
1 Otto Neurath, Protocol Sentences , in Logical
Positivism, edited by A.J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe
(1959) p. 201.
IX
Neurath's metaphor leaves open a diachronic or
historical question: Could the fragmentary reconstruction
of our beliefs result in a time when they had all been
replaced? It also leaves open a synchronic or
anthropological question: Could there be beings whose
beliefs were completely different from ours? The
anthropological question may be reducible to the
historical question: If there were beings whose beliefs
were entirely different from ours, could the fragmentary
reconstruction of our beliefs result in a time when we
had theirs? These questions raise the pivotal issue of
the conditions under which one belief system may be said
to be the same or different from another. In a way that
aptly continues Neurath's metaphor, and also discloses
this issue, Thomas Hobbes writes:
...if... for example, that ship of Theseus,
concerning the difference whereof made by
continual reparation in taking out the old
planks and putting in new, the sophisters
of Athens were wont to dispute, were,
after all the planks were changed, the
same numerical ship it was at the
beginning; and if some man had kept the
old planks as they were taken out, and by
putting them afterwards together in the
same ship order, had again made a ship of
them, this, without doubt, had also been
the same numerical ship with that which
was at the beginning; and so there would
have been two ships numerically the same,
which is absurd. 2
2 Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy , in The English
Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, first collected and
edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., vol. 1, reprint
of the edition of 1839, Scientia Aalen, London (1962) pp.
136-137
.
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Hobbes makes a quite literal point here that makes it
possible to extend Neurath's metaphor. First, consider
the literal point. Were identity transitive, and were the
replacement of a single plank to fail to yield a new and
different ship, then the original ship of Theseus would
be the same as the reconstructed ship of Theseus.
However, were we to put the old planks together, there
would be the old worn ship, there would be the shiny new
ship, and one would be two, which is absurd. One
important lesson here is that: to replace all planks is
to bring about a new and different ship. Or, more
generally, one lesson is that: to replace every part of
an object is to bring about a new and different object.
Second, to see how this point of Hobbes' thought-
experiment makes it possible to extend Neurath's
metaphor, suppose that the object in question is the
congeries of our beliefs. One way to get two ships of
belief is to begin with one ship, and then to replace all
of its planks. But, can all the planks in a ship of
belief be replaced? More literally, one way to get two
belief systems is to begin with one, and then to replace
all of its parts. Neurath has shown, however, that it is
impossible to replace all our beliefs at one time, but it
doesn't follow from this that it is impossible to replace
all of our beliefs. If we cannot replace all our beliefs
at one time, it is an open question whether there are
other conditions under which there could be two belief
xi
systems, and whether these conditions can be realized, is
it, for example, possible to replace all our beliefs over
an extended period of time? Powerful reasons have been
pressed for thinking that at least some parts of a belief
system cannot be replaced, and so the answer must be
negative
.
Donald Davidson has argued that not all of our
beliefs can be replaced. One way in which he has made
this point is by focusing on what he takes to be the
dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, and by then
pointing out how this metaphor reveals its incoherence.
Davidson writes:
The dominant metaphor of conceptual
relativism, that of differing points of
view, seems to betray an underlying
paradox. Different points of view makes
sense, but only if there is a common co
ordinate system on which to plot them; yet
the existence of a common system belies
the claim of dramatic incomparability. 3
As Davidson understands the conceptual relativist, she
believes that there are essentially incomparable belief
systems, and that they are incomparable in a way that is
importantly similar to the way that points of view are
incomparable. Davidson maintains that since any two
points of view must be locatable within a common co-
3 Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual
Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation,
reprinted with corrections, Clarendon Press, Oxford
(1986) p. 184. Hereafter: OVICS. There is an earlier and
perhaps significantly different version of this essay in
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical
Association, vol . 47 (1974) pp. 5-20.
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ordinate system, they must be comparable. So, either
there is an significant way in which conceptual
frameworks are not similar to points of view, or
conceptual frameworks must be comparable, in other words,
either the dominant metaphor is falsified, or the claim
of essential incomparability is falsified. Supposing that
the metaphor is a good one, it follows that belief
systems, or conceptual schemes, are essentially
comparable. If belief systems must be comparable, some of
our beliefs cannot be replaced, else there would be no
basis for comparison. Conseguently
,
whereas Neurath's
idea seems to have been that we cannot replace all of our
beliefs at one time, Davidson's idea is that we cannot
replace all of our beliefs.
Much of the force of Davidson's argument depends
upon the adeguacy of his premise that the dominant
metaphor of conceptual relativism is that of the point of
view. It is evident, I think, that it is not, since it
does belie the conceptual relativist's claim that some
conceptual schemes are essentially incomparable.
Ironically, a better metaphor might be that of the co-
ordinate system. Given the mere possibility of non-
absolute space, different co-ordinate systems do not need
a common space within which they have absolute location.
Indeed, the idea of a space within which co-ordinate
systems have location is somewhat confused, since it is
in terms of co-ordinate systems that location is defined.
xiii
sense
,
So, not only do different co-ordinate systems make
it is not necessary for there to be a common space
within which they have location. So, the better metaphor
for the alternative conceptual schemes of conceptual
relativism may well be that of alternative co-ordinate
systems. The pivotal question is whether there is reason
to doubt the claim that different co-ordinate systems can
be essentially incomparable, which would mean that this
metaphor also belies the claim that different conceptual
schemes can be essentially incomparable. The answer would
be affirmative, if there were a way to transform, or
translate, any location in any one co-ordinate system
into any location in any other system. This is the
essential idea of Davidson's criticism of conceptual
relativism.
In his argument, Davidson surreptitiously
separates two questions. One: Can there be two conceptual
schemes? Two: What ontology does the scheme idea
presuppose? Davidson himself writes: "Reality itself is
relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system
may not in another ." 4 If this thesis is right, and there
are many conceptual schemes, then there are many
realities. It might seem obvious that this thesis is the
weak link in the chain of reasoning that supports the
conclusion that there are many realities, but curiously,
4 OVICS, p. 183.
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Davidson's strategy is not to work on breaking this link.
Instead, he aims to assail the very idea of a conceptual
scheme. In doing this, however, he isolates the scheme
idea from the ontological background that gives it sense.
Like the magician whose trick depends on his ability to
focus our attention on something other than the
legerdemain, the persuasive force of Davidson's argument
depends on his ability to focus our attention on
something other than the ontological background of the
scheme idea. However, in disregarding this ontology,
Davidson criticizes a shadow. The critical evaluation of
his argument, not to mention other anti-relativist
arguments, presupposes an account of this ontology.
Although this essay contains my response to Davidson's
argument, this response is incidental. In Christopher
Marlowe's Doctor Faustus, after Mephostophilis has
appeared, Faustus inquires, "Did not my conjuring raise
thee?" Mephostophilis answers, "That was the cause, but
yet per accidens . " 5 Davidson's argument was the cause of
the appearance of my account of this ontology, but yet
per accidens . My aim here is to articulate and defend the
ontology that is presupposed by the thesis that there are
alternative conceptual schemes, and which has been
ignored by Davidson. In short, this ontology can be
5 Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, edited and
introduced by Sylvan Barnet, Signet, New York (1969) p.
33
.
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expressed as the literal thesis that there are many
actual worlds.
This work divides into four chapters. The goal of
chapter one is to introduce the thesis that there are
many actual worlds by introducing the thesis to which it
is opposed, to wit, the thesis that there is just one
world that has just one complete and true description. By
getting clear on this contrary idea, I hope to make clear
some of the tasks that the articulation and defense of my
idea must accomplish. In other words, I begin to explain
the ontology presupposed by the idea of an alternative
conceptual scheme by explaining the ontology to which it
is opposed. I will also display a reading of Protagoras
that I think illustrates the idea that I aim to develop.
I also argue that the objection that my idea is self-
refuting fails. In chapter two, I will discuss the work
of Whorf and Quine, and in chapter three, will turn to
the work of Goodman and Putnam. Not only does the work of
these four thinkers illustrate various elements of the
ontology that I hope to articulate, but each poses a
number of questions to which I think the explanation of
my idea must provide answers. In chapter IV, I explore a
number of the basic ideas that I will use to make sense
of the thesis that there are many actual worlds, for
example, the idea that an object is what a manifold of
objective representations represent, and the idea that a
world is the sum total of what exists in a time. I do
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this by appropriating the metaphysical inversion, which
Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, called his
Copernican Revolution, and by appropriating the central
insight of Robert Paul Wolff's essay Narrative time
,
namely, that the structure of time is constituted by
purposes
.
6
Since the argument that follows is quite
complicated, it may serve my readers well, if I include
the following summary.
(1) There are many representing beings.
[ Premise
.
]
(2) The set of representing beings
partitions into many non-empty classes.
[ Premise
.
(3) For each such class of representing
beings, there is a set of purposes, and
each set of purposes is incompatible with
every other such set. [Premise.]
(4) For each class of representing beings,
there is an ideal sum of representations
that has an asymmetric structure imposed
by the set of purposes associated with the
class of representing beings in question.
[ Premise
.
]
(5) There is no ideal sum of
representations that includes or subsumes
all the ideal sums of representations that
are associated with the various classes of
representing beings. [3,4]
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by
Norman Kemp Smith, St. Martins Press, New York (1965).
Hereafter: CRITIQUE. Robert Paul Wolff, Narrative Time:
The Inherently Perspectival Structure of the Human World,
in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume 15, The
Philosophy of the Human Sciences, edited by Peter A.
French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K.
Wettstein, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame
(1990) p. 214. Hereafter: NT.
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(6) There are many ideal sums of
representations. [1,2 ,4, 5]
(7) For each ideal sum of representations,
there is an actual world. [Premise.]
(8) There are many actual worlds. [6,7]
(9) There are many truths. [6,8]
This is, however, only a summary, and it requires
expansion and explanation. To this task, I now turn.
xviii
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CHAPTER 1
INTUITIONS: PROTAGORAS
In this work, two theses are under consideration.
One: there are many actual worlds, and two: there are
many truths. The latter should not be taken to mean that
there are many truths in the sense that snow is white and
7 + 5 = 12 are many truths, namely, two truths. What,
then, does it mean? To explain the answer to this
question, I will temporarily place aside these two
theses, and I will consider an alternative account of
truth and what it is to be a world. Simply put, this
alternative is that there is just one actual world. It
consists of a number of representation independent
objects that have, moreover, just one complete and
correct representation, where a correct representation is
one that represents, or corresponds to, objects as they
independently and really are.
Hilary Putnam has succinctly summarized this
alternative
:
... [1] the world consists of a fixed
totality of mind-independent objects...
[2] there is exactly one true and complete
description of the way the world is... [3]
truth involves some sort of
correspondence. . .
.
1 Hilary Putnam, A Defense of Internal Realism, in
Realism with a Human Face, ed. James Conant, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge (1990) p. 30. Hereafter: DIR.
The parenthetic enumerations are due to me. Compare
Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (1981) p. 49. Hereafter: RTH.
I shall occasionally refer to the view summarized by
Putnam's three theses as realism ; he refers to this view
1
In Putnam's terms, the truth
,
if one exists, is the
unique, true and complete description of the way the
world is. The truth is, in other words, all the true
sentences. A truth is just one of the many true
sentences
,
for example, snow is white or 7 + 5 = 12,
which may be seen, therefore, as parts of the complete
and true description. Context suffices, I think, to
disambiguate. However, there is another source of
ambiguity, since the ideas of the world, and a true
sentence are themselves unclear. In the context of the
alternative, or realist, account under consideration
here, these ideas can be partly clarified by showing how
Putnam's three theses form an integrated account of what
it is to be a world and a truth.
Putnam's first thesis is that independently of
every actual representation, and independently of our
capacity to represent, there is the order of things, or
objects, that possess various properties, that is, there
is the world. Note well that an important part of what
this means is that these properties are also independent
of both our capacity to represent, and how they may be
actually represented. In other words, objects are
distinct by virtue of the properties or characteristics
as metaphysical realism. The theses that there are many
actual worlds, and there are many truths, I shall, on
various occasions, refer to as relativism . Note both that
I prescind from ascribing to Putnam any attitude toward
the two theses under consideration here, and that he
rejects metaphysical realism.
2
that they possess, or fail to possess, independently of
whatever concepts or predicates we happen to possess.
Now, Putnam's second thesis is that the world,
that is, the representation independent order of
representation independent objects, has just one true and
complete description. As I said above, such a description
is the truth, but what is it for a description to be
true? Moreover, why is there just one such description?
that is, why is there just one truth? These questions
cannot be answered in the absence of a specific
conception of what it is to be a true sentence,
description or representation. Although problematic, the
required conception is provided by Putnam's third thesis.
To put Putnam's third thesis somewhat crudely,
true sentences are true because they correspond to the
facts. The problem, which makes this formulation crude,
is that the idea of a sentence corresponding to the facts
and the idea of a true sentence are equally enigmatic.
There may be no problem with understanding this in cases
such as its being true that the cat is at the door, since
the required fact would seem to be just the cat's being
at the door, and this seems both simple and easy to
understand. But, there are cases that are not so
intelligible. For example, were it true that Socrates is
not at the door, to what fact would this true sentence
correspond? It is tempting to postulate negative facts,
but these are odd posits: not only isn't Socrates at the
3
door, but Plato isn't there either, and moreover the
round square isn't there, and so on. Moreover, it seems
that nothing distinguishes the fact that Socrates isn't
at the door from the fact that Plato isn't at the door,
not to mention that fact that the round square isn't
there. But, if facts can't be distinguished, why not say
that there is just one fact? 2
Putnam does not offer us much aid here, but
Michael Devitt, who has presented an abundance of
assenting behavior in the presence of theses such as
Putnam's, provides, or attempts to provide, a more
refined account of what it is to be a true sentence, that
is, an account that does not explain the enigmatic by
means of the enigmatic. He writes:
Consider a true sentence with a very
simple structure: the predication 'a is
F ' . This sentence is true in virtue of the
fact that there exists an object which 'a'
designates and which is among the objects
'F' applies to. So this sentence is true
because it has a predicational structure
containing words standing in certain
referential relations to parts of reality,
and because of the way that reality is.
Provided structure, relations and reality
are objective then the sentence is
correspondence true .... 3
2 Compare D.J. O'Connor, The Correspondence Theory of
Truth, Hutchinson University Library, London (1975) pp.
64-65.
3 Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, Princeton University
Press, Princeton (1984) p. 27. The emphasis is mine.
Hereafter: DEVITT.
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Devitt's explanation relies on the notions of
designation
,
application
,
and certain referential
relations
,
but these need explanation as much as the
notion of a true sentence. More specifically, these
notions need to be explained because if one maintains
that the objects of which the world consists are
representation independent, and that truth is
correspondence, then one faces, as Putnam argues, two
deep enigmas.
The first enigma is that given Putnam's three
theses, that is, given realism, any representation could
be false, even if it is ideal. So, for example, it could
be that every sentient being is a brain in a vat. Putnam
argues that this — to wit: scepticism - is impossible,
and for this reason, he rejects these theses. 4 The second
enigma also turns on the premise that Putnam's three
realist theses entail that even an ideal representation
could be false. Putnam argues that if consistency is a
necessary condition for being an ideal representation, it
is, for model theoretic reasons, incoherent to say that
an ideal representation could be false, and so realism
ought to be rejected. 5 Since at least the former problem
4 Putnam has presented this argument in RTH , pp. 1-21.
5 Putnam has presented this argument in the following:
(1) Realism and Reason, Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Associations, vol. 50 (1977) pp.
483-497, (2) Models and Reality, The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 45 (1980) pp. 464-482, and (3) Model Theory
and the 'Factuality' of Semantics
,
in Reflections on
Chomsky, edited by Alexander George, Basil Blackwell,
5
will arise again in what follows, I will not go any
further into the details. My point is that they reveal
the need to provide a fuller account of the referential
notions designation, etc. — that are presupposed by
Devitt's account of truth.
To provisionally circumvent this cluster of
puzzles, and to return to the topic the place of a unique
truth in the ontology described by Putnam's three theses,
I will replace Devitt's account of what it is to be a
true sentence with an image, which I will entitle the
string theory of truth. Here, strings are placeholders,
and to be rid of them, it is necessary to construct an
ontological apparatus that can explain the relation
between representation and world. Although I will return
to this topic in the sequel, I will now present an
argument that Putnam's three theses, in relative
abstraction from any particular account of reference,
entail that there is just one truth. Recall that my
overall aim here is to make sense of the idea of truth,
Oxford (1989) pp. 213-232. In this work, I will not
return to this argument, because a fair examination of it
would require an excursion into a number of the
technicalities of model theory, which are beyond the
scope of my understanding at the present time. It seems
clear that Putnam's model theoretic argument shows that
Devitt should not simply assume that the referential
notions that are assumed by his account of truth are
unproblematic. A similar point about these notions holds
for Putnam's so called brains-in-a-vat argument, which I
will discuss in a subsequent section of this work.
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as in there are many truths, by making sense of the idea
of the truth.
Here is an image that explains what it is for a
sentence to be true, and that coheres, I think, with the
intuition articulated in the above quote from Devitt.
Take an object and take a name; let the latter be: a. Now
take some string, tie one end of the string to the name,
and tie the other end to the object. Now, take a property
and take a predicate; let the latter be: is an F. Now,
take some more string, tie one end of the string to the
predicate, and tie the other end to the set of all the
objects that have the property. - Ignore the problem of
how one ties a string to a set. — Then, a is an F is true
just when the object tied to a is an element of the set
tied to is an F. 6 For example, if we let the name be
6 Note the following. For the sake of exposition, I
ignore relations, negations, conditionals, universally
quantified elements, et cetera, of the complete and true
description, since they can be recursively specified
using what I give as a base. Moreover, I shall primarily
disregard the possibility of the actuality of worlds that
cannot be completely represented by a language that has a
structure that is fully specified by first order logic.
This is partly motivated by my aim to construct a
response to Davidson's aforementioned critique that works
within the confines of his unexpressed assumption that
whatever the world, or a world, is like, it can be
represented by a language that can be specified by first
order logic. Davidson makes this assumption throughout
his writings, but it is particularly evident in his The
Method of Truth in Metaphysics
,
which is in his Inquiries
into Truth and Interpretation, reprinted with
corrections, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1986) pp. 199-214.
Thus, within the scope of this work, I generally suspend
the possibility of the actuality of worlds that can only
be represented, or constituted, by languages that have,
for example, a structure of the sort that Ferdinand de
Saussure attributes to languages. Compare Ferdinand de
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Fido, and we let the predicate be is a dog, then Fido is
a dog is true just when the object tied to Fido is an
element of the set tied to is a dog. This is an essential
part of the idea of the complete and true description of
the world, and what it means to say that there is just
one such description. Given this account, and given that
there is just one world of representation independent
objects that have, and are distinguished by,
representation independent properties, there can only be
one truth. In other words, if the world is unique, and
truth is, in the sense just explained, correspondence,
then there is just one true and complete description of
the way the world is. The following thought experiment
shows this by showing how such a description could be
constructed, if it were possible to construct it.
With respect to the question of whether realism,
or metaphysical realism, entails that there is just one
truth, Putnam writes:
... assume ...[ that ]... there is a definite
set I of individuals of which the world
consists ... .And there is a definite set of
all properties and relations .... ,call it
P. Consider an ideal language with a name
for each member of I and a predicate for
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, edited by
Charles Bally and Albert Sechechaye with the
collaboration of Albert Riedlinger, translated and
annotated by Roy Harris, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois
(1986). The point of writing in terms of representations,
as opposed to propositions, or sentences, et cetera,
which have a specific sort of structure, is to write with
a generality that leaves open the possibility of
extending my argument to these possibilities.
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each member of P. . . . Such an ideal
language ... is unigue...and the theory ofthe world... the set of true
sentences
. . . is . . . unique
.
7
The idea seems to be this. To construct the one, true and
complete description of the way the world is: for every
object, take a name, take some string
,
tie one end of the
string to the object, and tie the other end to the name.
Do this so that no name is tied to two objects, and that
no object is tied to two names. Moreover, for every
property, take a predicate, tie one end of the string to
the set of all the objects that have the property, and
tie the other end to the predicate. Do this in such a
manner that no predicate is tied to two such sets, and
that no set is tied to two predicates. These two tasks
done, here is how the unique truth can be constructed.
For any name, n, and for any predicate, is P, add n is P
to the description of the world just in case the object
tied to n is an element of the set tied to is P. For
example, let the name be Fido, and let the predicate be
is a dog, add Fido is a Dog to the description of the
world just in case the object tied to Fido is an element
of the set tied to is a dog. When every combination of
name and predicate has been considered, the resultant
list of true sentences will be the one true and complete
description of the way the world is, that is, it will be
the truth.
7 DIR, pp. 30-31. The parenthetic addition is due to me.
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It is quite obvious that no finite being is
capable of constructing the complete description of the
way the actual world is, but this is irrelevant to my
purposes. In this regard, recall that ray aim has been to
explain the meaning of two theses: one: there are many
actual worlds, and two: there are many truths. Hitherto,
my strategy has been to explain the relevant conceptions
of world and truth by explaining a realist account of
them, but the realist explanation only serves as a
beginning. According to the realist, there is just one
actual world, truth is correspondence, and so there is
just one truth. According to the relativist, there are
many truths because there are many actual worlds.
Moreover, a truth is what it is within the context of
Putnam's three theses, that is, truth is correspondence -
except that there are many truths, because there are many
totalities of objects to be described. The basic idea is
that there are many actual worlds, and although each is,
in a sense yet to be articulated, representation
dependent, there is exactly one true and complete
description of the way each world is. So, there are many
truths
.
The theses that there are many actual worlds, and
that there are many truths raise the obvious questions -
perhaps I should say doubts - about whether anything
goes, or whether anything may be believed. On the one
hand, although there are limits to what can be believed
10
by a finite mind, within these limits, it seems that
there is nothing that cannot be believed. On the other
hand, this question has another sense, namely, whether
believing something is sufficient for its being true. On
one reading, this is Devitt's question: "What is the
reality that constrains us, and prevents us [sic: from?]
saying absolutely anything?" 8 If there isn't a unique,
representation independent and belief constraining world,
why isn't saying something equivalent to its being so? In
terms of my two theses, is believing something sufficient
for the existence of an actual world where it is true?
It is not obvious what it means to say that belief
is constrained by the world, not to mention any one of a
plurality of actual worlds. To say that the world
constrains belief is not to say that the world makes us
believe what is true, and it is not to say that the world
makes us believe what we happen to believe, although the
latter may be the case. To say that belief is constrained
by the world is, I think, to say that not every belief is
true. In other words, to believe something is not ipso
facto to believe something true. Thus, there is an
ambiguity in Devitt's question. It is trivially true that
there are physical constraints on what can be said or
8 DEVITT, p. 56. The emphasis and the parenthetical
remark are mine. Lynn Baker has pointed out to me that it
is not obvious what it means to say that belief is
constrained by the world, and consequently it is not
obvious what a belief constraining world is. The next few
paragraphs are the result of my reflections on her query.
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believed, but there are also social and political
constraints, to wit, pointedly ostending objects, for
example, pistols. Devitt may well have intended the
Istter, but I will bracket this reading here. Within the
limits of physical constraints, there doesn't seem to be
anything about the world that constrains or prevents us
from saying or believing what we please. Devitt's
question seems to be motivated by the realization that
many people seem to believe quite spooky things, and the
desire to find something about the world that will stop
them. In other words, his question seems to be motivated
by the absurd desire for the world in itself to police
what we say or believe. At most, however, Devitt could
show that there are constraints on saying and believing
in this quite limited sense: to say or believe something
is not ipso facto to say or believe something true. It
might be that this is all that Devitt intends, but I do
not take the denial of this to conflict with the two
theses under consideration.
The realist conception of world and truth that I
have been discussing is, I think, mainly motivated by the
fact that its unique, representation independent actual
world is taken to be belief constraining. In other words,
realism is principally motivated by the idea that it
seems to yield the highly desired result that belief is
not sufficient for truth. For example, suppose that
Socrates believes that Fido is a dog, but the object tied
12
to Fido is not an element of the set tied to is a dog. it
follows from the above account of realism that Fido is a
Dog is not true, and so in this case, belief is not
sufficient for truth. The point is general: belief or
assertion is not sufficient for truth. Now, what I hope
to do is to make sense of the thesis that there are many
belief or assertion constraining worlds. I hope to make
sense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds,
and for each, to believe something is not ipso facto to
believe something true.
Clearly, the above requires exposition, and it
raises all sorts of questions, for example: must there be
many actual worlds in order for there to be many truths?
It seems obvious that there is just one actual world, and
it seems obvious that truth is correspondence. Moreover,
although it takes a bit of work to articulate the
inference, it seems obvious that it follows that there is
just one truth. Consequently, it might also seem obvious
that no case can be made for the theses that there are
many actual worlds, and there are many truths. However,
Hartry Field has argued that even if there is just one
representation independent actual world, no complete and
true description could be unique. His premise is the
apparent triviality that:
The concepts we use in describing the
world are not inevitable: beings other
than our selves might use predicates whose
13
extensions differ from anything easily
definable at all in our language.... 9
The idea, I surmise, is this. Were there to be
collections of predicates that had extensions different
from those of our present repertoire of predicates, they
would yield different true and complete descriptions of
the way the world is, and thus there would be more than
one truth. Not only isn't Field's multiplicity of truths
the multiplicity that I seek to explicate, but more
importantly, Field fails, I think, to reconcile the
uniqueness and representation independence of the objects
of the world with the plurality of truths.
To see this more clearly, suppose, with Field,
that there might be two sets of predicates, and suppose
that no predicate from one set has the same extension as
any predicate from the other. Since the extension of a
predicate is the set of objects to which it applies, for
each set of predicates, there would be the union of their
extensions. Or, if a predicate involves more than one
argument, let its extension be the set of objects that
are elements of the n-tuples to which it applies. Given
that there are two sets of predicates, it is possible to
ask whether the union of the extensions of one set is the
same as the union of the extensions of the other set.
Here is an essential difference between Field's
multiplicity of truths and the one I hope to more fully
9 Hartry Field, Realism and Relativism, The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 79 (1982) p. 553.
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explicate. When I say that there are many truths, part of
what I mean is that there are many disjoint sets of
objects, and that for each, there is a complete and true
description of its elements, which is just one of many
truths. When Field says that there are many truths, part
of what he means is that the above described sets of
objects are the same. Field's suggestion is that we might
use alternative predicates to differently describe the
world of representation independent objects, but then
there is still the one and only actual world that is
allegedly described differently, and not many actual
worlds that have different descriptions.
I maintain that Field's suggestion cannot yield a
multiplicity of truths. If there were just one actual
world that consisted of representation independent
objects, there could only be one truth, and it would be
the one, true and complete description of these objects.
Suppose that the objects that populate the world
according to Field are representation independent, as
they are within the context of Putnam's three theses.
Such objects would be distinct from one another by virtue
of the properties that they possess, or fail to possess,
independently of whatever concepts or predicates we
happen to possess. The complete description of all the
representation independent properties that all the
representation independent objects possess would be the
truth. There is, therefore, a quite determinate
15
relationship between predicates, their extensions, and
the representation independent properties of objects, on
the one hand, and the number of truths, on the other. It
is irrelevant to object that were we to use different
names and different predicates, we might be inclined to
say that there are different objects. If the names and
predicates we use do not match up with the world's
representation independent objects and properties, a
description that employs them cannot be a truth in the
sense explained above. Names and predicates that don't
reflect the world's objects and properties can't be part
of a description of the way the one representation
independent world of objects is. So, Field's suggestion
does not yield a multiplicity of truths.
If there are to be alternative truths, the
application of alternative predicates to alternative
grammatical subjects must be related to the possession of
alternative properties by alternative objects, which
constitute the ontologies of alternative worlds. Given
the intuitive power of the ideas that there is just one
actual world, and that truth is correspondence, how could
it be that there are many truths? My answer is that there
are many actual worlds, and so there are many truths;
namely, there is one truth, that is, one complete and
true description, for each actual world. In other words,
if there are many actual worlds, each of which consists
of a distinct order of objects, then there are, in the
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sense explained above, many truths, that is, there is one
complete and true description for each actual world.
Therefore, it should be clear that my task is to
explicate what it is to be a world in a way that makes it
possible to show that there are many actual worlds.
There is a problem with this way of putting
things, however. My aim is to make sense of the thesis
that there is some plurality of worlds, and that each has
a maximally complete and true description. But, this is
misleading, because it fails to include an essential
component of the final view of this essay, namely, that
making sense of my two theses requires a certain
ontological inversion. But, I get ahead of myself. The
pictures presented in this section are sufficient to
begin to explain the conception of world and truth to be
more fully delineated in what follows. I mean here to
warn my readers that the contents of this section are not
final. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, these contents are
rungs to be climbed up and beyond — my reader must, so to
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed it. 10
The problem here is to make sense of the theses
that there are many actual worlds, and that there are
many truths. I find a clue to the solution of this
10 Compare Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus
,
translated by D.F. Pears and B.F.
McGuinness, and with an introduction by Bertrand Russell,
F.R.S., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London (1961) p. 151,
section 6.54. Hereafter: TLP.
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problem in the doctrines that Plato imputes to
Protagoras. In his Theaetetus, Plato reports that
Protagoras maintained that:
...a man is the measure of all things: of
those which are, that they are, and of
those which are not, that they are not. 11
On my reading of Plato's text, this contains the seeds of
a coherent alternative to the idea that there is a unique
belief constraining world in itself that is the same for
all observers and all thinkers, yet it does not require
the rejection of the idea of a belief constraining world.
On my interpretation, Protagoras urges us to think that
there are many belief constraining worlds, and that there
are many truths. This is an idea fraught with
difficulties, but I find, as I have just said, a clue to
its explication, and their solution in the Protagorean
doctrines
.
The idea of belief constraint is not discarded by
Protagoras. This is a key element in his thought, not to
mention any viable explanation of the thesis that there
are many actual worlds and truths, but belief is not
always constrained in the same direction. As I see it,
this is essential . So it is wrong to say that his view is
that anything goes, or that nothing is objective. He
maintains that more than one thing goes, and that there
11 Plato, Theaetetus, translated with notes by John
McDowell, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1973) p. 16, 152a.
Hereafter: THEAETETUS.
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are many objectivities. Moreover, he explains this in
terms of the idea that there are many actual worlds.
Clearly
,
there are at least three relevant questions that
need to be answered:
(1) What is it to be an actual world?
(2) How can there be many belief
constraining actual worlds?
and
(3) How can there be many truths?
The text of Plato's dialogue suggests that the
Protagorean thesis that man is the measure can be
developed into an account of what it is to be an actual
world, and into an argument that employs this account to
show both that there are many actual, belief constraining
worlds, and consequently that there are many truths. In
short, the text of Plato's dialogue suggests answers to
these three questions. Since it is, in this case and at
this stage, clear that a plurality of actual worlds
entails a plurality of truths, worlds come first.
Protagoras maintained that the world of Socrates
is, for example, the aggregate of whatever appears to
him, and since perception is the principal mode of
appearance, his world is the aggregate of what he
perceives. 12 This leaves open the question about whether
this means that his world is the aggregate of (i) what he
12 How would Protagoras answer: Can something appear that
cannot be described?
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does perceive, (ii) what he does and can perceive, or
( iii ) what he does and can perceive plus whatever may be
connected by rules to what he does and can perceive, it
is reflection upon these sorts of questions that leads to
an essentially different version of the thesis that there
are many actual worlds and truths. The Protagorean vision
is just one rung on a ladder. Be this as it may, an
account of truth obviously corresponds to this ontology.
The assertion that the wind is cold is true for
Socrates just when the wind that appears to Socrates is
cold, or the wind perceived by Socrates is cold. This can
be put in the idiom of the string theory of truth.
Consider the general idea first. Take an object that
appears to Socrates, that is, take an object that
Socrates perceives. Take a name, or some expression. Now
take some string, tie one end of the string to the
expression, and tie the other end to the object. Now take
a property, take a predicate, take some more string, tie
one end of the string to the predicate, and tie the other
end to the set of all the objects that both appear to
Socrates and that have the property. If a is the name or
expression, and is F is the predicate, then a is F is
true for Socrates just when the object tied to a is an
element of the set tied to is F. In the case of the
present example, if we let the expression be the wind,
and we let the predicate be is cold, then The wind is
cold is true for Socrates just when the object tied to
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the wind is an element of the set tied to is cold.
Similarly, the assertion that the wind is warm is true
for Theaetetus just when the wind that appears to
Theaetetus is warm, or the wind that Theaetetus perceives
is warm. The string theory of truth applies similarly.
Moreover, if the wind that appears to Socrates is
cold, the assertion that the wind is not cold is not
sufficient for it to be true for him. Similarly, if the
wind that appears to Theaetetus is not warm, the
assertion that the wind is warm is not sufficient for his
assertion to be true for him. So, one consequence of
Protagoras ' ontology, which is a desired consequence, is
that there are many belief constraining worlds. The
aggregate of whatever appears to someone, or the
aggregate of what someone perceives, is her world. Such a
world constrains belief or assertion, that is, with
respect to such a world, saying that some object has some
property is not sufficient for that object to have the
property in question. In other words, to assert something
is not ipso facto to assert something true. There can be
many truths, because there are many belief constraining
winds, that is, one that appears to Socrates, and one
that appears to Theaetetus, and so assertion is
constrained, but not always in the same way. More
generally, for any subject, s, to assert or believe
something is not ipso facto to assert or believe
something that is true for s. With this, Protagoras
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constructs an alternative to the views that there is just
one truth
,
and, rather interestingly, although given the
aim of this work, perhaps not as importantly, that there
is no truth.
More generally, according to Protagoras, the
aggregate of what is perceived by an individual, or the
aggregate of what appears to an individual, is her world.
Since there are many individuals, there are many worlds.
Clearly, such a world is not a merely possible world.
Such a world is just one of many actual worlds. For each
Protagorean world, there is a total description, and so
there is a truth. It is important to note that the
relevant notion of relative truth is that of a
correspondence between what is said and a segment of a
world, to wit, what is said is true just when it
corresponds to, or correctly describes, some segment of a
world. So, this is a correspondence theory of truth as
described above. The contentious question concerns the
number of worlds to which what is said can correspond.
The difficulty lies in showing that there are many belief
constraining worlds, but once this is given, it is
obvious that there are many truths. This requires that a
proposition, or sentence, or statement, et cetera, be
true for an individual just when it describes what she
perceives, or it describes what appears to her. A truth,
or total truth, would just be a totality of propositions,
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sentences, or statements, et cetera
,
that describe
someone's world.
It is, of course, quite difficult to understand
the status of the Protagorean account of the plurality of
actual worlds and truths, since it does not appear to be
about what is perceived by any individual. This account
seems to tell us what individuals are like independently
of how they are perceived by any individual
,
but
Protagoras has no place for such propositions in his
scheme of man measured things. His picture is that of a
multiplicity of individuals, each of whom is conscious of
a certain field of things, but there are different things
in different fields. A world is, in this picture, just
the sum total of what appears, and can appear, in a
field. Thus, there are different worlds, and, on the
assumption that truth is correspondence between what is
said and some segment of a world, there are many truths.
To represent a world, to have the truth, is to represent
what is in one of these fields, to give a complete
description of the field. It might be that no one could
produce such a description, but that is what a truth, a
total truth, would be. What about the Protagorean
picture? According to it, all pictures depict the
contents of a field. Since the Protagorean picture aims
to depict all the fields, it cannot depict the contents
of any particular field. This seems incoherent, but it is
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not a serious objection to the Protagorean picture, or so
I argue
.
In his Theaetetus, Plato has Socrates raise this
sort of objection against the Protagorean thesis that man
is measure all things:
...it [the Protagorean thesis] involves
this very subtle implication. Protagoras
agrees that everyone has in his [sic]
judgements the things which are. In doing
that, he's surely conceding that the
opinion of those who make opposing
judgements about his own opinion - that
is, their opinion that what he thinks is
false — is true.... So if he admits that
their opinion is true - that is, the
opinion of those who believe that what he
thinks is false — he would seem to be
conceding that his own opinion is
false .... 13
This refutation begins with the assumption that the
Protagorean thesis implies that "...everyone has in his
judgements the things which are." 14 This is, however,
ambiguous between (i) when one judges truly, one judges
about the things which are in one's world, and (ii)
whatever one judges is ipso facto true. As I reconstruct
Protagoras, he meant the former: everyone who judges
truly judges about the things which are in her world. As
Plato reads him, Protagoras meant the latter: whatever
one judges is ipso facto true. In addition to Plato, as
13 THEAETETUS, p. 46, 171a-b. This passage is the locus
classicus for the thesis that relativism is self-
refuting .
14 THEAETETUS, p. 46, 171a.
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recent an interpreter as M.F. Burnyeat reads Protagoras
in this manner:
No one lives in a world in which his [sic]
mere belief in a proposition is either a
sufficient or a necessary condition for
its truth (in that world). But that
everyone lives in such a world is
precisely what the Measure doctrine
asserts.... Protagoras alleges we
all... live in a world in which their mere
belief in a proposition is a sufficient
and necessary condition for its truth (in
that world)
.
15
Plato predicates his subtle refutation of the Protagorean
thesis on this uncharitable reading. It begins with the
obvious consequence that whatever Plato judges is ipso
facto true. Since Plato judges that the Protagorean view
is false, it follows that it is true that the Protagorean
view is false. So, the Protagorean view is false. It
seems that Plato's refutation shows that the Protagorean
thesis entails its own negation, i.e. that it is self-
refuting .
Burnyeat also predicates his account of the subtle
refutation on this uncharitable reading. On his reading,
Protagoras offers us a picture of a multiplicity of
individuals, each of which is conscious of a certain
field of things. In this picture, a world is just the sum
total of what appears, and perhaps what can appear, in a
field. The pivotal point is that for each field, the mere
15 M.F. Burnyeat, Protagoras and Self-Refutation in
Plato's Theaetetus
,
The Philosophical Review, vol . 85
(1976) pp. 182-183. The emphasis is due to me.
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belief in a proposition is both a sufficient and a
necessary condition for its truth. Now, given the
assumption that Plato merely believes that the field of
what appears to him is not such that the mere belief in a
Proposition is both sufficient and necessary for its
truth, it follows that the field of what appears to Plato
is a counterexample to the Protagorean picture. So, once
again it seems that the Protagorean thesis entails its
own negation, i.e. that it is self-refuting
. The pivotal
problem with these subtle refutations is that had
Protagoras asserted that whatever one judges is ipso
facto true, he would have been inane, not a relativist.
On a more charitable reading, Protagoras meant that
everyone who judges truly judges about the things which
are in her world, and there are many worlds, et cetera.
It is not obvious that this version of the Protagorean
thesis is self-refuting
,
but what I have to say about
this, and the question of whether relativism is self-
refuting in general, concerns the analysis of how self-
refutation arguments work.
Plato presents the essence of the famous objection
that relativism is self-refuting . 16 I will here only
16 The literature on this subject divides along an
admittedly artificial line. There are formally oriented
pieces, and there are historically oriented pieces. The
line is artificial since some involve both. The number of
times the self-refutation objection is merely asserted to
be the decisive refutation of relativism is far greater
than the number of times it comes even close to being
made formally clear. For discussions that try to be
formally clear, compare the following, (i) J.L. Mackie,
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briefly indicate why I think this objection fails, in
general, this objection has the following form. Some
version of relativism, R, will be said to entail either
its own negation or a contradiction, and then we are
urged to reject R. Since a proposition entails its own
negation just when it entails a contradiction, and the
result is the same, namely, the proposition in guestion
is necessarily false, I will only discuss the former
case, which is more intuitive to me.
What is self-refutation? This is an important
question. Although the term is often used, it is rarely
Self-Refutation - A Formal Analysis
,
The Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 14 (1964) pp. 193-203. Hereafter: MACKIE
.
(ii) Jonathan Bennett, Review of J.L. Mackie . Self-
Refutation - A Formal Analysis
,
The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 30 (1965) pp. 365-366. (iii) John Passmore,
Philosophical Reasoning, Basic Books, New York (1969) pp.
58-80. Hereafter: PASSMORE, (iv) F.C. White, Self-
Refuting Propositions and Relativism
,
Metaphilosophy,
vol. 20 (1989) pp. 84-92. Hereafter: SRPR. (v) Peter
Davson-Galle
,
Self-refuting Propositions and Relativism
,
Metaphilosophy, vol. 22 (1991) p. 175-178. Hereafter:
DAVSON-GALLE. Understanding the self-refutation argument
has also benefited from various historical
investigations. The activity has mostly centered around
the interpretation of Plato's Theaetetus. The literature
on this immense. I have mostly drawn on the following.
(i) M.F. Burnyeat, Protagoras and Self-Refutation in
Plato's Theaetetus
,
The Philosophical Review, vol. 85
(1976) pp. 172-195. (ii) Jack W. Meiland, Is Protagorean
Relativism Self-Refuting?
,
Grazer Philosophische Studien,
vol. 9 (1979) pp. 51-68. (iii) Mohan Matthen, Perception,
Relativism
,
and Truth: Reflections on Plato's Theaetetus
152-160, Dialogue, vol. 24 (1985) pp. 33-58. NOTA BENE:
Semantic self-refutation is not, I think, the same as
pragmatic self-refutation . So, even if relativism is not
semantically self-refuting, it could be pragmatically
self-refuting. In this work, I shall only focus on the
former, since I have not yet found a version of the
latter that has been formulated with the degree of
clarity required for critical evaluation.
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explained. Some writers suggest that it is best
explicated by laying out its form. For example, John
Passmore suggests that: "Formally, the proposition p is
absolutely self-refuting, if to assert p is eguivalent to
asserting both p and not-p ." 17 This is confusing for a
number of reasons. Asserting is something that persons
do. Here, a formal account would be an account of the
logical structure of self-refuting propositions. It would
not matter that someone does or does not assert them, or
at least this is what a anti-relativist should say. A
formal account of modus ponens would be an account of the
logical structure of a particular sort of argument, and
it would not matter that someone does or does not assert
an argument with this structure. Moreover, it is
mysterious what it could mean to say that asserting p is
equivalent to asserting p and not-p. Does this mean that,
where p is self-refuting , every speaker who intends to
assert p finds herself actually, although accidentally,
asserting, in the manner of a slip of the tongue, p &
not-p? If this is a formal account, why mention
assertion? So, if we drop the part about asserting, we
are left with this: p is self-refuting, if p is
equivalent to both p and not-p.
Although this may be a matter of the subjectivity
of simplicity, this version is overly complicated. I
17 PASSMORE, p. 60.
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think it more simple to say that p is self-refuting, if p
implies ~p. Nothing is a stake here, since the two
versions are logically eguivalent. Note, moreover, that
by this criterion, when p is self-refuting, since it is a
truth of logic that:
[P - ~P] = [p - (q & ~q) ]
,
p also entails a contradiction. On this account,
therefore, a case of self-refutation is the same as a
case of contradiction. This is so even if one adopts the
analysis of self-refutation recently offered by F.c.
White, who writes:
Self-refuting propositions have three
essential characteristics. [1] They are
false. [2] They falsify or contribute to
falsifying themselves. [3] They falsify
themselves through self-reference. 18
When White says that self-refuting propositions
"...falsify or contribute to falsifying themselves," this
amounts, I think, to the claim that when p is self-
refuting, if p is true, then p is false. In other words,
when p is self-refuting, p implies ~p. So, a proposition,
p, is self-refuting just when (1) p is false, (2) p
implies ~p, and (3) p refers to p. These three features
are exemplified in what may well be the paradigm of the
self-refuting proposition: every general statement is
false. As Putnam has put this point:
18 SRPR
,
p. 84. The parenthetic enumerations are due to
me
.
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A 'self-refuting supposition' is one whosetruth implies its own falsity. For
example, consider the thesis that all
general statements are false. This is a
general statement. So if it is true, then
it must be false. [Because it refers to
itself by virtue of quantifying over
itself.] Hence, it is false. 19
The pivotal condition is (3), which is where I suspect
the objection from self-refutation fails.
Whatever version of relativism is considered, let
it be R, the self-refutation argument will have the
following structure, where p is a variable ranging over
propositions
:
[R] (p) ( . . .p. . . )
.
The self-refutation argument proceeds. The variable, p,
is said to range over R, and it is allegedly shown that
when p takes R as a value, it is easy to show that R
implies its own negation, or to deduce a contradiction.
The conclusion is that R is incoherent, or, what is more
to the point in this context, R is self-refuting. Are
relativists without a response to this? They could say
the following: do not let p take R as a value.
Is this ad hoc ? I think that it is not. Consider
an analogous case in the world of those who think that
there is one unique world, who think that truth is
getting it uniquely right, who countenance both a form of
bivalence and Tarski's Convention T. Consider the
following proposition, A:
19 RTH
,
p. 7. The parenthetic remark is mine.
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[A] A is not true.
Is A true or not true? It is easy to show that A is true
just when A is not true, and this is logically equivalent
to a contradiction. We are never asked to conclude that
the non-relativist conception of truth is contradictory
or self-refuting. This contradiction does not provide the
kind of pressure required to establish the essential
incoherence of this sort of conception of truth, but what
about the contradiction?
There are many stories about this. One might say
that the specification of A is viciously circular
(Russell), or propose a hierarchy of languages and truth
predicates (Tarski), or say that since A isn't grounded,
it lacks truth value (Kripke). 20 It doesn't matter
whether or which of these is the uniquely correct one
story. Because, the point is that an anti-relativist, or
someone who wants to preserve a non-relativist idea of
truth, is permitted to amend a rule of her logic, if it
should yield an inference that she is unwilling to
accept. As Goodman once said: "A rule is amended if it
yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an
inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are
20 Compare Susan Haack, Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (1978) pp. 135-151. Peter
Davson-Galle
,
in his recent response to White's version
of the thesis that relativism about truth is self-
refuting, suggests that "...relativism about truth would
seem to be able to spawn quasi-Tarskian variants that
escape White's argument." DAVSON-GALLE, p. 178.
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unwilling to amend." 21 Is this ad hoc ? If we deny so in
the anti-relativist's case, we should deny so in the case
of a relativist. From the relativist's point of view, the
choice is between allowing and disallowing p to take R as
a value. What could be wrong with the following line of
reasoning? Premise: if we allow division by zero, we can
show that one equals zero. The proof is obvious.
(1) Begin with the obvious: 1=1.
(2) From (1), and by subtracting 1 from
both sides, we get: 1-1 = 0.
(3) From (2), and by multiplying both
sides by l/(l-l) [which requires division
by 0, because 1-1 = 0, but since a point
is being made, this is allowed] we get:
(1-1) . 1/(1-1) = o . 1/(1-1).
(4) From (3), and since a • 1/a = 1, and 0
• a = 0, we finally get the result that: 1
= 0. Q.E.D.
Conclusion: don't allow division by zero. Here, a rule is
amended because it yields a conclusion that we are
unwilling to accept. The rule is something like: for all
a and b, there is a c such that a/b=c, and the amendment
is that b cannot equal zero. Now suppose the relativists
allow p to take R as a value, and suppose that the anti-
relativists are correct when they claim that under this
condition, R entails either its own negation, or a
contradiction. It is obvious that the prudent policy is
21 Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction , in Fact,
Fiction, and Forecast, fourth edition, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1983) p. 64.
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for the relativist to bar p from taking R as a value. 22
Here is the argument for the prudence of this policy.
Premise . if we allow p to take R as a value, R entails
the negation of R, and a contradiction. Conclusion : do
not allow p to take R as a value. So, with this way out,
the argument from self-refutation is not a sufficient
critique of relativism, Protagorean, conceptual or
otherwise. This response is the same as the doctor's
response to the patient who says, "It hurts when I do
this!" The doctor says, "Don't do that!" When the anti-
relativist says, "Incoherence is the result of applying
relativism to itself!", the relativist should say "Don't
apply relativism to itself." This is a well known
response to the problem of propositions such as "This
proposition is not true." It seems to me that any
solution to the so-called liar paradox is, in some way, a
22 There have been a number of controversies wherein it
has been suggested that instead of augmenting our
physics, logic itself should be changed. For a discussion
of when there could be reasons for revising classical
logic, compare Susan Haack, Deviant Logic: Some
Philosophical Issues, Cambridge University Press, London
(1974). For a recent example of the suggestion that logic
be revised, compare the controversy surrounding the
following, (i) Patrick Grim, There Is No Set of All
Truths, Analysis, vol. 44 (1984) pp. 206-208. (ii) Selmer
Brings jord, Are There Set-Theoretic Possible Worlds?,
Analysis, vol. 45 (1985) p. 64. (iii) Christopher Menzel,
On Set-Theoretic Possible Worlds, Analysis, vol. 46
(1986) pp. 68-72. Hereafter: MENZEL. (iv) Patrick Grim,
On Sets and Worlds: A Reply to Menzel, Analysis, vol. 46
(1986) pp. 186-191. Menzel claims that "...the world-
story theorist can have either his world stories [the
ontology he needs to do his semantics] or an iterative
understanding of sets that includes the power set axiom
[his logic], but not both." MENZEL, pp. 71-72.
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solution (!) to the paradox (!) of relative truth, that
is, it would be, so to speak, a solution to the
relativist liar paradox. No one says that realism, or
anti-relativism, is self-refuting because there is no
universally accepted solution to the liar paradox. There
is, therefore, no reason to say it of relativism.
Above, I said that whatever version of relativism
is considered, it will have the structure of R, but this
fails to do justice to relativism. Indeed, it would be an
abstract relativist who would assent to R. Those who
proffer the argument from self-refutation rarely, if
ever, attempt to figure out just what case the relativist
might be making. White is one example. 23 They assume that
the relativist thinks something witless like everything
is relative
,
and then with equal wit they go on to prove
that this is self-refuting or incoherent. But then it
can't be claimed that the argument is based on a deep, or
even moderately brief, analysis of the relativist's
position. For example, it can't be claimed that the
argument is based on a deep, or even moderate, analysis
of the writings of Whorf
,
Quine, Kuhn, or Feyerabend. It
is not based on an analysis at all. This may be a
stronger response to the objection that relativism is
self-refuting. Thus, there are two responses to this.
One: the self-refutation argument must be directed at a
23 PASSMORE, pp. 58-80; MACKIE , pp. 193-203.
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developed version of relativism. Two : the paradoxes of
relative truth can be resolved by developing a logical
apparatus that is analogous to those that have been
proposed to resolve the paradoxes of non-relative truth.
The development of the required logical apparatus
presupposes, however, a given account of relativism, that
is, of the theses that there are many actual worlds and
there are many truths. So, first comes the philosophical
work, and then comes the logic. Here, I will only attend
to the former, and I will leave the development of the
technical logical apparatus aside as beyond the scope of
this work. This said, I will now return to the task of
elucidating the analysis, or the ontology, that makes
sense of the relativist's notion of multiple actual
worlds and multiple truths.
The above version of Protagoreanism provides us
with a story wherein we can see three things: (1) what an
actual world is, (2) how it is possible for there to be,
and that there are many actual worlds, and (3) how it is
possible for there to be, and that there are many total
truths. I have no idea how one could prove that any
version of relativism must provide such a story. It has
assumed many forms. To make these ideas more clear, I
shall examine how they function in the thought of a
number of thinkers. It might be that none of these
thinkers would accept either the epitaph, or epithet,
relativist
,
so I limit my investigation to the role that
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these three themes play in their writings. Here, my aim
is ancient: to elucidate certain themes by showing how I
see them developed, or able to be developed, in the
thought of my predecessors. My final cause is, of course,
to thereby articulate my own version of the development
of these themes.
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CHAPTER 2
ATTEMPTS: WHORF AND QUINE
The writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf contain elements
that suggest an account of what it is to be a world that
shows how it is possible for there to be, and that there
are many actual worlds, and so many truths. I will begin
with them. If there were a plurality of actual worlds,
there would be, I think, a plurality of truths, namely,
there would be one truth, that is, one complete
description, for each actual world. So, I will mostly
focus on what I think suggests an account of how there
can be a plurality of actual worlds.
As I have read Whorf, the premise of this account is
that "...language produces an organization of
experience." 1 This premise is not difficult to accept.
Whorf provides us with many examples, although they seem
to have been directed to linguists, anthropologists, and
those who happen to be well acquainted with a variety of
disparate languages. The most famous among Whorf 's
examples is, of course, Hopi . Suppose, as Whorf asserts,
that "...the Hopi language contains no reference to
'time'...." 2 Without a temporal vocabulary, for example,
1 Benjamin Lee Whorf, The Punctual and Segmentative
Aspects of Verbs in Hopi, in Language, Thought, and
Reality, edited and with an introduction by John B.
Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase, The M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge (1956) p. 55. Hereafter: PSAVH.
2 Benjamin Lee Whorf, An American Indian Model of the
Universe
,
in Language, Thought, and Reality, edited and
with an introduction by John B. Carroll, forward by
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how could one then describe change? This question is not
about the conditions under which it would then be
possible to describe change, but it is about what such a
description would be like. If one doesn't think that the
very idea of describing change without a temporal
vocabulary is incoherent, then one might suspect that
something must be omitted from a Hopi description of
change, but Whorf assures us that "...the Hopi language
is capable of ... describing correctly, in a pragmatic or
operational sense, all observable phenomena of the
universe .
"
3
Whorf alleges that someone who describes change
with the aid of a temporal vocabulary experiences change
differently from someone who describes it with an
atemporal vocabulary. The point of the above question is
to get one to see that his claim is correct. In Hopi,
Whorf asserts:
...there are no verbs corresponding to our
'come' and 'go' that mean simple and
abstract motion, our purely kinematic
concept. The words in this case translated
'come' refer to the process of eventuating
without calling it motion — they are
'eventuates to here' ( pew'i
)
or
'eventuates from it' ( angqo or 'arrived'
( pitu , pi. oki) which refers only to the
terminal manifestation, the actual arrival
Stuart Chase, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1956) p. 58.
Hereafter: AIMU.
3 AIMU, p. 58.
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at a given point, not to the motion
preceding it. 4
As strange as it may seem, in using Hopi to describe the
motion of an object from one location to another, one
does not say that after the passage of some time, and
after some preceding motion, the object finally arrived
here. Moreover, I am not clear on what one does say. This
lack of clarity is not an objection to Whorf's example,
however, since the point of the example is, I think, that
anyone who experienced the object of the Hopi description
would have an essentially different experience from
someone who experienced the object of the corresponding
English description. Such examples often strike many of
us as quite alien. So, although the fact of their
strangeness, or distance may itself be one of the best
examples, or one of the most obvious consequences, of the
linguistic ordering of experience, I will describe and
consider another illustration of Whorf's premise.
For us, there can be at least two experiences of
the following: (1) if the mouse is on the house, the
mouse is dizzy, and the mouse is on the house, so the
mouse is dizzy; (2) if the mouse is on the house, the
mouse is dizzy, and the mouse is not dizzy, so the mouse
is not on the house; (3) if the mouse is on the house,
the mouse is dizzy, and the mouse is not on the house, so
the mouse is not dizzy; and (4) if the mouse is on the
4 AIMU
,
p. 60.
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house, the mouse is dizzy, and the mouse is dizzy, so the
mouse is on the house. Someone whose vocabulary includes,
or whose language has a syntax that can capture, modus
pollens, modus tollens
,
the fallacy of denying the
antecedent
,
and the fallacy of affirming the consequent
will have one experience of this. Someone who lacks this
vocabulary, and whose language lacks the relevant syntax,
will have a quite different experience. The former will
experience this as four variations on a theme, and the
latter will experience it as a chaos. This is only an
example, however. The pivotal question is whether the
premise that language orders experience can be developed
into an account of actual world multiplicity.
Not only does Whorf assert that language orders,
or arranges experience, but he also asserts the stronger
thesis that the result of this is a world order. He
writes that "... language ... is a classification and
arrangement of the stream of sensory experience which
results in a world-order...." 5 Although one sometimes
experiences the world, and experience is one of the many
things that comprises the world, it is important to be
clear that experience is essentially different from the
world, and so the world order is essentially other than
the order of experience. Hence, it is unclear how the
linguistic ordering of experience could be related to the
5 PSAVH
,
p. 55.
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order of the world, and it is also unclear, perhaps
so, how it could be that the world itself is ordered by
language. Yet, Whorf asserts both that "...languages
dissect nature in many ways...,*' and that »(w)e dissect
along lines laid down by our native
languages...." 6 The difficulty, as Devitt points out, is
that
:
. . .we can make good sense of talk of our
[language?] imposing on, organizing and
cutting up experience. But this is not to
say that we construct the world; it is our
experience of the world, not the world
itself, that we [by means of our
language?] are imposing on, organizing and
cutting up. 7
Note well that Devitt concedes that there is good sense
to be made of Whorf 's talk of our language imposing on,
cutting up, organizing, and ordering our experience of
the world. But, it is a very different thing to claim
that language imposes on, cuts up, and orders the world
itself, which would seem to be cut up, and ordered in its
own language independent way, and this is the very
difficulty at hand.
Whorf goes even further, however. He asserts that
"...different languages differently 'segment' the same
6 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Science and Linguistics
,
in
Language, Thought, and Reality, edited and with an
introduction by John B. Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase,
The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1956) p. 214 and p. 213.
Hereafter: SL.
7 DEVITT, p. 140. The parenthetical inguiries are mine.
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situation or experience » 8 Not only do different
languages differently order the experiences of their
speakers, but in some manner, different languages
differently order the same world. So, if there are many
languages, and there is a distinct world-order for each
language, then there are many world-orders. It might seem
that this is very near to affirming that there are many
actual worlds, since it might seem plausible to say that
there is one actual world for each world order. Yet, this
doesn't quite yield the conclusion that there are many
actual worlds. Note well that it is the same situation,
or world, that is differently segmented, or dissected, by
different languages, but there is an obvious difficulty
with this. As Roger Trigg has observed:
There are clearly many ways of classifying
and grouping together objects in the
world. The fact that different languages
may do it differently does not of itself
suggest that they are referring to
different states of affairs or 'different
worlds '
.
9
The difficulty is that there seems to be just one nature,
or actual world, that is differently dissected by
different languages, but this only needs to mean that
different languages have different resources for picking
8 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Gestalt Technique of Stem
Composition in Shawnee, in Language, Thought, and
Reality, edited and with an introduction by John B.
Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase, The M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge (1956) p. 162. The emphasis is mine.
9 Roger Trigg, Reason and Commitment, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (1973) p. 163.
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out and describing different pre-existing patterns among
pre-existent language-independent objects. So, the
conclusion that there are many actual worlds is guite
distant, if it is even possible to reach it from Whorf 's
premise. (It might be instructive to recall the reason
that Field's suggestion does not work: if the world
consists of representation-independent objects, there can
only be one truth, and it would be the one, true and
complete description of these objects.) Thus, once again
the pivotal question arises about how, and, perhaps more
importantly, whether the premise that language orders
experience can be developed in an account of actual world
multiplicity.
Whorf's suggestion is that language orders
experience. Not only is this merely intuitive and
inexact, its relation to the conclusion that there are
many actual worlds is unclear, but I have only claimed
that it is suggestive. Something more is needed. I would
add an alternative to the idea that the world is some
sort of sum of experience independent objects. It is
unclear whether Whorf could imagine such a thing. As I
have noted, he seems to have thought that there is just
one world, and that different languages have different
resources for picking out and describing different pre-
existing patterns among pre-existent and linguistically-
independent objects. However, Whorf himself maintains
that there is a significant difference between the thesis
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that "...'Sentences are unlike because they tell about
unlike facts'...," and the thesis that "...'Facts are
unlike to speakers whose language background provides for
unlike formulation of them.'" 10 This suggests the
distinction between the thesis that a true sentence is
one that describes a fact, and the thesis that a fact is
what some true sentence describes. Despite the obscurity
of the Whorfian texts, the metaphysically significant
point is that to get the conclusion that there are many
worlds from Whorf's suggestion that language shapes
experience
,
it is, I think, necessary to add something
like the premise that a world is the ideal sum of the
objects of an ideal sum of linguistically shaped
experiences .
As I have interpreted Protagoras above, he
maintained the analogous premise that the world of
Socrates is the aggregate of whatever appears to him, and
since perception is the principal mode of appearance, his
world is the aggregate of what he perceives. To arrive at
the conclusion that there are many worlds from Whorf's
premise that language shapes experience, it is necessary
to add an additional premise such as the premise that the
world of the Hopi is the aggregate of whatever appears to
them. Moreover, since linguistically shaped experience is
10 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Languages and Logic, in Language,
Thought, and Reality, edited and with an introduction by
John B. Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase, The M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge (1956) p. 235.
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the principal mode of appearance, their world is the
aggregate of the objects of their linguistically shaped
experiences
.
Whorf seems to have believed a number of
trivialities. He seems to have maintained that experience
is ordered by language
,
and that different languages
differently order experience. As I noted above, these are
not difficult assumptions. However, Whorf has also
indicated that he believed that there is just one world
,
and that different languages have different resources for
picking out and describing different pre-existing
patterns among pre-existent and language-independent
objects. Such assertions seem to be supported by either
reflection on common experience, or most people's natural
ontological attitude . 11 So, the difficult task lies in
showing how, and that, these trivialities support a
monstrosity, namely, the thesis that there are many
actual worlds. It is clear that it is necessary to make a
case for the theses that the world is shaped by language,
that different languages order the world differently
,
and
that there are many actual worlds. The case can be made,
given the reconception of a world as an ideal sum of the
11 Compare, Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological
Attitude
,
in Scientific Realism, edited with an
introduction by Jarrett Leplin, University of California
Press, Berkeley (1984) pp. 83-107. I only mean to borrow
this phrase from Fine for the purpose of calling up my
reader's realist intuitions, which I suspect aren't in
need of resurrection.
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objects of a manifold of linguistically shaped
experiences. Then, not only are worlds linguistically
shaped, but for each language, there is an ideal sum of
objects of linguistically shaped experiences. So, for
each language, there is a world. Now, were there to be
many languages, there would also be many worlds, it seems
obvious that there are many languages, though this is not
an uncontested thesis, so it should be obvious that there
are many worlds. Moreover, if each of these worlds had a
complete description, there would be many truths. As has
been pointed out above, however, there are a number of
problems with all of this, but their solutions rest on
this reconception
.
12
1 ? It may make the structure of my reconstruction of
Whorf's suggestion more clear, if I number the relevant
theses, and state the various problems and what I take to
be their solutions in a much more abstract form:
(1) experience is ordered by language,
(2) different languages order experience differently,
(3) there is just one actual world,
(4) different languages have different resources for
picking pre-existing and language-independent patterns
among pre-existing and language-independent objects,
( 5 ) the actual world is ordered by language
,
(6) different languages order the world differently, and
( 7 ) there are many actual worlds
.
Now, 1, 2, 3 and 4 are supported by either reflection on
common experience, or most people's natural ontological
attitude. It is necessary to make a case for 5, 6 and 7.
The first problem is that Whorf says that 5 is the result
of 1, but there is a logical gap between 1 and 5. The
solution is that the idea that there is a gap between 1
and 5 presupposes a non-relativist conception of what it
is to be a world. Given a relativist conception of what
it is to be a world, there is no gap. The second problem
is that 5 would seem to be the only support for 6, but
the best motivation for 5 is 1, and 1 doesn't at all seem
to support 5. The solution is that given a relativist
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The first problem is that Whorf says that the
world is ordered by language because experience is
ordered by language, but there seems to be a logical gap
between these theses. The solution to this problem is
that the idea that there is a gap here presupposes that
the world is an ideal sum of experience independent
objects. If a world were the ideal sum of the objects of
an ideal sum of linguistically shaped experiences, there
would be no gap.
The second problem is that the only reason for
saying that different languages order the world
differently would seem to be that the world is ordered by
language. However, the best reason for the latter is that
experience is ordered by language, but this brings us
back to the alleged first problem. Thus, the solution to
this supposed problem is, I think, that if a world is the
ideal sum of the objects of an ideal sum of
linguistically shaped experiences, it too disappears.
conception of what it is to be a world, this problem also
disappears. The third problem is that even if there were
support for 6, presumably from 5, which comes dubiously
from 1, 6 only seems plausible if it is read as 4. But,
when 6 is interpreted as saying 4, it offers no support
for 7, and there is, therefore, no support for denying 3.
The solution is that given a relativist conception of
what it is to be a world, 6 has another reading, and on
this reading, 6 supports 7, and 6 gives reason to deny 3.
Now the last problem is: what premise in conjunction with
1 entails 7? I would say that it is this: a world is an
ideal sum of the objects of a manifold of linguistically
shaped experiences, but this is the basis of the solution
of all these problems.
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The third problem is that there doesn't seem to be
any reason to say that different languages differently
order the world. On the one hand, if there were such a
reason, part of the best candidate would seem to be that
the world is ordered by language, which is alleged to be
itself dubiously supported by the premise that language
orders experience
. But, this sort of difficulty is, once
again, partly allayed by the solution to the first
problem: a world must be conceived as an ideal sum of
objects of linguistically shaped experiences. On the
other hand, it might be alleged that the claim that
different languages differently order the world is only
plausible if it is interpreted as meaning that different
languages have different resources for picking out and
describing different pre-existing patterns among
linguistically-independent objects. But, on this
interpretation, it should be clear that this claim lends
no support to the monstrosity that there are many actual
worlds, and there is, therefore, no support for denying
the seeming triviality that there is just one actual
world. However, if a world were an ideal sum of objects
of linguistically shaped experiences, there would be
another interpretation of the thesis that the world is
differently ordered by different languages. Moreover, on
this reading, this thesis would support the monstrosity,
and it would thereby provide a reason to deny the
triviality
.
48
understoodDoes Whorf offer us even a hint that he
that a reconception of what it is to be a world is
required to pass from the thesis that experience is
ordered by language to the thesis that there are many
worlds? The situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, as
far as I can tell, Whorf never even imagined that the
world might be something other than the collection of
linguistically independent objects. On the other hand, it
seems to be well known that one of his most powerful
motivations was his desire to reconcile the scientific
world picture with the religious world picture. John B.
Carroll tells us that "... Whorf 's interest in linguistics
stemmed from one in religion...." 13 George Lakoff tells
us that:
Whorf 's objectivism came from two sources:
he was a fundamentalist Christian, and he
was trained as a chemical engineer at MIT
in the 1910s. His interest in linguistics
arose from the discrepancy between his two
sources of objective truth: science and
the Bible. 14
Emily A. Schultz claims that "Whorf 's personal struggle
to resolve the competing claims of science and religion
led him to focus on the study of language as a likely
13 John B. Carroll, Introduction
,
in Benjamin Lee Whorf,
Language, Thought, and Reality, edited and with an
introduction by John B. Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase,
The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1956) p. 7.
14 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What
Categories Reveal about the Mind, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago (1987) p. 324.
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source of insight." 15 What could the insight possibly be?
and how could it be related to the thesis that there are
many actual worlds?
Whorf might have thought something like the
following: if the world of science were the ideal sum of
the objects of those experiences shaped by scientific
language
,
and the religious world were similarly the
ideal sum of the objects of those experiences shaped by
religious language, and these languages were sufficiently
different
,
then there would be two worlds, and the claims
of science would not be able to conflict with the claims
of religion. As noted above, however, Whorf does not, as
far as I know, ever suggest that he possessed the
reconception of what it is to be a world required for
this type of resolution. 16
To Whorf 's work, therefore, it is necessary to add
(1) an account of what it is to be an actual world, (2)
an account of the multiplicity of actual worlds, and (3)
an account of the multiplicity of truths. Moreover, none
of his work even approaches (4) the question of the
ontological status of these many actual worlds. So, Whorf
15 Emily A. Schultz, Dialogue at the Margins: Whorf,
Bakhtin, and Linguistic Relativity, The University of
Wisconsin Press, Madison (1990) p. 7.
16 Note the similarity of Whorf 's resolution of the
science-religion conflict with Kant's resolution of the
science-morality conflict. It was by reflection on the
latter that I came to conjecture the form of the former,
but I will not here provide any discussion of Kant's
position on the science-morality conflict.
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cannot answer my four questions: (l) what is it to be an
actual world? (2) Why are there many actual worlds? ( 3 )
What is the ontological status of these actual worlds?
(4) Why are there many truths? There is no reason that he
should be able to answer them, however, since he had
other concerns. His works are important to the
explication of my theses, because they contain the
premise that experience is shaped by language, and when
this premise is added to a sufficiently revolutionary
reconception of what it is to be a world, his work
becomes a model of how such questions might be answered.
This is important, since having such a model brings us
closer to my aim of explicating and defending my two
theses. Thus, his work is neither irrelevant to mine, nor
does it do mine.
There are a number of reasons why Whorf's work
does not do mine. First, and perhaps most importantly, he
didn't explain how language shapes experience. Second, he
didn't have a clue that a world might be conceived as
something other than a collection of pre-existent and
language-independent objects. So, he had no idea that a
world might be conceived as an ideal totality of the
objects of linguistically shaped experiences. Third,
consequently, he didn't have a clue that it might be
necessary to explain the idea of an ideal totality of
objects. Fourth, even if a world is conceived as an ideal
sum of the objects of linguistically shaped experiences,
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it is not clear how subjective experiences could be
distinguished from objective experiences. A world cannot
be all of the objects of linguistically shaped
experiences, since this would include the objects of
linguistically shaped experiences that are, or would be
considered, illusory. In short, it is not clear what
Whorfian principles would exclude the objects of illusory
experiences from a world.
Fifth, Whorf's argument, as I have reconstructed
it, seems to move at the wrong level. This argument
assumes that a difference among worlds is due to an
empirical difference. I don't think that this is right:
there are different worlds not because there are
different schemes of empirical concepts, but because
there are different schemes of a priori concepts. The
sort of linguistic variation necessary to derive an
account of the plurality of actual worlds is not the
variation of divergent vocabularies. This is why the
infamous multiplicity of Eskimo words for snow is totally
irrelevant: world multiplicity is, to borrow some Kantian
terminology, due to a multiplicity of categories, not a
multiplicity of empirical concepts. 17 Why think that
17 Compare SL, p. 216. Compare Geoffrey K. Pullum, The
Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax, in The Great Eskimo
Vocabulary Hoax and Other Irreverent Essays on the study
of Language, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
(1991) pp. 159-171. Also compare Laura Martin, 'Eskimo
words for snow': A case study in the genesis and decay of
an anthropological example, American Anthropologist, vol
.
88 (1986) pp. 418-423. Moreover, compare Stephen 0.
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there are many alternative sets of categories? But, i get
ahead of myself.
Sixth, Whorf's writings suggest that if there are
many experience shaping languages, and something is a
part of a world just when it can be the object of a
linguistically shaped experience, then there are many
worlds, and so many truths. This suggestion presupposes
the existence of languages that are different to the
point of being capable of differently shaping experience,
but this is deeply enigmatic. How different must such
languages be? One possible answer, which has been
articulated by Davidson, is that such languages must be
different to the point of untranslatability
. There is
reason to believe, however, that an untranslatable
language could not be discovered. This would undermine
the legitimacy of the anthropological and linguistic
investigations that motivate the premise that there are
languages that differently shape experience, that is, the
premise of one possible argument for the plurality of
actual worlds. Donald Davidson illustrated this reason
well, when he wrote that:
Whorf, wanting to demonstrate that Hopi
incorporates a metaphysics so alien to
ours that Hopi and English cannot, as he
puts it, 'be calibrated', uses English to
Murray, Snowing canonical Texts, American Anthropologist,
vol . 89 (1987) pp. 443-444.
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convey the contents of sample Hopi
sentences. 18
Upon the discovery of an untranslatable language, one
would want to report to one's fellows that there are
natives who speak a language that cannot be translated
into our language, and this is what they say. This cannot
be: if this is part of one's own language, one has
translated what is untranslatable; if this is part of the
native's language, one has failed to report what the
natives say.
This is the argument that Davidson describes as
"...a very short line indeed." 19 its premise is that:
... nothing ... could count as evidence that
some form of activity could not be
interpreted in [or translated into] our
language that was not at the same time
evidence that that form of activity was
not speech behavior.... 20
Its conclusion is that:
...we probably ought to hold that a form
of activity that cannot be interpreted as
language in our language [or cannot be
18 OVICS, p. 184. Davidson tells us that Whorf's phrase
is to be found in his The Punctual and Segmentative
Aspects of Verbs in Hopi. [PSAVH, pp. 51-56.] This is not
correct. This phrase occurs in Whorf's Science and
Linguistics
.
[SL, pp. 207-219.] In this piece, Whorf
writes, "(w)e are... introduced to a new principle of
relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by
the same physical evidence to the same picture of the
universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are
similar, or can in some way be calibrated ." [SL, p. 214.
The emphasis is due to me.]
19 OVICS, p. 185.
20 OVICS, p. 185.
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translated into our language] is not
speech behavior. 1
I think that the idea is this. On the one hand,
translation is the best evidence that something is
language. The translation of extraterrestrial signals
would be, for example, the best evidence that they are
language. On the other hand, repeated failure to
translate something is the best evidence that it is
untranslatable. It is trivially true that the repeated
failure to translate extraterrestrial signals is the best
evidence that they are not translatable. Perhaps it
should be said that a failure to translate
extraterrestrial sounds - in the form of electromagnetic
radiation, or something of this sort - is the best reason
one could give for saying that they are untranslatable,
since to call them signals is to suggest that they are
language. In either case, since translation and failure
to translate are mutually exclusive, the best reason that
one could give for saying that something is language and
the best reason that one could give for saying that
something is untranslatable are mutually exclusive.
Here's the difficulty. Whorf's thesis is that
different languages differently shape experience.
Davidson suggests that to make sense of this, such
languages must be different to the point of being
untranslatable, but this requires that there be something
21 OVICS, pp. 185-186. The remark is mine.
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that is both a language and untranslatable. Question:
What evidence could support the thesis that this
requirement is satisfied? Answer: None. Evidence that
some sounds or marks are language, namely, their
translation, is obviously evidence inimical to their
being untranslatable. To show that they are language is
to show that it is translatable. Furthermore, evidence
that some sounds or marks are untranslatable, namely,
repeated failure to translate it, is evidence inimical to
their being a language. To show that something is
untranslatable is to show that it is not language. There
cannot be, therefore, evidence that something is an
untranslatable language. So, no anthropologist, no
linguist, no historian, and no social scientist could
ever persuade us to believe that there are untranslatable
languages. Therefore, no evidence could support Whorf's
thesis that different languages differently shape
experience. Languages cannot be so different that they
differently shape experience, and experiences cannot be
shaped differently by different languages. This
undermines Whorf's thesis that different languages
differently shape experience, and it thereby undermines
any attempt to employ his thesis to make sense of my
thesis that there are many actual worlds and truths.
Davidson's argument is strikingly similar to
Hume's argument against miracles. If there is a miracle,
then there is a violation of the laws of nature. If we
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are to have evidence that there is a violation of a law
of nature, then we must have evidence that something is
both a law of nature of nature and yet violated. Evidence
that something is violated is also evidence that it is
not a law of nature. Thus, there can never be evidence
that something is a violated law of nature, that is,
nothing could be the evidence that shows there has been a
miracle. 22 similarly, an alternative experience would be
associated with a language that cannot be translated into
our language. Evidence that there is an alternative
experience is, therefore, evidence that there is
something that is both untranslatable and yet a language.
Evidence that something is untranslatable is also
evidence that it is not a language. Thus, there can never
be evidence for an alternative experience. I will return
to this topic in the sequel.
Whorf's work only contains a hint of an account of
the theses that there are many actual worlds, and that
there are many truths. Moreover, this hint needs to be
supplemented with an account of what it is to be a world.
The work of Willard Van Orman Quine also contains such a
hint, but it requires far less supplementation. When it
is developed, we are provided with a more or less
explicit account of what it is to be a world, and it
22 Compare David Hume, Enquiries concerning the human
understanding and concerning the principles of morals,
edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, second edition, Clarendon
Press, Oxford (1902) pp. 109-131. Hereafter: HUME.
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suggests how there might be many worlds. Unlike
Protagoras and Whorf
,
however, it would not be correct to
represent Quine as first arguing that there are many
worlds, and then arguing that each has a complete and
true description, and so there are many truths. For
Quine, or at least as I have construed his words, there
are many worlds because there are many truths. So, in
discussing Quine's views, it is not possible to begin by
exclusively focusing on the issue of the guiddity and
plurality of worlds, and then to turn to the issue of the
plurality of truths as something that follows naturally
from this focus. In the case of Quine, what it is to be a
world, the plurality of worlds, and the plurality of
truths are three closely related issues. In short, in the
following discussion of Quine's views, I cannot focus on
the issue of the quiddity and plurality of worlds, and
assume that the plurality of truths falls out of the
result. With this caveat in mind, what is Quine's hint?
In his essay On what there is, Quine articulates
what he takes to be the ontological question: "What is
there ?" 23 He distinguishes this question from the
question about what sentences, in general, say there is.
The former is a question about ontology; the latter is a
question about the ontological commitment. According to
23 Willard Van Orman Quine, On what there is, in From a
Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays,
second edition, revised, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts (1980) p. 1. Hereafter: OWTI
.
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Quine, the answer to this second question is that to be
is to be the value of a [bound] variable. 24 in less
felicitous words, what sentences say there is is what
there must be in order for them to be true. As Quine once
put the point:
...a theory [i.e., a set of sentences] is
committed to those and only those entities
to which the bound variables of the theory
must be capable of referring in order that
the affirmations made in the theory be
true
.
26
This does not answer Quine's first question about what
there is, since it fails to say which sentences are true,
but it doesn't follow that it is irrelevant to his first
question
.
Quine's central ontological insight is that if we
possessed a list of all of the true sentences, we would
have an answer to his question: What is there? The answer
would be: that to which the bound variables of these
sentences must be capable of referring in order for them
to be true is what there is. In essence, so to speak,
Quine maintains that science provides us with a list of
true sentences, and he concludes, in Two dogmas of
empiricism, that: "Ontological questions ... are on a par
with questions of natural science." 26 Here, Quine adopts
24 OWTI
,
p. 15. The parenthetical remark is mine.
25 OWTI, pp. 13-14. The emendation is due to me.
26 Willard Van Orman Quine, Two dogmas of empiricism
,
in
From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical
Essays, second edition, revised, Harvard University
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a thesis that is similar to Charles Sanders Peirce's
thesis that what there is is what inquiry guided by the
scientific method will tell us there is. Or, as Peirce
himself put this point:
The opinion which is fated to be
ultimately agreed to by all who
[scientifically] investigate, is what we
mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real.
That is the way I would explain reality
.
27
I note that Quine does not accept exactly this thesis. He
rejects it because he thinks that it rests on the dubious
notion of an infinite process of inquiry that employs an
ideal version of the scientific method. Moreover, he
thinks that it rests on a wrongheaded application of the
concept of a limit to theories, which is, as he notes,
defined for numbers, but not for theories. From my
perspective, the most important reason that Quine gives
for rejecting Peirce's thesis is that it presupposes that
the result of applying the scientific method forever
would be unique, but I get ahead of myself.
Quine's view is that the entities to which the
bound variables of all the true sentences must be capable
of referring in order for them to be true is what there
is. However, it is important to note that Quine's view
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1980) p. 45. Hereafter:
TDE
.
27 Charles Sanders Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, in
Philosophical Writings of Peirce, selected and edited
with an introduction by Justus Buchler, Dover
Publications, New York (1955) p. 38. The remark is mine.
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presupposes an ontological inversion, and this inversion
is also presupposed by Peirce's thesis. On the realist
view of world and truth delineated above, the concept of
truth is explicated in terms of the concept of reality.
According to Peirce and Quine, however, the concept of
reality is explicated in terms of the concept of truth.
Their view is that reality is what all the true
representations represent, and the practice of science
determines which representations are true. The idea is
really quite simple. Since what there must be in order
for true theories to be true is what there is, and the
practice of science determines which theories are true,
its practice determines what there is.
In other words, to the question about what
theories say there is, i.e., the question about
ontological commitment, Quine answers that to be is to be
the value of a bound variable. To the question about what
there is, i.e., the ontological question, he answers that
to be is to be the value of a bound variable of a true
theory. Note that there is an idea here that is common to
Protagoras, Whorf and Quine, namely, the idea that there
is a order of representations, and what they represent is
what there is. For Protagoras, the representations in
question are some individual's perceptions, and for
Whorf, they are linguistically shaped experiences. These
are their versions of the previously mentioned
ontological inversion. For Quine, the ontology
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determining representations are true theories. This
invites an obvious question: which theories are true? To
this question, Quine defers to natural science. His
conclusion is that natural science answers the question
about what there is, but can its answer be unique? and is
its answer unique? As I anticipated above, Quine answers
such pivotal questions negatively.
In Word and Object, Quine writes that "...in
general the simplest possible theory to a given purpose
need not be unique." 28 Simplicity aside, one instance of
this is the algebraic fact that for any finite set of
data, D, that assumes the form of points in a plane,
there need not be just one theory that assumes the form
of a polynomial that will generate D. It is well known
that for any such set of points, there are indefinitely
many polynomials that will generate it. For example, if
we disregard units such as mass or seconds, we may let:
D = {<0,2>, <1,3>, <2,4>, <3 , 5> }
.
Here are three of indefinitely many polynomials that will
generate D:
(1) y=x 5-4x 4-x 3+16x 2-llx+2
(2) y=x4-6x 3+llx 2-5x+2
( 3 ) y=x+2
28 Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object, The M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge (1960) p. 22. Hereafter: Word and
Object. The emphasis is mine.
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In this example, the theories take the form of
polynomials, and the evidence or data takes the form of
points in a plane coordinate system. 29 Theories and
evidence come in many forms, however. The more general
point is that for any body of evidence, E, there are
indefinitely many theories that imply or generate E. So,
more than one total theory can account for all the
possible evidence.
Quine has expressed this point in several ways. In
Word and Object, he puts this point in the following
manner:
. . .we have no reason to suppose that man's
surface irritations even unto eternity
[i.e., all the possible data] admit of any
one systematization [i.e., total theory]
that is scientifically better or simpler
than all possible others. It seems
likelier .. .that countless alternative
theories would be tied for first place. 30
In his reply to Chomsky in Words and Objections, he
asserted that: "The totality of possible observations of
nature, made and unmade, is compatible with physical
theories that are incompatible with one another." 31 In On
29 This example comes from Carl G. Hemple, Philosophy of
Natural Science, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs,
N.J. (1966) p. 41.
30 Word and Object, p. 23. The remarks are mine. I will
accept without question Quine's promiscuous employment of
the concepts of all the possible data and total theory.
31 W . V
.
Quine, To Chomsky, in Words and Objections:
Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine, D. Reidel Publishing
Company, Dordrecht-Holland (1969) p. 302.
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the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation
,
we are told
the following:
Theory can still vary though all possible
observations be fixed. Physical theories
can be at odds with each other and yet
compatible with all possible data in a
word, they can be logically incompatible
and empirically equivalent. 32
In addition, in On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the
World, Quine asserts that:
If all observable events can be accounted
for in one comprehensive scientific theory
— one system of the world, to echo
Duhem's echo of Newton — then we may
expect that they can all be accounted for
equally in another, conflicting system of
the world. 33
Thus, sometimes Quine asserts that there are countless
alternative theories that can systematize, or account for
all the possible evidence, and sometimes he asserts that
if there is one theory that can account for all this
evidence, then there is at least one more theory that can
do the same. In either case, the point is that:
"Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords
even in principle no unique definition of truth." 34 In
one version of Empirical Content, Quine also expressed
this point in the following manner:
32 W.V. Quine, On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of
Translation
,
The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67 (1970) p.
179.
33 W.V. Quine, On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the
World, Erkenntnis, vol. 9 (1975) pp. 313.
34 Word and Object, p. 23.
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. . .let us suppose that.
. .two [theory]
formulations are in fact empirically
equivalent even though they are not known
to be; and let us suppose that all the
implied observational categoricals are in
fact true
,
although, again, not known to
be. Nothing more, surely, can be required
for the truth of either theory
formulation. Are they both true. I say
yes
.
35
According to Quine, what there is is what true theory
says there is, and science is supposed to provide true
theory. However, science does not provide the true
theory; it provides, or is, in principle, capable of
providing an array of true theories. Thus, there cannot
be a unique answer to the ontological question; what is
there? So, what there is is not unique. If an actual
world is all of what there is, this means that there are
many actual worlds.
In fairness to both my readers and Quine, I must
acknowledge that he claims that "...it is a confusion to
suppose that we can stand aloof and recognize all the
35 Quoted from Roger F. Gibson, Jr., Enlightened
Empiricism: An Examination of W.V. Quine's Theory of
Knowledge, University of South Florida Press, Tampa
(1988) p. 115. Hereafter: GIBSON. The remark is due to
Gibson. Quine came to substantially change this passage.
Compare W.V. Quine, Empirical Content, in Theories and
Things, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1981) p. 29.
The expression observational categorical may require
explanation. An occasion sentence is a sentence that is
true on some occasions and false on others. An
observation sentence is an occasion sentence to which
everyone in a speech community would assent on the
occasion of the like stimulation of their sensory
receptors. An observational categorical is a sentence of
the form whenever this, that, where this and that are
observation sentences. (Compare page 4 of the above
mentioned work by Gibson.)
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ways, all
alternative ontologies as true in their several
the envisaged worlds as real." 36 such a supposition
confuses, he maintains, truth with evidential support,
but recall that he also maintains that two theories can
be both logically incompatible and empirically equivalent
and empirically complete. Further, nothing more than
empirical adequacy and completeness can be required for
their truth. As Quine himself has asserted, "...whatever
evidence there is for science is sensory evidence." 37
There is a real conflict here. If all evidence is
empirical evidence, and an empirically adequate and
complete total theory is true, and there are, in
principle, many empirically adequate and empirically
complete total theories, then there are many true total
theories. Moreover, if a world is the object of a true
total theory, there are many worlds.
Quine suggests that the way out of this difficulty
is to find a way of making two theories one. The method
is obvious.
When a sentence is affirmed in one of two
empirically equivalent theories and denied
in the other, the incompatibility is
resoluble simply by reconstruing some
theoretical term in that sentence as a
pair of distinct homonyms [note that the
36 W.V. Quine, Things and Their Place in Theories
,
in
Theories and Things, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
(1981) p. 21.
37 W.V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized
,
in Ontological
Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press,
New York (1969) p. 75.
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incompatibility of empirically equivalenttheories must be due to their theoretical
content]
....Once the two empirically
equivalent systems of the world have been
rendered logically compatible, they can betreated as a single big tandem theory
consisting perhaps of two largely
independent lobes and a shared logic. 38
This will not work, however. Quine's claim is that
theories can be logically incompatible and empirically
equivalent, but such theories are meant to be total or
global. As Roger F. Gibson, Jr., has pointed out,
"...when Quine is talking about underdetermination, he is
doing so only in connection with global world theories
and not in connection with any lesser theories." 39 Thus,
it must not be forgotten that the claim is that more than
one total theory can account for all the possible data or
evidence. Thus, there are, I think, three flaws with
Quine's method of making two theories one.
First, a total theory cannot be made part of a
larger tandem theory. No theory is larger than a total
theory. Second, suppose, per contra, that there could be
a larger tandem theory that subsumes two total theories.
Still, for any larger, that is, totalizing, tandem
theory, there must be another total theory with which it
is logically incompatible yet empirically equivalent.
38 W.V. Quine, Reply to Roger F. Gibson
,
Jr., in The
Philosophy of W.V. Quine, The Library of Living
Philosophers, vol. xviii, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn and
Paul Arthur Schilpp, Open Court, La Salle (1986) p. 156.
The parenthetical remark is mine.
39 GIBSON, p. 116.
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Thus, Quine would seem to be stuck with the unsightly
spectacle of an infinite regress of totalizing theories.
Third, if the reconstrual of the theoretical terms of two
conflicting theories were to yield a larger, or
totalizing, tandem theory that consisted of at least two
independent lobes, then since each lesser theory would be
both empirically adequate and empirically complete, every
phenomenon would have at least two explanations. If for
every totalizing tandem theory, there is another total
theory with which it is logically incompatible yet
empirically equivalent, then Quine would also seem to be
stuck with the really quite odd idea that every
phenomenon has infinitely many explanations. Be this as
it may, let me note that I have not read Quine in order
to get him right. I have read him to help myself
understand my own ideas. Here, I have tried to be fair to
Quine by conceding that my use of his views rests on a
certain amount of twisting, and by showing where I have
twisted them.
Questions of Quinean exegesis aside, since there
would be a complete description of each world, there
would be many truths. Quine himself suggests this:
Where it makes sense to apply 'true' is to
a sentence couched in the terms of a given
theory and seen from within the theory,
complete with its posited reality ... .To
say that the statement 'Brutus killed
Caesar' is true, or that 'The atomic
weight of sodium is 23' is true, is in
effect simply to say that Brutus killed
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Caesar, or that the atomic weight of
sodium is 23. 40
Thus, Quine may also be taken to have provided an account
of how there can be many total truths. As I have
indicated, I know that Quine would reject this as akin to
perdition. He asks, "Have we now so lowered our sights as
to settle for a relativistic doctrine of truth — rating
the statements of each theory as true for that theory,
and brooking no criticism?" 41 Like Huck, he immediately
retorts, "Not so. Why not? Quine answers, "...we
continue to take seriously our own particular aggregate
science, our own particular world-theory or loose total
fabric of quasi-theories, whatever it may be." 43 Quine
admits that there could be an alternative to our best
current theory, and that both theories could satisfy any
imaginable theoretical constraints equally well, for
example, both theories could be equally simple,
consistent, et cetera. Why then should we prefer our
present theory and its ontology? Why should we take them
seriously? Quine answers, albeit a bit vaguely, that
"...we own and use our beliefs of the moment .. .until by
what is vaguely called scientific method we change them
40 Word and Object, p. 24.
41 Word and Object, pp. 24.
42 Word and Object, pp. 24.
43 Word and Object, pp. 24.
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here and there for the better." 44 This answer is, I
think, that any theory that could do the work that we
desire our present theory to do isn't now available to do
that work. So, we are, proffers Quine, justified in
both our scientific practice and our present
theory with its ontology seriously.
Quine's views are not without their problems, not
to mention the myriad of exegetic problems associated
with the task of appropriating them for sake of showing
that there is a multiplicity of actual worlds. Rather
than delve any further into these problems, I shall focus
on the task of showing that an essential fragment of his
views fits with, or implies this multiplicity.
On the one hand, Quine adamantly maintains that
there is only one world and one truth, and being caught
in the web of scientific belief, he also maintains that
the former is the world of physics, and that the latter
is its description. On the other hand, Quine suggests a
view of ontological commitment and ontology that I think
implies that there are many worlds, namely, the view that
what true representations represent is what there is. His
view that there is just the world of science is not
inevitable, however, if what there is is what some
manifold of true representations represent, and there are
many distinct manifolds of true representations . This
44 Word and Object, pp. 24-25.
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could it be
raises an obvious and pivotal question: How
that there are many disparate manifolds of true
representations? A clue to an answer lies in Quine's
remark that "...in general the simplest possible theory
to a given purpose need not be unique." 45 The element of
purposiveness introduces another kind of
underdetermination. Let me explain.
Suppose that both our purposes and the set of all
possible data are fixed. Suppose that there is at least
one total theory that implies all the possible data, that
is, suppose that there is at least one empirically
complete theory. Then, according to Quine, there is an
array of equi-simple, empirically complete, empirically
equivalent, and yet incompatible theories. Add to this
the premise that nothing more than empirical completeness
could be required for the truth of a theory, and it
follows that there is an array of true theories.
Moreover, it follows that there is also an array of
domains of objects that are required for them to be true.
If each such theoretically ordered domain is a world,
there is an array of actual worlds. Moreover, since each
such world has a complete description, there are many
truths. This is the familiar kind of underdetermination.
Quine tells us that it can be overcome, however.
45 Word and Object, p. 22. The emphasis is mine. By this
point, it should be clear that purposiveness will be an
essential element in my argument for the plurality of
actual worlds.
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According to him, our present theory is to be preferred
because only it is available to do the work that we
desire done, but this work is determined by our purposes.
In other words, relative to our purposes, there is a
determinate matrix of work to be done, and so there is a
preferred theory, namely, the theory that gets it done.
Moreover, there is a preferred ontology, namely, the
domain of objects that are required for the preferred
theory to be true. At this stage, this too should be
familiar, but there is, I think, an additional kind of
underdetermination, which is introduced by the very
purposiveness that Quine thinks eliminates
underdetermination
.
Were our purposes to conflict, we would conflict
over the work we want to see done, and so there would be
no way to identify, and so no justification for
preferring, present theory. There can be no preferred
theory in the face of conflicting purposes, and since our
purposes clearly conflict, there can be no preferred
theory. This has, I think, astounding consequences. Quine
tells us that relative to each set of purposes, there are
many empirically complete and equivalent yet incompatible
theories, but relative to a given set of purposes, there
is one preferable theory. However, there are many sets of
purposes . This much seems clear. For each set, there is
both a plurality of theoretical options, and there is one
option that is preferable to all the others. Thus, for
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each set of purposes, there is an empirically complete
theoretical option that is, on the empiricist principles
that Quine proffers, true. Thus, since it is clear that
there are many sets of purposes, there are many
empirically complete theoretical options that are true,
that is, true on empiricist grounds. For each such
theory
,
there is a domain of objects that is required for
them to be true. If each theoretically ordered domain is
a world, there are many actual worlds. Moreover, if each
such world has a complete description, there are many
truths. There is, therefore, an essential fragment of
Quine's views that, in conjunction with the truism that
there are many purposes, implies that there are many
worlds and many truths. So, his view that there is just
the world of physics is not inevitable.
Quine's work, unlike that of Whorf, does not
require the addition of an account of what it is to be a
world. So, he is able to answer the question: What is it
to be a world? However, he thinks that there is just one
world, and it is the world of science. Moreover, he
desires to eradicate any element in his views that leaves
open the possibility of a multiplicity of worlds and
truths. He at least wants to make it difficult, if not
impossible, for anyone to use his views to argue that
there are many worlds and truths. So, he has no concern
for the questions: Why are there many worlds? and Why are
there many truths? 1 have argued that contrary to Quine's
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desires, an essential element of his ontological views
provides the foundation on which answers to these very
questions may be built. This foundation can be
extrapolated from his tacit acceptance of the ontological
inversion that is presupposed by Peirce's thesis, that
is, from the presupposition that reality is what all the
true representations represent. In turn, this
presupposition must be supplemented with an analysis of
the role of purposiveness in theory selection. However,
Quine's work only contains a hint of an explication of
the ontological status of a world. So, although Quine can
tell a very complicated story about what it is to be a
world, the issue of the ontological status of a world
does not explicitly arise for him, and so he does not
explicitly offer an answer to this question: What is the
ontological status of the plurality of actual worlds?
There is no reason why he should be able to offer such
answers, however, since he, like Whorf
,
had other
concerns
.
Quine's aim has been to give an account of science
from the perspective of science; my aim is to give an
account of the multiplicity of actual worlds. Everything
that exists, or might exist, from the perspective of
science is just one of many actual worlds, and so science
has no special place for me. As I noted above, I have not
read Quine in order to get him right. I have read him to
help myself understand my own ideas. My reading of Quine
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has been guided by the assumption that his views on the
plurality of scientific worlds could serve as a model for
articulating my views on the plurality of actual worlds.
Thus, like the work of Whorf
,
the work of Quine is
relevant to mine, but it does not do mine.
There are a number of reasons why Quine's work
does not do mine. First, Quine's ontological insight is
that what all the true representations represent is what
there is, but he presupposes that every representation is
a sentence. So, his ontological insight only has a very
narrow range of application, namely, to a world, or
worlds, that have a sentential structure. As I have
noted, I am working within the confines of this
presupposition, but it should also be noted that it keeps
a quite wide range of possibilities from sight. Second,
Quine can only imagine the world of science. He thinks
that whatever room there is for a plurality of worlds
lies in the space of science, and even then he thinks
that there is really no such room.
Third, Quine maintains that to be is, in short, to
be the value of a bound variable of a true theory, and
that since the practice of science determines which
theories are true, its practice determines what there is.
There is an important ambiguity here. On the one hand,
this only needs to mean that the practice of science
leads to the discovery of which theories are true, and to
the discovery of what there is independently of theory.
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In this case, to determine is to discover what is the
case independently of all actual and possible
rePreseritations
,
but this makes nonsense of the
ontological inversion that I have attempted to show lies
at the heart of Quine's central ontological insight. On
the other hand, Quine's claim can be taken to mean that
the practice of science is what makes true theories true,
and that this practice is what makes there be what there
is. In this case, to make seems to be to create from
nothing, but it is a truly monstrous thing to say that
the practice of science begins with nothing, and then
creates what there is. So, I must reject both readings of
this pivotal term: determination
,
but this raises the
important question of how it must be understood.
Fourth, Quine's way into the plurality of worlds
is through the premise that incompatible total theories
can account for all the possible evidence, and the
premise that such theories must, on empiricist grounds,
be true, and the premise that what there is is what there
must be in order for a true total theory to be true. The
aggregate of possible evidence is not ontologically
neutral, since part of what there is is what there must
be for all the possible evidence, which Quine assumes to
take a sentential form, to be true. In other words, the
incompatible total theories must share an empirical
ontology. So, Quine's views only support the thesis that
there are many actual worlds in a limited sense, namely,
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there can be different ontologies, but only theoretical
ontologies can differ, and empirical ontologies must be
had in common. Thus, Quine's views do not show us the way
to an account of the multiplicity of non-overlapping
actual worlds.
Fifth, Quine's ontological insight presupposes an
inversion, namely, that a world is everything that there
must be in order for all the true representations to be
true. As far as I can determine, he does not make this
inversion explicit, and so he leaves open the question of
why one should accept it. In other words, why invert?
Sixth, Quine does not answer the question about how there
can be many disparate manifolds of true representations.
I have argued that there is a hint of an answer in his
work, but that it must be extrapolation from an single
remark that may only have the status of an aside. In
short, there are many disparate manifolds of true
representations because there are many purposes. Seventh,
consequently, Quine does not take purposiveness seriously
enough, and as I have noted, the premise that
representation producing beings are purposive beings will
be essential to my argument that there are many actual
worlds
.
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CHAPTER 3
MOTIVATIONS: GOODMAN AND PUTNAM
Whorf s work only contains an implicit account of
the multiplicity of worlds and truths. One can cull from
Quine's work a more or less explicit account of these
multiplicities, but he would assert that there is just
the one world and the one truth of natural science.
Neither Whorf, nor Quine explains (1) why there are many
actual worlds, (2) why there are many truths, and ( 3 ) why
the aforementioned ontological inversion ought to be
embraced, which is, I think, among the most puzzling
things to be explained. So, they have not done what I
want to do, but I have only sought to elucidate these
themes by showing how I see them developed, or able to be
developed, in their work. In pursuit of their further
elucidation, I will now draw on the work of Nelson
Goodman. More specifically, I will attempt to elucidate
these three themes by exploring three aspects of
Goodman's metaphysical vision. I will begin with an
examination of what I take to be Goodman's answer to the
question: Why embrace the aforementioned ontological
shift?
According to Quine, to be is to be the value of a
bound variable. This thesis requires a reconception that
amounts to a fundamental ontological shift, a Copernican
revolution. Quine's thesis presupposes, however, that the
idea that there is just one representation-independent
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world must be supplanted by the idea that a world is
everything that there must be in order for all the true
representations to be true. In other words, his thesis
presupposes the renunciation of metaphysical realism, and
the appropriation of something like the thesis that a
world is an ideal sum of what can be represented by a
manifold of true
,
or right
, representations
.
As far as I
can ascertain, he neither makes this ontological shift
explicit, nor does he say why it should be embraced.
Moreover, the same can be said about Whorf. Since this is
a pivotal premise in my argument for a plurality of
actual worlds, not to mention an essential element of my
response to Davidson's critique of conceptual relativism,
it behooves the present writer to answer questions such
as the following. Why should the former idea be rejected?
Moreover, what could possibly compel the latter ? In
short, why shift?
Part of Goodman's importance is that he provides
us with both a proof that a shift is necessary, and a
fuller articulation of the terminus ad quern of such a
shift. The terminus a quo is, of course, the thesis that
there is a unique world, and neither its existence, nor
the way it is depends on the way it is represented. Given
this, a world cannot be an ideal sum of what is
representable by a manifold of right or true
representations. If the world were such a sum, both the
existence of the world, and the way of the world would
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then depend on the way it is represented, which on the
hypothesis of metaphysical realism, it doesn't. It is, I
think, instructive to interpret Goodman's proof in terms
of a strategy that may have been first advanced by Kant.
In a 1798 letter to Christian Garve, Kant wrote that
...the antinomy of pure reason [for example, pure reason
shows both that there must be a first moment, and that
there cannot be a first moment]— is what first aroused
me from my dogmatic slumber [which includes
transcendental or metaphysical realism]...." 1 There is a
discernible and definite strategy here: since realism,
metaphysical or transcendental, is an essential premise
in an antinomy, and since antinomies are intolerable, the
only alternative is to give up the relevant version of
realism, and to adopt a version of the ontological shift
that is now at issue. Mutatis mutandis
,
Goodman argues
that since the realist thesis is an essential element of
an enigma, which is as intolerable as any antinomy, the
above described ontological shift must be embraced. The
pivotal question is: What is this enigma?
There are statements that can both be false, but
cannot both be true, for example, (1) Socrates always
flies, and (2) Socrates never flies. Such statements are
entitled contraries. Now, true statements can sometimes
1 Immanuel Kant, Kant: Philosophical Correspondence,
1759-1799
,
edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1967) p. 252.
Parenthetic remarks are due to me.
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appear to be contraries. For example, ( 3 ) the sun always
moves, and (4) the sun never moves are both true, and yet
they appear to be contraries. It is important to note
that Goodman ' s enigma is not that there are true
contraries; it isn't that there are contraries that are
both true. It is also important to note that our reason
for saying that (3) and (4) are both true is closely
connected to, if not the same as, our reason for saying
that they are not contraries. Our reason for saying that
(3) and (4) are true is that they are elliptical for two
much more complex statements, namely, (5) there is a
frame of reference under which the sun always moves, and
(6) there is another frame of reference under which the
sun never moves, which are, given sufficient
qualification, both true. Furthermore, our reason for
saying that (3) and (4) are not contraries is that (5)
and (6) are not contraries. In this case, our
sophistication about frames of reference keeps us safe
from the enigma of true contraries. According to Goodman,
however, we are hoist by this very sophistication.
A frame of reference is a set of axes in terms of
which the position or the motion of an object can be
described; as Goodman writes, "...frames of reference are
just coordinate systems within which spatial relations
are mathematically represented." 2 Goodman's enigma rests
2 Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, Reconceptions in
Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Hackett
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on what he takes to be two fundamental truths about
frames of reference. The first truth is, as Goodman
writes, that "...nothing is at rest or is in motion apart
from a frame of reference » 3 I will take it as obvious
that apart from all frames of reference, there is no
position, motion or rest. The second truth is, as Goodman
writes, that: "Frames of reference ... seem to belong less
to what is described than to systems of description...." 4
This is not obvious. The idea is that although a frame of
reference is an essential element of some systems for
describing objects, it is neither an object among the
objects that may be described with the assistance of such
a system, nor does it characterize any such objects. In
less perspicuous words, although words that may have at
least once seemed clearer to my readers, a frame of
reference is empirically real and transcendentally ideal.
Be this as it may: not only can a frame of reference be
used to describe the spatial and temporal features of
objects; a frame of reference must be used to so describe
objects. Moreover, although a frame of reference must be
used to describe the spatial and temporal features of
objects, a frame of reference does not itself describe
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1988) p. 50. Hereafter:
RP.
3 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett Publishing
Company, Indianapolis (1978) p. 12. Hereafter: WW.
4 WW, p. 2.
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any object, in other words, a frame of reference is a
necessary condition for the representation of rest or
motion, and perhaps the representation of any possible
object, but a frame of reference is not itself a
representation of any object, or any relation among
objects. The latter part of this is not obvious. Why
doesn't a frame of reference represent some object or
objects? or some relation among objects? These are quite
complex questions, and they are questions over which I
shall not here worry, but the answer is, I think, that if
some frame of reference were somehow a part of the world
as i s i n itself, then there would be, for example, an
up and down to this world, which, as a matter of
empirical fact
,
there isn't. In any case, Goodman
articulates his enigma by bringing these two truths
together with the reflection that the realist, as he
construes her, thinks that there must be a world as it is
in itself, that is, apart from all systems of
descriptions, and so there must be a world apart from all
frames of reference. Moreover, this sort of realist
thinks not only that there must be a world apart from all
frames of reference, but that there must also be a
framework-independent way that such a world is.
Kant has an apt image for all of this. 5 It is easy
to imagine that the objects reflected in a mirror have a
5 CRITIQUE, p. 533, A644=B672. Compare p. 300, A298=B354.
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reality behind its surface, a farside reality. This
illicitly presumed subsurface reality is the focus
imaginarius
,
which is exploited by the story of Alice.
The story of metaphysical realism exploits a similar
imaginary focus, and herein lies the enigma. The
metaphysical realist begins with a number of descriptions
of objects that depend on an egual number of frames of
reference. Then she imagines or supposes that these
objects have a reality that is independent of these
frames. The point of the image is that this supposedly
framework independent reality is no more legitimate than
the focus imaginarius
. To see how this image or
supposition breaks down, let us submit to it, and let us
acquiesce in the thesis that there is a world apart from
all frames of reference. If there is such a world, then
there must be, according to the realist as construed by
Goodman, a framework-independent way that it is, but this
invites an obvious question: What is this way?
Goodman asks a remarkably simple question:
If I ask about the world, you can offer to
tell me how it is under one or more frames
of reference; but if I insist that you
tell me how it is apart from all frames,
what can you say? 6
The answer to this clearly rhetorical question is that
one can say nothing. Now, it is exactly here that
Goodman's truths about frames of reference become
6 WW, pp. 2-3.
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relevant. There is, apart from all frames of reference,
neither motion nor rest. Apart from all frames of
reference, events are neither simultaneous nor
successive, and so apart from all such frames, there is
neither simultaneity nor succession. Moreover, although a
frame of reference is an essential part of a system of
description, it is not a part of what is thereby
described. With respect to these kinds of spatial and
temporal relations, therefore, apart from all frames of
reference, there is no way that the world is. Goodman's
enigma can be made clearer in the light of a certain
contrast with the Parmenidean dictum that "...you could
not know what is not — that cannot be done — nor indicate
it." 7 The relevant point is not that one cannot indicate
what is not, instead it is that what one cannot indicate
is not. The intuition that underlies Goodman's enigma,
which constitutes its suppressed premise, is that where
nothing can be said
,
there is nothing. In other words,
where one can say nothing, there is nothing to say, and
so there is nothing. Or, equivalently, where there is
something, something can be said, which should not be
confused with the thesis that wherever there is something
to say, there is something. According to Goodman, the
intolerable enigma is that if there are objects apart
7 G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic
Philosophers, second edition, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1983) p. 245.
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from all frames of reference, then there is nothing to
say about them - that is, there is, in abstraction from
all frames of reference (and note again that the
realist's supposition is exactly that there is a world
apart from all such frames) nothing to say about objects
with respect to rest and motion - and so there are no
such objects. Therefore, given Goodman's suppressed
premise, there are no objects apart from all frames of
reference. In short, if there are objects apart from all
frames of reference, there are no objects apart from all
frames of reference. This is an enigma, if anything is.
Goodman's enigma can also be expressed in the
following manner. Reflexion on what it is to be a frame
of reference should make it clear that (1) there is,
apart from all frames of reference, neither motion or
rest, and (2) although a frame of reference may be an
essential element of any system that can represent the
spatial and temporal relations of things, no frame of
reference is a thing - that is, object, property of an
object, or relation among objects, et cetera - in the
world as it is in itself. Now, the realist, as construed
by Goodman, maintains that apart from all systems of
representation, and so apart from all frames of
reference, there is not only a world, but there is a way
that this world is. Goodman asks: if there is, apart from
all systems of description, and so all frames of
reference, both a world, and a way that this world is,
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rest and motion? if
then what is this way with respect to
there are no frames of reference in the world as it is in
itself, and there is neither rest nor motion where there
are no frames of reference, then there is, with respect
to rest and motion, no way that the world in itself is.
Thus, the realist thesis that there is, apart from all
frames of reference, both a world and a way that it is,
and a pair of general truths about frames of reference,
together lead to the enigma that there is such a way, but
there can't be such a way. Now, just as Kant didn't think
that he had established an antinomy, Goodman does not
think that he has established this enigma. It needs
resolution. Moreover, just as Kant thought that the only
way to resolve his antinomies, not to mention escape
skepticism, is to reject realism, Goodman thinks that the
only way to resolve his enigma is to reject the realist
thesis upon which it is based.
Goodman's point has been well illustrated in a
sphere outside that of physics, namely, that of
economics. Richard D. Wolff and Stephen A. Resnick tell
us, in their Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical, that
under the framework of neoclassical economic theory,
there is a panoply of entities: individuals, markets,
commodities, technologies, prices, money, income,
savings, investments, individual preferences, utility,
supply, demand, production, distribution, labor, capital,
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growth, GNP, interest rates, uncertainty, and so on. 8
They write that:
For neoclassical economists, society isthe collection of individuals in it.
Individual wants, thoughts, and deeds
combine to make society what it is. To
understand an economy is then to make
sense of the aggregate effects of
individual wants and acts. Neoclassical
theory does this by demonstrating howindividuals maximize their material self-interests by utilizing their owned
resources and the available technology in
market transactions
.
9
They also tell us that under the framework of Marxian
economic theory, there is an equally impressive array of
different entities: class, surplus, capital, labor, labor
power, commodities, values, production and distribution,
accumulation of capital, crises, imperialism, et cetera.
They write that "...Marxian theory ...will presume that
any event occurs as the result... of everything else going
on around that event and preceding that event. Be this
as it may, Wolff and Resnick note that:
This partial and preliminary listing
underscores a remarkable difference in the
neoclassical and Marxian theories.
Notwithstanding the considerable overlap
in the words and phrases that appear in
both theories, basic objects on one theory
exist as secondary objects or are
altogether absent in the other. Self-
interest-maximizing individuals are as
8 Richard D. Wolff and Stephen A. Resnick, Economics:
Marxian versus Neoclassical, The Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore (1987). Hereafter: EMVN.
9 EMVN, p. 15. The emphases are due to me.
10 EMVN, p. 19.
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scarce in Marxian theory as surplus laboris in neoclassical theory Class
exploitation is a key object for Marxiantheory, while most neoclassicals woulddeny its existence; likewise, the self-interest-maximizing individual as
specified in neoclassical theory would be
rejected as an imaginary creation by most
Marxists. 11
At this point, Goodman can be paraphrased: if I ask about
the economic world, you can offer to tell me how it is
under the neoclassical and Marxian frames of reference;
1;f I insist that you tell me how the economic world
is apart from all such frames, what can you say?
Goodman's answer can be repeated: one can say nothing.
The same intuitions are relevant: where one can say
nothing, there is nothing to say, and so there is
nothing. Thus, the economic world in itself is nothing.
This is exactly the conclusion that Wolff and Resnick
reach: "...objects in and for one theory may literally
not exist in another Objects of theories do not exist
out there in the world just waiting for theories to
observe [sic] and explain them." 12
Once again, note that Goodman does not believe
that he has established an enigma. Its point is similar
to the point of Kant's antinomies, to wit, realism must
be rejected, that is, it is necessary to reject the
assumption that there is, apart from all frames of
11 EMVN, pp. 17-18.
12 EMVN, pp. 17-18. Note that theories do not observe;
people observe.
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reference, both a world and a way that it is. 13 Goodman
concludes that:
We are confined to ways of describing
whatever is described. Our universe, so to
speak, consists of these ways rather than
of a world or of worlds. 3- 4
The world posited by metaphysical realism is, therefore,
nothing, and so it is necessary to shift to another
conception of what it is to be a world. Goodman's
argument moves quickly, perhaps too quickly. It assumes
many things, for example, it assumes that one may
generalize from a thesis about frames of reference, that
is, just one of many systems of description, to a thesis
about all systems of description - including conceptual
schemes - but it is not clear what justifies this.
Moreover, it isn't clear what justifies Goodman's
implicit assumption that if there is, apart from all
frames of reference, nothing to say about the motion or
rest of objects, then there is nothing at all to say
about these objects. There are many problems here, but
before I attend to them, I will discuss the second of the
13 There is an formal difference between a Kantian
antinomy and Goodman's enigma. Let R be the thesis of
realism, transcendental or metaphysical. In the case of
the Kantian antinomy, then, there is statement, S, which
is such that (1) if S and R, then not-S, and (2) if not-S
and R, then S. Kant resolves an antinomy by rejecting R,
whatever its specifics may be. Now, let F be Goodman's
pair of truths about frames of reference. In the case of
Goodman's enigma, it seems that: if R and F, then not-R.
Holding F constant, Goodman's conclusion is: not-R.
14 WW, p. 3.
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three facets of Goodman's vision, which corresponds to
the second of my three questions. Even if Goodman has
given us a good reason to embrace the already discussed
ontological inversion, why should it be thought that
there is more than one actual world?
Even if the idea of a unique world in itself is
intolerably enigmatic, it may be that the plurality of
true or correct frame of reference dependent descriptions
may all be transformable, or translatable, into one
another. If so, there may be just one world, namely,
whatever it is that is described by all
intertransformable or intertranslatable true
descriptions. If all the true framework relative
descriptions were translatable into one another, the
unique world might be defined as everything that is
described by them, that is, if there is anything that is
described by them. As Goodman himself puts this
possibility
:
We might... take the real world to be that
of ...groups of them [i.e., alternative
right versions] bound together by some
principle of reducibility or
translatabi lity . .
.
Or, in other words:
...we may say... two versions deal with the
same facts if we mean by this that they
not only speak of the same objects but are
also routinely translatable each into the
other. As meanings vanish in favor of
certain relationships among terms, so
15 WW, p. 20.
9 1
vanish in favor of contain
relationships among versions. 16
More generally, if all the correct representations were
transformable into one another, the world might be
defined as everything that is represented by such
representations. Why, then, think that there are many
actual worlds?
Goodman considers the example of the apparently
conflicting descriptions of the sun's motion to be
uninteresting, because they are easily transformable or
translatable into one another, and this makes it seem
that they are all somehow representations of the same
thing, that is, the same world. He writes:
The alternative descriptions of motion,
all of them in much the same terms and
routinely transformable into one another,
provide only a minor and rather pallid
example of diversity in accounts of the
world
.
17
Moreover, Goodman provides this warning:
If we are tempted to say that 'both are
versions of the same facts', this must no
more be taken to imply that there are
independent facts of which both are
versions than likeness of meaning between
two terms implies that there are some
entities called meanings. 18
Is it even possible for there to be a method that can
transform any correct representation into any other
apparently opposing yet also correct representation? Of
16 WW, p- 93 .
17 ww, p- 3 .
18 WW, p- 93 .
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any method that appeared to be so capable, it would be
necessary to ask: how much opposition could such a method
transform, if such a method could transform opposition ? 19
It is instructive to recall Quine's alleged method for
together incompatible yet empirically eguivalent
and complete theories. Goodman must answer the following
sorts of questions. Does the set of right representations
represent one and only one world? Can the set of right
representations be put together in such a way that they
represent just one world? According to Goodman, they do
not
,
and they cannot
.
Here, Goodman offers two arguments. The first
assumes the form of an invitation to make a number of
comparisons. In essence, he asks us to compare the
scientific pictures of the world, the moral or political
pictures of the world, and the many aesthetic pictures of
the world. According to Goodman, if one looks, one should
see that although all of these pictures are true or
right, they cannot be put together in a way that results
in a composite picture of one world. Moreover, there is
no picture to which all the others can be reduced;
Goodman asks, perhaps rhetorically, "How do you go about
reducing Constable's or James Joyce's world-view to
19 In a radically different idiom, if there were a
dialectic that appeared able to sublate all opposing
framework relative representations, then it would be
necessary to ask: how much opposition could the dialectic
sublate, if the dialectic could sublate opposition?
93
physics?" 20 I think that Goodman would say that a similar
point applies to neoclassical economic theory and Marxian
economic theory as described by Wolff and Resnick; not
only is it impossible to put these economic pictures
together in a way that results in a composite picture of
one economic world, but neither can be reduced to the
other
.
Much more striking [than the alternative
descriptions of motion considered above]
is the vast variety of versions and
visions in the several sciences, in the
works of different painters and writers,
and in our perceptions as informed by
these, by circumstances, and by our own
insights, interests, and past experiences.
Even with all illusory or wrong or dubious
versions dropped, the rest exhibit new
dimensions of disparity. Here we have no
neat set of frames of reference, no ready
rules for transforming physics, biology,
and psychology into one another, and no
way of transforming any of these into Van
Gogh's vision, or Van Gogh's into
Canaletto's
.
2 ^
The obvious question is why not simply link the manifold
of versions, visions, works, and perceptions? and say
that what they represent is the one and only world?
Goodman answers
:
Such of these versions as are depictions
rather than descriptions have no truth-
value in the literal sense, and cannot be
combined by conjunction. The difference
between juxtaposing and conjoining two
statements has no evident analogue for two
20 WW, p. 5.
21 WW, p. 3. The parenthetic remark is due to me.
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pictures or for a picture and a
Nothing can serve as the linking mechani
element of the manifold of right or true
sm whereby every
representations
can be put together. Juxtaposition would leave out
statements, and conjunction would omit pictures. So, the
manifold of representations cannot be put together in a
way that results in one composite representation of one
Goodman's second argument is based on a well known
strategy for resolving apparent inconsistencies. Bill is
the cat and Bill is not the cat are, for example,
consistent, if the former Bill and the latter Bill do not
refer to the same entity. More generally, what appear to
be inconsistent statements can be shown to be consistent
by establishing that certain terms refer to different
objects. As Goodman writes, "...contradiction [or:
inconsistency] is avoided by segregation." 23 He thinks,
moreover
,
that such a strategy supports the conclusion
that "...conflicting statements, if true, are true in
different worlds." 24 Goodman's task is to show how this
strategy supports this conclusion. The first step
involves the example discussed above: the sun always
22 WW, p. 3.
23 Nelson Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge (1984) p. 31. The parenthetic
addition is due to me. Hereafter: OMOM.
24 RP, p. 50
world.
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moves and the sun never moves. Although these statements
appear to be contraries, both are true. There can't be
true contraries, however. So, the appearance of true
contraries must be dispelled , 25 Such dispelling reveals
the connection between the strategy and the conclusion.
One solution is that apparently contrary
stateinents belong to different accounts. The idea is that
according to one account, the sun always moves, and
according to another account, the sun never moves. This
solution does not work, however. There is little, if any,
difference between these statements and the statements
that generated the puzzle in the first place. Another
solution is to relativize the relevant statements to
different frames of reference. The idea here is that
relative to one frame of reference, the sun always moves,
and relative to another frame of reference, the sun never
moves. However, this solution also doesn't work. Frames
of reference are, as Goodman thinks of them, coordinate
systems with which spatial and temporal relations can be
mathematically represented. True yet contrary
mathematical representations are as much of a problem as
the apparently true yet contrary statements with which
the present puzzle began. Goodman's solution is that such
conflicting statements, if true, are true in different
worlds. If Goodman's solution works, so to speak, there
25 Compare RP, p. 50.
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are many worlds, but what motivates his solution? Behind
this solution stands the intuitive force of the well know
strategy for resolving apparent inconsistencies described
above. If the sun always moves and the sun never moves
are contrary yet true descriptions of the same world, the
conflict is neither mitigated nor dispelled. As Goodman
notes: "The apparent conflict between true descriptions
shows that they are not descriptions of the same
thing." 26 Therefore: "The earth that is truly described
as in motion is not the earth that is truly described as
at rest." 27 Thus, there are many actual worlds.
Goodman concludes that since a world is what is
represented by a manifold of true representations, and
the different manifolds of true representations cannot be
put together in a way that results in a composite
representation of just one world, there are many worlds.
He writes, "...the multiple worlds of conflicting true
versions are actual worlds.... if there is any actual
world, there are many." 28 Since a world is what answers
to a true, or correct version, and there are many such
versions, indeed the purpose of much of Goodman's work is
to lay out the ways in which many true versions can be
made, there are many actual worlds.
26 RP, p. 51.
27 RP, p. 51.
28 OMOM, p. 31.
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This would seem to bring us to the third facet of
Goodman's metaphysical vision, and the third of my
questions: how can there be many truths? Unlike
Protagoras and Whorf
,
however, Goodman does not first
argue that there are many worlds, and then turn to the
task of showing that each world has a complete and true
description, that is, there are many truths. For Goodman,
as for Quine, or at least as I have construed their
words, there are many worlds because there are many
truths. So, in discussing Goodman's metaphysical vision,
one cannot begin by focusing exclusively on the issues of
the quiddity and plurality of worlds, and then to turn to
the issue of the plurality of truths. What it is to be a
world, the plurality of worlds, and the plurality of
truths are, for Goodman, three closely related issues,
but the plurality of truths is not a consequence of his
account of the quiddity and plurality of worlds. It
should be clear that Goodman maintains that the opposite
is the case: there are many actual worlds because there
are many truths.
None of this entails that Goodman rejects the
correspondence theory of truth, or the image that I have
called the string theory of truth. As I understand
Goodman, he is an advocate of this formalism, but he
rejects, with Quine, one assessment of the priority of
its elements. Formalism aside, Fido is a dog is true if
and only if the object tied to Fido is an element of the
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set tied to is a dog. Clearly, then, truth can be
defined, if objects, sets, and string constituted
relations are taken as primitive. However, Goodman's move
is to take truth as primitive, and to define the
collections of objects that make up the ontologies of the
manifold of actual worlds. Crudely put, on the one hand,
reality and correspondence can be taken as primitive, and
a true sentence can be defined as a sentence that
corresponds to reality; on the other hand, truth and
correspondence can be taken as primitive, and reality can
be defined as that to which all the true sentences
correspond. Thus, in addition to his acceptance and
defense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds,
Goodman also seems willing to endorse a notion of truth
that is quite similar to that outlined in the preceding.
He affirms that:
...the familiar dictum "'Snow is white' is
true if and only if snow is white" must be
revised to something like "'Snow is white'
is true in a given world if and only if
snow is white in that world".... 29
O Q ,WW, p. 120. Does Goodman's critique of worldmaking
presuppose the ontology of sets and sets of sets that
Tarski's account of truth presupposes? It is tempting to
take Goodman to be asserting that truth is primary, and
that the objects, the sets and sets of sets, which make
up the ontologies of the manifold of actual worlds, are
derivative. Goodman is, however, a nominalist. He
believes that there are only individuals, and that a well
made world is such that if there are k basic entities, or
atoms, there are at most 2k-l entities that can be
constructed from them. The principal nominalist principle
is that "...if we start from any two distinct entities
and break each of them down as far as we like (by taking
parts, parts of parts, and so on), we always arrive at
some original entity that is contained in one but not the
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,
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t WI ' P. 161.] Ontologiesthat violate this principle are not well made, and so theontology of sets and sets of sets, which is clearlypresupposed by Tarski's account of truth, is not well
made. It is important to note that it is not that setsper se are bad, instead it is sets of sets that are the
source of trouble. Goodman writes: "One may use the sign
e and speak of classes and yet have a nominalistic
system if severe restrictions upon the admitted classes
are observed." [WI, p. 171.] The aforementioned trouble
arises because of the possibility, which nominalism rules
out, of there being different entities that are composed
of the same entities. For example, imagine an ontology
according to which there are four atoms: a, b, c, and d.
And, imagine that there are two sets, K and L. Let
K= { { a , b } , { c , d } } and let L={ {a,c}
,
{b,d} }
.
According to
standard set theoretic principles, K and L are two
things. Since K and L are composed on the same atoms,
they should not, on nominalist scruples, count as two,
and so any ontology according to which they do count as
two is a defective ontology. This could be a reason to
doubting the veracity of Tarski's account of truth.
Putting this issue aside, however, Goodman's critique of
worldmaking should not depend on an account of truth that
presupposes an ontology that is, by its own standards,
badly made. Moreover, if Goodman's critique of
worldmaking is, in some manner, committed to the ontology
of Tarski's conception of truth, it cannot provide an
impartial analysis of an actual world where this ontology
doesn't obtain. Goodman's critique of worldmaking would
then seem to be incapable of accounting for the
nominalist ontologies that he himself favors. If,
however, that Goodman's critique of worldmaking
presupposes his form of nominalism, platonistic
ontologies would then be badly made. So, if Goodman's
account of worldmaking presupposes either nominalism or
platonism, one or the other will be ruled out, in a less
than fair manner, as ill made, and so it will be
incapable of accounting for worlds that are clearly
actual. Thus, an analysis of worldmaking that presupposes
Goodman's nominalism rules out platonistic ontologies on
the ground that they contain too many entities, and an
analysis of worldmaking that presupposes platonism rules
out nominalist ontologies on the ground that they contain
too few entities. This is, I think, why Goodman writes:
"...in this general discussion of worldmaking I do not
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If there are many actual worlds, and there is one total
truth for each world, then Goodman would seem to have
provided an account of how there can be many total
truths. However, for Goodman, since a world is what
answers to a manifold of true or right representations,
and there are many such manifolds, the plurality of
truths is a premise, not a conclusion.
As with the work of Whorf and Quine, Goodman's
work is neither irrelevant to mine, nor does it do mine.
It provides moral support for those of us who think
monstrous thoughts about pluralities of actual worlds,
but there are a number of reasons why his work does not
do mine. First, there seems to be an irresolvable
ambiguity in the midst of Goodman's metaphysical vision.
In his The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman, Israel Scheffler
points out that in Goodman's work, there are two
impose nominalistic restrictions, for I want to allow for
some difference of opinion as to what actual worlds there
are." [WW, p. 95.] Goodman's critique of worldmaking must
not presuppose nominalism, since this would beg the
question against platonism; and it must not presuppose
the platonism that is presupposed by Tarski's account of
truth. So, Goodman's investigation of worldmaking should
not invoke Tarski here or anywhere. And, so, one should
resist the temptation to write that Goodman thinks that
truth is primary, and that the objects, the sets and the
sets of sets, et cetera, which constitute the ontologies
of the manifold of actual worlds, are derivative. One
should say that Goodman thinks that: truth is primary,
and that ontology - of whatever strain, nominalist or
platonist — is derivative. If Goodman can't invoke
Tarski, however, how are we to understand his use of
true? Moreover, how are we to understand his invocation
of Tarski's T sentences ? These sorts of questions fall
far beyond the scope of this essay, and so I will bracket
them here.
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conflicting interpretations of the word world. On the one
hand, there is a versional interpretation. Here, a world
is, in Schef f ler ' s words, "...a true (or right) world-
version...." 30 Goodman seems to have the versional
interpretation in mind, when he asks "(i)n what sense
are... there many worlds?" and he answers that "...many
different world versions are of independent interest and
importance.—
"
31 Moreover, he also seems to have the
versional interpretation in mind, when he writes that
"...the world [is] displaced by worlds that are but
versions...." 32 Here, the pivotal idea is that a world
should be equated with an ideally completable and true
description. This very formulation leaves open, however,
the possibility that there is some sphere or domain of
objects that such a description might fail to get right,
and this brings one to the second possible interpretation
of the word world. So, there is, on the other hand, an
objectual interpretation. In Schef f ler 's words, a world
is "...a realm of things (versions or non-versions)
referred to or described by...
a
right world-version. 1,33
Goodman seems to have the objectual interpretation in
mind, when he writes that "(t)he multiple worlds I
30 Israel Schef f ler, The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman,
Synthese, vol. 45 (1980) p. 201. Hereafter: WWG.
31 WW, p. 4
.
32 WW, p. 7. The parenthetic addition is due to me.
33 WWG, p. 201.
102
countenance are just the actual worlds made by and
answering to true or right versions." 34 Scheffler's
distinction makes it seem that worlds are one thing, and
versions are another. Perhaps it should be said that this
makes it seem that worlds are concatenations of things,
and versions are not, but I will prescind from this issue
here
.
With Scheffler's distinction in hand, a realist
might object to Goodman's metaphysical vision on the
grounds that it is ambiguous between (1) there are many
true versions
,
and (2) there are, in the above described
ob jectual sense, many worlds. Such a realist might
reluctantly accept the first thesis, and adamantly reject
the second thesis on the grounds that it is simply
confused. If so, the metaphysical realist is then
obligated to say exactly what the confusion is. What
could her explanation be except a reiteration of the
claim that there is the world, there are our
representations, the world is independent of our
representations, and so the world and our representations
are distinct? In other words, to what could such an
explanation amount, if not a reiteration of the
distinction between the objectual and the versional
interpretations of the word world? This is, I think,
insufficient
.
34 WW, p. 94.
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Someone who has embraced the aforementioned
ontological shift, that is, who thinks that the limit of
the world and the limits of representation somehow
coincide, that is, who thinks that to be is to be
representable, would not, or should not, accept
Schef f ler ' s distinction. Goodman acknowledges that:
...a right version and its world aredifferent. A version saying that there is
a star up there is not itself bright orfar off, and the star is not made up ofletters
.
35
However, he would add that:
...saying that there is a star up there
and saying that the statement 'There is a
star up there ' is true amount, trivially,
to much the same thing, even though the
one seems to talk about the star and the
other to talk about a statement. What is
more important, we cannot find any world-
feature independent of all versions.
Whatever can be said truly of a world is
dependent on the saying - not that
whatever we say is true but that whatever
we say truly (or otherwise present
rightly) is nevertheless informed by and
relative to the language or other symbol
system we use. 36
To what, then, does the distinction between the objectual
and the versional interpretations of the word world
amount? Goodman does not offer a clear answer to this
question, but he suggests that this is entirely
illegitimate: "No firm line can be drawn between world-
35 Nelson Goodman, On Starmaking
,
Synthese, vol . 45
(1980), p. 212. Hereafter: OS.
36 OS, p. 212.
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features that are discourse dependent and those that are
not
.
1,37
This last point is closely related to a second
deficiency in Goodman's metaphysical vision, namely,
there is the highly dubious character of Goodman's
premise: where nothing can be said, there is nothing, it
should be noted that Goodman is neither alone, nor should
his premise seem so alien as to also seem plainly
wrongheaded. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
,
Ludwig Wittgenstein similarly affirmed that "(t)he limits
of my language mean the limits of my world." 38 Although
he opposed this premise, in his The View from Nowhere,
and in a somewhat different idiom, Thomas Nagel has more
recently written:
. . .what there is is what we can think
about or conceive of... the idea of
something that we could not think about or
conceive of makes no sense. 39
Within the framework of metaphysical realism, however,
Goodman's premise is, irrespective of idiom, plainly
wrong. If the world is a world of representation-
independent objects, it is possible for there to be
something that cannot be represented. As Nagel writes:
What there is and what we, in virtue of
our nature, can think about are different
37 OS, p. 212.
38 TLP, p. 115, section 5.6.
39 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford University
Press, New York (1986) p. 90. Hereafter: TVFN
.
105
things, and the latter may be smaller thanthe former.
In other words, if there is a world of representation-
independent objects, it is possible for there to be
something about which nothing can be said. This vitiates
Goodman ' s argument for adopting the ontological shift
discusses above.
If what there is is some sort of ideal sum of what
can be represented by the manifold of true, or right,
representations, then Goodman's premise is far more
plausible, if not obviously right. If the sphere of what
there is and the sphere of what can be represented by
some manifold of right or true representations are co-
extensive, then it is trivially true that where no
representation can be produced
,
there is nothing. Recall
the point of Goodman's argument: he wants to motivate the
above described ontological inversion, which seems to be
a pivotal premise in the argument that there are many
actual worlds. Also recall that this ontological
inversion amounts to the thesis that the sphere of being
and the sphere of the rightly or truly representable are
identical. Moreover, recall that Goodman's strategy is to
argue that realism is intolerably enigmatic. His argument
presupposes this premise: where there is nothing to say,
there is nothing. This premise is totally unacceptable to
the realist, and it presupposes that the sphere of being
40 TVFN
,
p. 91.
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and the sphere of the representable are identical, so,
Goodman ' s argument is circular, in short, Goodman argues
that since realism is an enigma, the ontological
inversion must be accepted, but his argument for thinking
that realism is an enigma rests on the premise that where
nothing can be said
,
there is nothing, which only seems
acceptable in the context of the very ontological
inversion that Goodman seeks to motivate. This is
important, since the circularity of Goodman's argument
leaves unfulfilled the task of explaining why the
aforementioned ontological inversion ought to be
embraced, and without such an explanation, there is, I
think, little hope of explaining why there are a
plurality of actual worlds.
There is a third problem with Goodman's
metaphysical vision, which also concerns his defense of
this ontological shift. As I noted above, in his
argument, Goodman assumes that one may generalize from a
thesis about frames of reference, that is, just one of
many systems of description, to a thesis about all
systems of description, but it is not clear what
justifies this. Conceptual schemes are systems of
description, and if they are like frames of reference in
that they are not part of the world, then Goodman may
well be able to press the above described argument. But,
although it may be obvious that frames of reference are
not part of the world, it is not at all obvious that
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conceptual schemes are in no way a part of the world.
Moreover
,
recall that it is essential to metaphysical
realism that independently of both our actual
representations, and our capacity to represent, there is
an unique order of objects that possess various
properties, and that these properties are also
independent of both our actual representations and our
capacities to represent, in other words, there are
objects that are distinct by virtue of the properties
that they possess, or fail to possess, independently of
whatever lexicon of predicates we may happen to possess.
Indeed, as G.H. Merrill has pointed out:
...the world must be represented not
simply as a set, but as a set together
with a class of relations among the
members of that set. To describe the world
is to describe the entities (or kinds of
entities) in it and their relations to one
another .... it is this stronger position
that the realist traditionally r?l
holds 41
David Lewis has made a similar point:
...realism needs realism. That is: the
realism that recognizes a non-trivial
enterprise of discovering the truth about
the world [which is guaranteed by the
uniqueness and independence of the world,
which is a principal motivation for
accepting realism] needs the traditional
[?] realism that recognizes objective
sameness and difference, joints in the
G.H. Merrill, The Model-Theoretic Argument Against
Realism, Philosophy of Science, vol. 47 (1980) p. 72. The
parenthetic question mark is due to me.
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world, discriminatory
of our own making. 4 2
classifications not
So, since it is not clear whether the argument about
frames of reference can be legitimately extended to
include conceptual schemes, Goodman's argument may not
only move too quickly, but it may beg some important
questions
.
In the foregoing, I considered Goodman's proof for
adopting a certain ontological shift, and I noted that
his proof followed one of two strategies that were
advanced by Kant. Its basic idea was that since realism
is intolerably enigmatic, that is, an essential premise
in an antinomy, it is necessary to both reject it, and
shift to some version of antirealism or idealism, or even
irrealism, as Goodman entitles his position. 43 in short,
his proof didn't work, and so it is, within the context
of this work, still necessary to motivate this sort of
shift, not to mention the necessity of resolving the
myriad of other problems that have arisen up to this
point. In this section, I will investigate Hilary
Putnam's proof for the necessity of embracing this type
of shift, a proof which follows the second Kantian
strategy
.
42 David Lewis, Putnam's Paradox
,
Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, vol . 62 (1984) p. 228. The parenthetic
remarks are due to me.
43 WW, p. x.
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In his Prolegomena, Kant wrote that "...my
remembering David Hume [to wit: his skepticism] was the
very thing which many years ago first interrupted my
dogmatic slumber [to wit: his realism]...." 44 There is a
discernible and definite strategy here: the basic idea is
that since realism entails skepticism, and skepticism is
intolerable — as intolerable as any antinomy — we should
shift to some other metaphysical view. Be this as it may,
it must be acknowledged that realist intuitions have
great power. So, if one's objection to realism is that it
entails skepticism, one is obligated to establish this
entailment, and one is prima facie obligated to provide
an equally powerful case against skepticism. For Kant, it
seems that scepticism is merely intolerable, and if his
ontological or transcendental turn dispels it, he takes
his turn to be ipso facto justified. The justification of
transcendental idealism, and so the repudiation of
transcendental realism, comes, in part, with the latter's
mere association with scepticism. In his Reason, Truth
and History, Hilary Putnam objects to realism for a
similar reason. 45 Following, in its broadest outlines,
what I have described as the second Kantian strategy, he
44 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics
That Will Be Able To Come Forward As Science, translated
by Paul Carus, extensively revised by James W. Ellington,
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1977) p. 5. The
parenthetic remarks are due to me. Hereafter:
PROLEGOMENA
.
45 Compare RTH
,
chapter one.
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also argues that realism is refuted by virtue of its
association with scepticism, but he, unlike Kant, offers
us an ostensible refutation of scepticism. Now, I wish
that Putnam's argument were sound, but I think that it is
not. In this section, I will say what his argument is,
where he thinks it takes us, and I will explain why I
think it fails. In conclusion, I will explore the
prospects of reconstructing his argument in a way that
might lend support to the thesis that there are many
actual worlds and truths.
Let us be clear about the theses involved. Once
again, metaphysical realism, to use Putnam's idiom,
includes the thesis that there is just one actual world,
which consists of a multiplicity of representation
independent objects, and the way that the world is, or
the way that these objects are, is also representation
independent
.
46 This is essential. Additionally,
metaphysical realism includes the theses that there is
just one true and complete representation of this world,
and that truth is, more or less, a correspondence between
some representation and some segment of the world. As
Putnam understands it, metaphysical realism is, in short,
the view that:
46 I will ask my reader to disregard putative
counterexamples such as representations, which are both
part of the world, and yet not representation
independent. There is, after all, a way - into the nature
of which I shall not here inguire — in which
representations are representation dependent.
Ill
•••[ 1 ] the world consists of a fixedtotality of mind-independent objects
. .
.
r
2
1
there is exactly one true and completedescription of the way the world is ... [31truth involves some sort of
correspondence
. . .
,
47
To what alternative metaphysical picture does Putnam
think his argument takes us? Contrary to the realist
thesis that there is just one actual world that consists
of a multiplicity of representation independent objects,
after the shift, which Putnam's proof aims to motivate,
"...what objects does the world consist of? is a question
that only makes sense to ask within a theory or
description ." 48 Putnam illustrates this with an example
drawn from mereology - the axiomatic analysis of the
whole-part relation . 49 Suppose that there are three
objects: x^, x 2 , and X 3 . He asks: how many objects are
there? The answer appears obvious: there are three.
However, suppose that for any two objects, there is a
third object that is their mereological sum. Given this
47 DIR, p. 30. The parenthetic enumerations are due to
me. Compare RTH
,
p. 49.
48 RTH, p. 49.
49 Compare Hilary Putnam, Truth and Convention: On
Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism
,
Dialectica
,
vol. 41 (1987) pp. 69-77. Hereafter: TC.
Compare Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism: The
Paul Carus Lectures, Open Court, LaSalle (1987) pp. 18-
20. For an introductory discussion of mereology, see
Henry S. Leonard and Nelson Goodman, The Calculus of
Individuals and Its Uses, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 5 (1940) pp. 45-55. In addition, see Nelson Goodman,
The Structure of Appearance, third edition, with an
introduction by Geoffrey Heilman, D. Reidel Publishing
Company, Boston (1977) pp. 33-40.
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mereological principle, if there is no null object, there
are then seven objects, to wit: ( 1 ) Xl , (2) x 2 , ( 3 ) x 3 ,
(4) x x + X 2 , (5) x-L + x 3 , (6) X 2 + X 3 , and (7) x 3 + x , +
X 3 . So, are there three objects or seven? Or, more
generally, what is there? Putnam maintains that the
answers to such questions are relative to either some
method of counting, or some theory or system of
description. According to metaphysical realism, there is
an independent something that gets counted differently,
but how may parts does this something have? This question
can only be answered in a way that is dependent on some
method of counting, and on either the answer of three or
seven, "...we have not a neutral description, but rather
a partisan description." 51 Putnam maintains, therefore,
that no theory or description independent answer can be
given to the question: what is there? Moreover, he denies
that there is just one true description of the world,
rather: "...there is more than one 'true' theory or
description of the world." 52 Along with this, he denies
that truth is correspondence, rather: " 'Truth' ... is some
sort of (idealized) rational acceptability...." 53
50 I will ignore such tacit presuppositions as: for all i
and j, + Xj = Xj + x^.
51 TC, pp. 70-71.
52 RTH
,
p. 49.
53 RTH, p. 49.
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Be this as it may, as I have noted, realist
intuitions are deeply entrenched, and so Putnam is
obligated to motivate this alternative. Once again, his
strategy is to argue that since metaphysical realism
entails scepticism, and scepticism is intolerable, so is
metaphysical realism. What is this scepticism? Why is it
so bad? Scepticism is, in this context, the thesis that
any non-tautologous representation could be false, even
an ideal representation. In other words, even a
representation that is consistent, maximally simple,
conservative, empirically adequate, and so on, could be
false. Given the foregoing explications, Putnam's claim
that metaphysical realism entails scepticism is
equivalent to the claim that if there is just one
representation independent actual world, and truth is,
more or less, the correspondence between some
representation and some segment of this unique world,
then any non-tautologous representation could be false,
even an ideal representation. Why should one think,
however, that metaphysical realism entails skepticism?
An essential part of metaphysical realism is that
the one and only actual world is representation
independent. As construed by the metaphysical realist,
representations constitute neither the being, nor the
quiddity of the world. Consequently, there is no
necessary connection between our representations and the
way the world is, even if the representation is ideal.
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SO' any ^presentation could fail to correctly represent
the way the world is, that is, any representation could
be false. This is even true of an ideal representation.
One way in which a representation, even if ideal, could
be false is this: every sentient being could be a brain
in a vat whose afferent and efferent nerve endings are
connected to a super computer that generates impulses
that make it seem to the bevatted brains that the world
is the way it seems to be to us who have presumed
ourselves to be unbevatted. This is a pantemporal claim:
every sentient being has been, is and will be such a
brain. This is, of course, a cybernetic version of
Cartesian scepticism. Another way in which an ideal
representation could be false is that there could be
"...an evil genius, as clever and deceitful as he is
powerful, who has directed his entire effort to
misleading me." 54 As Putnam only focuses on the former
possibility, so will I. in this case, our world picture,
even if it were refined to the point of being ideal,
would be mostly wrong. What if the result of refining our
present world picture were to include the proposition
that every sentient being is a bevatted brain? It might
not seem to us that this could be the result of refining
our world picture to the point at which it is ideal, but
S4 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy,
translated from the Latin by Donald A. Cress, Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis (1979) p. 16.
Hereafter: DESCARTES.
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we are entrenched. I will here ignore this sort of
problem, in any case, according to Putnam's scenario,
although we would think of ourselves as being justified
in believing that we possess pairs of hands, and that we
walk, we would have no hands, and we would not walk, it
would seem to us that we have hands, but these hands
would only be computer-generated images, or something of
this sort.
The above point merits reiteration. The realist
maintains that both the existence of the world, and the
way of the world are representation independent, it
follows that there is, at most, a contingent connection
between our representations and the existence or the
essence of the world. Although I may believe that I am
not a bevatted brain, given the contingency of the
relation between my representations and the being and way
of the world, I could be a bevatted brain. If our
representations constituted the way the world is, this
relation would be necessary, but realists adamantly
reject the thesis that our ideas either bring about the
being, or constitute the way of the world. In short,
metaphysical realism entails that we could all be brains
in vats. Or, metaphysical realism entails skepticism.
Putnam argues, however, that it is impossible for us all
to be brains in vats, and so metaphysical realism must be
rejected. How could Putnam possibly show that it can't be
that every sentient being is a bevatted brain? Doesn't it
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seem obvious that there is a possible world where every
sentient being is a brain in vat?
Putnam summarizes his argument in the following
manner
:
...if we are brains in a vat, then 'We arebrains in a vat' is false. So it is
(necessarily) false. 55
As Gary Iseminger has pointed out, this argument
resembles the consequentia mirabilis of the mediaevals
.
56
In other words, it seems to have this valid structure:
(i) if p, then not-p ; (ii) therefore: not-p. On this
reading of its structure, Putnam's argument seems to be
the following:
(1) If all sentient beings are brains in a
vat, some sentient being is not a brain in
a vat
.
(2) Therefore: some sentient being is not
a brain in a vat.
However, it is obvious from Putnam's
summary that his argument does not have
the form of the consequentia mirabilis .
His argument is this:
(3) If all sentient beings are brains in a
vat, then All sentient beings are brains
in a vat is false.
(4) Therefore: All sentient beings are
brains in a vat is necessarily false.
However, the problem with this argument is that it is
fallacious. From the premise that (i) if p, x is false,
it does not follow that (ii) x is necessarily false. Or,
55 RTH
,
p. 15. Compare RTH, p. 8.
56 Gary Iseminger, Putnam's Miraculous Argument
,
Analysis, vol. 48 (1988) p. 191, footnote 2.
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more precisely, this version of Putnam's argument has the
following invalid structure: (i) if p , x is faJse; (ii)
therefore: x is necessarily false. What, then, is to be
made of Putnam's argument?
It should be clear that Putnam desires to show
that it can't be that all sentient beings are bevatted
brains. As he sees things, if this were forthcoming, then
so would the refutation of one seemingly important
version of scepticism, and therewith would come the
refutation of metaphysical realism. It might seem evident
that only two things are needed for a valid argument that
yields the conclusion that Putnam desires: one, the
premise of the last argument considered above, namely
(3)
,
and two, the additional and trivial premise that: it
must be that if All sentient beings are bevatted brains
is false, some sentient being is not a bevatted brain. It
might also seem evident that this trivial premise is
justified by Tarski's semantic conception of truth, which
is itself trivial. If we add this seemingly trivial
premise to the premise of the last version of Putnam's
argument above, we get the following:
(A) It must be that if all sentient beings
are bevatted brains, All sentient beings
are bevatted brains is false. [?]
(B) It must be that if All sentient beings
are bevatted brains is false, some
sentient being is not a bevatted brain.
[ Tarski?
]
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(C) it must be that if all sentient beinqsare bevatted brains, some sentient beinqis not a bevatted brain. [A,B]
(D) some sentient being must not be abevatted brain. [C, consequentia
mirabilis
]
b '
Obviously, two questions may be asked about this
argument. First: why premise (A)? Second: why premise
(B)? in answering these questions, I shall argue for two
theses. One: the basic reason for (A) is ironically also
a reason why Putnam's bevatted brains scenario does not
depict a case in which most of our beliefs are false, in
fact, Putnam has unwittingly shown us that if we were
bevatted brains, most of our beliefs would be true. Two :
given the basic reason for (A), (B) is not a consequence
of Tarski's account of truth, and so the reason for (B)
rests on a mistake.
A key premise of Putnam's argument for (A) may be
entitled the causal theory of reference
. This is the
thesis that anyone who refers to an object must stand in
an appropriate causal relation with it. How are we to
render precise this notion of an appropriate causal
relation? As far as I can tell, no one has yet answered
57 Jane MacIntyre, Putnam's Brains, Analysis, vol . 44
(1984) pp. 59-61. This is essentially MacIntyre's
reconstruction. Hereafter: PB. Note that this version of
the argument employs a modalized version of the
consequentia mirabilis ; an argument whose premise has
this form: it must be that if p, then not-p, and whose
conclusion has this form: it must be that not-p, is
valid. This form of inference is justified by the
intuition that if a proposition of the form if p , then
not-p is true in all possible worlds, then a proposition
of the form not-p is also true in all possible worlds.
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this question. It's not that there is a fully developed
theory that shows that reference is a kind of causal
relation, and that specifies the nature of this relation.
It seems that the causal theory of reference is, at this
time, nothing more than a number of intuitions about the
general manner in which a congeries of philosophical
issues might be resolved. Michael Devitt is as ardent a
proponent of the causal theory of reference as anyone,
but he writes of it in terms of hope and optimism. 58
Within the context of Putnam's argument, however, the
causal theory of reference doesn't need to be any more
than this, and so this question does not need to be
answered. Our intuitive grasp of what such a theory would
have to be like is, I suppose, all that is required. All
that is needed is the intuition that reference is, or
rests on, a causal relation, and the intuition that
certain causal relations are, and others are not
sufficient for reference.
Premise (A) is a consequence of these intuitions.
A bevatted brain would not stand in the sorts of causal
relations with vats, brains, etc., that are required for
it to successfully refer to them. A bevatted brain would
58 Compare DEVITT, pp. 5, 27, 111, and 149. It must be
noted, however, that Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny have
attempted to more fully spell out the content of the
causal theory of reference. Compare their Language and
Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language,
The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1987). I will here bracket
their attempt.
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be causally related to the computer, the vat, the
nutrients, etc., but not in a way that is sufficient for
it to be able to refer to them. Similarly, if the
bevatted brains hypothesis is momentarily put aside, it
can be seen that although Karl may be causally related to
the oxygen that he breaths when he says Fido is a dog,
his words do not thereby refer to that oxygen. The
intuition is that the causal relations that a bevatted
brain would bear to the computer, vat, etc., would not be
sufficient for its representations, or sentences, to
refer to the computer, vat, etc.
Suppose, however, that the bevatted brains
prevailed in referring. To what then would they refer?
There are a number of options here. Putnam writes that:
...when the brain in a vat (in the world
where every sentient being is and always
was a brain in a vat) thinks [or: says?]
'There is a tree in front of me', his
thought [or: sentence?] does not refer to
[1] actual trees.... it might refer to [2]
trees in the [computer generated] image,
or to the [3] electronic impulses that
cause tree experiences, or to [4] features
of the program that are responsible for
those electronic impulses. 5^
Thus, Putnam presents four possibilities. Assuming that a
bevatted brain would be capable of referring, it might
refer to: (1) actual trees, (2) computer generated
images, (3) the impulses that cause these images, or (4)
features of the computer's program that produce these
S Q RTH
,
p. 14. The parenthetic enumerations are due to
me
.
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impulses
. Since the bevatted brains would not, given our
supposed intuitions, stand in the sorts of causal
relations that are necessary for their successful
reference to actual trees, they obviously would not be
referring to actual trees. Putnam and others have assumed
that bevatted brains would refer, if they prevailed in
referring at all, to computer generated images. Jane
McIntyre writes, "...a brain in a vat could only refer to
images of brains and images of vats...." 60 Carol A. Van
writes, "
. . .if the [bevatted] hypothesis were true,
'vat' would refer not to actual vats but to 'vats in the
image'...." 61 Thomas Tymoczko writes, "...we should
interpret the brains' word [sic: phrase?] 'elm trees' as
referring to trees-in-the-image [sic: elm-trees-in-the-
image?]...." 62 To borrow a phrase that is currently in
the air, if a bevatted brain refers, it refers to the
virtual reality, or virtual objects, generated by the
super computer. In more philosophical words, were a
bevatted brain to be capable of reference, it would refer
to some phenomenal reality, or phenomenal objects —
perhaps: phenomenological reality or phenomenological
objects — generated by the computer. It has also been
60 PB, p. 60.
61 Carol A. Van Kirk, Kant's Reply to Putnam
,
Idealistic
Studies, vol . 14 (1984) p. 14.
62 Thomas Tymoczko, In Defense of Putnam's Brains,
Philosophical Studies, vol. 57 (1989) p. 293.
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assumed that nothing depends on this, and I will here
work within the confines of this assumption.
If a bevatted brain prevailed in referring, it
would, I here assume, refer to computer generated images,
or, in other words, it would refer to computer generated
virtual objects. Now, suppose that a bevatted brain asks,
Could I be bevatted? or Am I bevatted? To what would its
words then refer? Putnam has put the answer quite simply:
...if... we are really brains in a vat,
then what we now mean by 'we are brains in
a vat' is that we are brains in a vat in
the image .... 63
This is the key to (A). Ex hypothesi, in the computer
generated image, we would not be bevatted brains. In
other words, our virtual or phenomenal reality would not
be one in which we are brains in a vat. It is, however,
exactly the way of the elements of this virtual reality
that figure in the evaluation of the truth and falsity of
the beliefs or representations of the bevatted brains.
For example, The cat is on the mat is true in the
language of the bevatted brains just when the computer
generated cat image bears the computer generated on
relation to the computer generated mat image. Therefore,
if we are all brains in a vat, then All sentient beings
are brains in a vat is false. As Putnam writes, this is
false because:
63 RTH, p. 15.
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...part of the hypothesis that we arebrains in a vat is that we aren't brainsm the image (i.e. what we are
'hallucinating' isn't that we are brainsin a vat). So, if we are brains in a vat,then the sentence 'We are brains in a vat'says something false (if it says
anything), in short, if we are brains in avat, then 'We are brains in a vat' is(necessarily) false
.
64
If we are bevatted, then We are bevatted is true if and
only if our virtual reality is one in which we are
bevatted. Our virtual reality would, if we were bevatted
brains, be identical to our de facto phenomenological
reality, that is, everything would seem the same. Our de
facto phenomenological reality is not one in which we are
bevatted brains, however. So, if we are bevatted brains,
then since our virtual reality is not one in which we are
bevatted brains, We are bevatted brains is false. Thus:
if we are bevatted brains, We are bevatted brains is
false. This, in short, is Putnam's justification for (A).
Before I proceed to my discussion of Putnam's
argument for (B)
,
I should note that there is reason to
doubt that Putnam's justification for premise (A) is
consistent with his implicit assumption that the bevatted
brain scenario is one that illustrates the sceptical
thesis that any representation could be false. How could
this be? How could it be, for example, that my present
perceptual representation that I possess two hands is
false? Putnam answers that it would be false, and so it
64 RTH
,
p . 15.
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could be false, if every sentient being were a brain in a
vat. He argues that this scenario just could not obtain,
but for the moment, let us bracket the question of
whether or not his argument succeeds. Instead, let us
consider whether or not the bevatted brains scenario is
one according to which my present perceptual
representation that I am possessed of two hands is false.
Putnam argues that if we are bevatted, and the
causal theory of reference holds, then We are bevatted is
true just when our virtual reality is one in which we are
bevatted. Since this computer generated virtual reality
is qualitatively identical with what we would experience
were we to be unbevatted or embodied brains, and since we
don't experience ourselves as bevatted, our virtual
reality is not one in which we are bevatted. Therefore,
We are bevatted is false. This way of thinking about the
content, or reference, of a bevatted brain's beliefs
provides a powerful reason for saying that were I
bevatted, my representation of myself as possessed of two
hands would not be false, and that it would be true. An
essential part of Putnam's story is that if we were
bevatted, the vast majority of such perceptual and
doxastic representations would be false. It would seem
that I possess a pair of hands, but since there are, ex
hypothesi
,
no hands, I would be deceived. But, Putnam
himself tells us why this analysis is wrong: if we are
bevatted, I possess two hands is true just when our
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virtual reality is one in which the virtual me virtually
possesses a virtual pair of hands. Ex hypothesi
,
our
virtual reality, were we to be bevatted brains, would be
qualitatively identical with the phenomenological reality
of embodied brains. Since we would experience me as
possessing a pair of hands, our virtual reality would be
one in which I would possess two hands, and so I possess
two hands would be true. Putnam himself makes a similar
point
:
. . .the brain is right, not wrong in
thinking 'There is a tree in front of me.'
Given what 'tree' refers to... and what 'in
front of' refers to... then the truth
conditions for 'There is a tree in front
of me' when it occurs... are simply that a
tree in the image be 'in front of' the
'me' in question ... .And these truth-
conditions are certainly fulfilled. 65
Is my perceptual representation of myself as possessed of
two hands false according to the bevatted brain scenario?
No, since its truth conditions would concern the elements
of a virtual reality that would, ex hypothesi, obtain.
So, Putnam's scenario doesn't do the work he wants. Now,
I shall not rest my criticism of Putnam's argument on
65 RTH, p. 14.
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this, and so I will now turn to the question of premise
(B )
,
66
As I noted above, it might appear that the only
additional thing that is needed for a valid argument that
yields, or at least appears to yield, the conclusion that
Putnam desires is the trivial premise that: it must be
that if All sentient beings are brains in a vat is false,
some sentient being is not a brain in a vat. I also noted
that it might appear that this premise is provided by
Tarski's account of truth. The idea turns on a
consequence of Tarski's account of truth, namely, that it
entail biconditionals such as: it must be that Snow
is white is true in some language just when snow is
white, and it must be that Snow is white is not true, or
false, in some language just when some snow isn't white -
leaving the quantification implicit. It would seem that
Tarski's account would also entail that if All sentient
beings are bevatted is false in some language, some
sentient being must not be bevatted. This is wrong.
Reflection on this additional premise will show that and
how this supplemented version of Putnam's argument fails.
66 It seems obvious that in some worlds, reference is a
causal relation, and in others, it is not. So, the causal
theory of reference is clearly contingent. Consequently,
it is unclear how it could be the pivotal reason why it
must be that if all of us are bevatted, All of us are
bevatted is false. I will ignore this sort of problem
here
.
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Here, it is, I think, necessary to enter into the
details of Tarski's account of truth, since it
constitutes an important part of the background of the
preceding reconstruction of Putnam's argument, and these
details, although often mentioned, are rarely
articulated. Tarski's account of truth is an account of
truth for a very special kind of language, namely, a
formalized language. Let me first give an example of such
a language, and then show how Tarski defines truth for
it. I will call this language Q.^ 7
Like all languages, Q has what might be thought of
as an alphabet. Here, this is a list of the primitive
symbols from which all the other symbols of Q are
constructed. In addition to the positive integers
,
the
primitive symbols of Q include: a, F, x, ~, n, (, and
). Among these, we have the five following symbols:
(1) logical connectives
:
~ and
(2) universal quantifier: n, and
( 3 ) brackets : ( and )
.
fi 7 In this account, I more or less follow the excellent
exposition provided by Geoffrey Hunter in his Metalogic:
An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order
Logic, University of California Press, Berkeley (1973).
One notable exception is that I omit function symbols
from Q. I have also drawn much from Elliott Mendelson,
Introduction to Mathematical Logic, third edition,
Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole Advanced Books and Software,
Pacific Grove, California (1987).
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Other symbols of Q, which are constructed from the
elements of this list of primitive symbols, where i is a
positive integer, include the following:
(4) constants: a^,
(5) variables : Xj_, and
(6) predicates: F i .
What do these symbols mean? Although this question will
receive a more detailed answer, the following should
serve as a rough guide. The logical connectives work
almost exactly like the words not and if then. The
universal quantifier is similar to all in ordinary
language. Moreover, the brackets function as punctuation.
Now, the individual constants function like names, e.g.,
Fido. The individual variables are like the pronoun it,
except that there are infinitely many of them. - Note
that together the constants and the variables are the
terms. - The predicate symbols work like ordinary n-place
predicates, e.g., the one-place predicate is a dog.
Among the non-primitive symbols of Q, there are
the well-formed formulas, or wffs. These are, simply put,
the declarative sentences.
(1) If F| is an n-place predicate symbol,
and are n terms, then
Fi^-i r • • • r tn is a wff, and it is an atomic
wf f
.
(2) If A is a wff, and x^ is the i-th
variable, then nx^A is a wff.
(3) If A is a wff, then -A is a wff.
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wff
If A and B are Wffs
'
then (A -*• B) is a
(5) Nothing else is a wff.
This only concerns syntax, and so this leaves open the
question of what these symbols mean, that is, it leaves
open the question of their interpretation. Although these
symbols are subject to the rough sort of characterization
given above, in the context of a formalized language, an
interpretation is a quite specific kind of thing. There
are two parts to an interpretation of a language such as
Q. The first part consists of a non-empty set, D. This is
the domain of the interpretation. For example, D might be
the set of positive integers, and if it is, talk in Q
will be interpreted, so to speak, as talk about the
positive integers. The second part is a function, I. Very
roughly
,
this function determines the elements of D about
which the various symbols of Q talk. On the one hand, I
assigns to each individual constant some member of D. For
example, it might be that I(a 1 )=l. in this case, a 1 is,
very roughly, taken to talk about the number one. On the
other hand, I assigns to each n-place predicate symbol a
subset of D11
,
that is, a subset of the n-th Cartesian
product of D, where D1 is, for example, the set of l-
tuples of the elements of D. For example, it could be
that I(F 1 )={<y>: y is an even number}. In this case, F x
is, once again very roughly, taken to talk about the even
numbers. I will merely note that the connectives are
given their usual truth-functional meanings.
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The notion that I am out to render more precise is
the notion of truth in Q relative to an interpretation.
But, there are three preliminaries, to wit, (l) the
notion of satisfaction, ( 2 ), the notion of a denumerable
sequence of elements of D, and (3) the notion of a star
function relative to a given denumerable sequence of
elements of D.
A sequence is a function from some subset of the
positive integers to some set of objects. For any two
sequences, s and t, s=t just when s i =t i , for all i. in
other words, s=t just when the i-th term of s is the i-th
term of t, for all i. The sequences that are relevant
here are infinite sequences of elements of the domain of
some interpretation, that is, functions from the entire
set of positive integers, which is, after all, a subset
of itself, to the domain of the relevant interpretation.
Were the domain of interpretation to be the set of
positive integers, such a sequence could be (l, 2, 3, 4
,
...), and another could be (1, l, l, i, ...), and yet
another could be (1, 1, l, 2, ...). We are now in a
position to define the notion of a star function relative
to a given denumerable sequence of elements of D.
Let s be an arbitrary denumerable sequence of
elements of D. Now, for each interpretation, I, there is
a star function, s*
,
whose domain is the set of terms of
Q — the union of the constants and the variables of Q —
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and whose range is D. Now, s* is defined as follows.
There are two cases:
( 1 ) in the case of an individual constant
a i ' s (ai)=I(a i ), that is, s*( ai ) is the
element of D that I assigns to aif
and
(2) in the case of a variable, xif
s ( xi
)
=S 2 / that is, s*(x^) is the i-th
term of s, which is an element of D.
For example, suppose three things: (1) the term in
question is a 2 , (2) l( 3l )=2, and (3) s is (l, 3, 5, 7,
...)• Then, s*(a1 )=I(a 1 )=2. Or, suppose, for example,
that (1) the term in question is x 3 , and (2) s is as
before, then s*(x 3 )=s 3 =5. Now, satisfaction can be
recursively defined.
It is well formed formulas that are, or are not,
satisfied by the infinite sequences of elements of the
domain of some interpretation, and there are four cases
to be defined:
(1) the case where the formula in question
has the form F^-l,
—
,tn , where is an
n-place predicate symbol, and where
tlf ,tn are evidently n terms,
(2) the case in which the formula has the
form nxjA, where A is itself a well formed
formula, and where x^ is obviously the i-
th variable,
(3) the case where the formula has the
form ~A, where A is itself a well formed
formula
,
and finally
(4) the case in which the formula has the
form (A -* B)
,
where A and B are themselves
well formed formulas.
132
In the first case, s satisfies the relevant formula just
when the n-tuple <s*( tl ) s*(tn )> is an element of
I (Fi)' that is / this n-tuple is an element of the set of
n-tuples of D of I that I assigns to F^ 68 m the second
case, s satisfies the formula in question just when every
denumerable sequence of elements of D that differs from s
in at most the i-th term satisfies A. in the third case,
s satisfies this formula just when s does not satisfy a.
In the last case, s satisfies this formula just when s
does not satisfy A or s satisfies B.
It is helpful to have examples. Let I(a 1 )=5, and
let I(Fj)={<y>: y is an even number}. Moreover, let s be
(1, 3, 5, 7, ...); one can suppose that s^ is the i-th
odd integer. Then: s satisfies F^ just when <s*(a
x
)> is
an element of ICFj), and so s satisfies F-^-l just when 5
is an even number . Since 5 is not an even number, s does
not satisfy F^a-^. Does s satisfy F 3 x 3 ? Once again, s
satisfies F 2X 3 just when <s*(x 3 )> is an element of I(F 1 ).
Since s (x 3 )=s 3=5, and I(F 1 )={<y>: y is an even number},
and 5 is not an even number, s does not satisfy f 1x 3 .
Does s satisfy nx 2 (F 1x 2 )? Recall that s satisfies
nx 2 (Fix 2 ) just when every denumerable sequence of
elements of D that differs from s in at most the second
fi ft Note that this is a formal exposition of the intuition
that lies behind the string theory of truth, and that
strings are the metaphorical representatives of the
relations that constitute Tarski's interpretation
function
.
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term satisfies F^x^ Now, let t be ( 1 , 7,5 7 )
that is, let t be a denumerable sequence of elements of d
that differs from s in at most the second term. Given the
above account of satisfaction, t satisfies F
x
x 2 just when
<t*(x2 ) > is an element of 1^), and so t satisfies f
x
x 2
just when 7 is an even number. Since t*(x 2 )=t 2=7, and 7
is not an even number, t does not satisfy F-^, and so s
does not satisfy nx 2 (F 1x 2 ). Since the remaining two cases
are more or less self-evident, I will now pass on to the
notion of truth in Q relative to an interpretation I.
What Tarski said, and what the reconstruction of
Putnam's argument, which is being considered here,
appropriates, is essentially this: a formula of Q is true
for a given interpretation I of Q just when every
denumerable sequence of members of the domain of I
satisfies it.^ 9 j n other words, a sentence is true
relative to a given language and its interpretation just
when every denumerable sequence of members of the domain
of the interpretation satisfies it. Similarly, a formula
of Q is false for a given interpretation I of Q just when
no denumerable sequence of members of the domain of I
satisfies it. The pivotal point here is that this is the
69 Compare Alfred Tarski, The Concept of Truth in
Formalized Languages, in Logic, Semantics,
Metamathematics, second edition, edited and introduced by
John Corcoran, translated by J.H. Woodger, Hackett
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1983) p. 195.
Hereafter: CTFL.
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notion of truth that is operative in the reconstruction
of Putnam's argument that is being considered here.
As a first step toward making clearer the role
that Tarski's account of truth plays in this
reconstruction of Putnam's argument, I will establish an
instance of what Tarski demanded from a theory truth,
namely, Convention T, or what Tarski referred to as the
test of the material adequacy for an account of truth . 70
According to Tarski, a materially adequate account of
truth must entail all the biconditionals of the form: $
is true in Q (for an interpretation I) if and only if p,
where § is a structural descriptive name of a sentence in
the object language, and p is a translation of § into a
sentence of the metalanguage, that is, the language in
which the definition of true in Q is given. Convention T
is, it is instructive to note, analogous to the
requirement that any definition of an ordered pair be
such that if <a,b>=<x,y>, then a=x and b=y. Tarski's
famous example is: snow is white is true if and only if
snow is white.
Be this as it may, a much simpler example of
Convention T is: Fido is a dog is true in some language,
which is presumably English, just when Fido is a dog.
Fido is a dog is not a well formed formula of Q, but I
will pretend, for the sake of illustration, that this can
70 Compare CTFL, pp. 187-188.
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be ignored. Moreover, since I'm only explaining this for
the sake of illustration, it too can be ignored. In any
case, if Fido is a dog could be represented in Q, it
would be represented as F^, where I(F 1 )=l(is a dog),
and I(a 1 )=I(Fido) . For the same reason, also suppose that
I(F1 )={<y>: y is a dog}, and I(a 1 )=Fido. Let me show how
Tarski's account of truth for Q relative to this
interpretation function entails my example.
(1) Suppose that it's not that Fido is a
dog is true just when Fido is a dog, that
is, suppose that it's not that F^ is
true just when Fido is a dog.
(2) From (1) it follows that either (a)
F 1 a 1 is true and Fido is not a dog, or (b)
F l a l is not true and Fido is a dog.
(3) Suppose that F 1 a 1 is true and Fido is
not a dog.
(4) From (3) and Tarski's account of
truth, it follows, in short, that every
sequence of elements satisfies F-^a-j^
.
Specifically, s satisfies F 1 a 1 .
(5) Given (4) and the definition of
satisfaction, <s*(a 1 )> is an element of
I (F]_ ) •
(6) Given (5), since I(F 1 )={<y>: y is a
dog}, <s (a
x
)> is an element of { <y> : y is
a dog}, and so s*(a 1 ) is a dog.
(7) Given (6) and the above account of a
star function relative to a sequence,
s (a 1 )=I(a 1 ), and since I(a 1 )=Fido, Fido
is a dog, which contradicts (3). So, the
supposition at (3) must be rejected.
(8) From (7) and (2), (b)
,
that is, F^!
is not true and Fido is a dog.
(9) Given Tarski's account of truth, and
(8), it follows, it short, that no
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sequence satisfies
. Specifically, sdoesn't satisfy F 1a 1 .
(10) From the above account of
satisfaction, and (9), it follows that
<s (ai)> is not an element of I(F 1 ).
(11) Since (10), and since I(F 1 )={<y> : yis a dog}, <s (a-j_)> is not an element of
{ <y> : Y is a dog}, and so s*(a-,) is not adog. x
(12) Given (11) and the above account of a
star function relative to a sequence,
s (a 1 )=l(a 1 ), and since I(a-,)=Fido, Fido
is not a dog, which contradicts (8). So,
the assumption at (1) must be wrong, and
so: Fido is a dog is true just when Fido
is a dog. (Q.E.D.
)
Tarski's idea is that a materially adequate account of
truth for a formal language must entail this sort of
biconditional for every sentence of the language in
question. The point of going through this example is to
get my reader to clearly understand how the mechanism of
Tarski's account of truth works. The pivotal question is:
What role does Tarski's account of truth play in the
present reconstruction of Putnam's argument? Roughly put,
it is supposed to provide the link between: all sentient
beings are bevatted, and: some sentient being must not be
bevatted. More specifically, it is supposed to provide
the premise that: if all sentient beings are bevatted is
false, it must be that some sentient being is not
bevatted. My claim is that Tarski's account of truth
provides neither this link, nor this premise.
With Putnam, let us suppose four things. First: we
are brains in a vat. Second: the causal theory of
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reference. Third: our language is sufficiently like Q to
give an interpretation of it. So, there will be a set of
individual constants, which will be mapped onto the
elements of some set, D. There will be a set of n-place
predicates, which get mapped onto subsets of Dn . Et
cetera. Putnam's fourth and pivotal supposition is that
our intuitions about the intimate relation between
causality and reference imply that every element of D is
something like a computer generated image. In short,
every element of D is a computer generated virtual
entity. Putnam suggests that the contents of D might be
computer generated images, or electronic impulses that
cause these images, or features of the computer program
that generate such electronic impulses. As I have noted,
it doesn't matter whether the domain of the
interpretation is a set of images, electronic impulses,
or facets of the machine's program; I believe that the
present reconstruction of Putnam's argument fails on all
three construals of the contents of D, but I will focus,
as does Putnam, on the construal according to which the
elements of D are computer generated images.
I have developed the foregoing account of Q and
its interpretation for the sake of being able to show
that and how the current revision of Putnam's argument
fails. What I propose to do is go through the mechanics
required to show that Tarski's account of truth does not
give Putnam the premise that it must be that if all
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sentient beings are brains in a vat is false, some
sentient being is not a brain in a vat. I claim that all
it gives him is the premise that it must be that if all
sentient beings are brains in a vat is false, some
computer generated image of a sentient being is not a
computer generated image of a bevatted brain. If my claim
is not obvious, it can be established in the following
manner. If the elements of D are computer generated
images, then: I(is a sentient being)=I(F
1 )= {<y>: y is a
computer generated image of a sentient being}, and I (is a
brain in a vat)=l(F 2 )={<y>: y is a computer generated
image of a brain in a vat}. Given this, let us see what
Tarski's account of truth entails. Once again, Putnam
needs it to entail that: it must be that if All sentient
beings are brains in a vat is false, some sentient being
is not a brain in a vat. But this is quite different from
what it does entail. Once again, although All sentient
beings are brains in a vat is not a sentence of Q, I will
pretend, for the purpose of explication, that this can be
ignored. Here are the required mechanics:
(1) Suppose that All sentient beings are
brains in a vat is false, that is, suppose
that nx 1 (F 1x1 -* F 2 x-]_) is false. Moreover,
given the causal theory of reference,
every element of D of I is a computer
generated image, and so it must be that
I(F 1 )={<z>: z is a computer generated
image of a sentient being} and I(F2 )={<z>:
z is a computer generated image of a brain
in a vat }
.
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(2)
By Tarski s account of truth and mno sequence satisfies nxqCFqX-, -* f 0Xi )and so s does not satisfy it. 1 1
(3). By the definition of satisfaction s
satisfies nx-LfFjX-L - F 2 x-l
)
just when every
sequence that differs from s in at mostthe first place satisfies F 1x1 -» f 2X 1 •
( 4
)
By ( 2 ) and ( 3 )
,
some sequence that
<^ 1 f^ers from s in at most the first placefails to satisfy FlXl - F 2x x . Let it be t.
(5) By the definition of satisfaction, t
satisfies F^x^ -*• ^2X 1 just when t doesn't
satisfy F 1x1 , or t satisfies f 2x 1 .
(6) By (4) and (5), t satisfies F-iX-,, and
t doesn't satisfy F 2x 1 .
(7) By the definition of satisfaction, and
( 6 2' ( xi)> is an element of I(F 1 ), and<t (x
x )> is not an element of I(F 2 ).
(8) By ( 1 ) and (7), t*(x^) is a computer
qenerated imaqe of a sentient beinq, and
t (x
x )
is not a computer qenerated imaqe
of a brain in a vat.
(9) By (8), some computer qenerated imaqe
of a sentient beinq is not a computer
qenerated imaqe of a brain in a vat.
(10) By (1) throuqh (9), if All sentient
beings are brains in a vat is false, then
some computer generated image of a
sentient being is not a computer generated
image of a brain in a vat. (Q.E.D.)
NOTA BENE: This conclusion is not the premise that the
reconstruction of Putnam's argument needs. In other
words, this conclusion is not premise (B) of the above
version of his argument.
If we add what was supposed to be a trivial
premise to the premise of my initial version of Putnam's
argument, namely (3), that is, add the above result of
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Tarski 's account of truth, we get an argument that runs
as follows:
iat
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sentlent beings are brains ina vat is false, then it must be that somecomputer generated image of a sentientbeing is not a computer generated image ofa bram m a vat. [Tarski: the conclusion
of the mechanics articulated above.]
(c;) It must be that if all sentientbeings are brains in a vat, then some
computer generated image of a sentient
eing is not a computer generated image of
a brain in a vat. [A,B']
(D) Not all sentient beings must be brainsin a vat. [???] 71
To work, this reconstruction of Putnam's argument needs a
premise with an antecedent that is the same as the
consequent of (A), and with a consequent that contradicts
the antecedent of (A). If he could get this, (C) could
be: if all sentient beings are brains in a vat, some
sentient being must not be a brain in a vat. Then, Putnam
could get (D)
.
But, Tarski's account of truth cannot
provide such a premise. It can only provide (B'), and
this is not sufficient. So, even when Putnam's argument
assumes the form of what seems to be its best
reconstruction, it is not a version of the consequentia
mirabilis
. Instead, it is a non sequitur.
71 Compare PB.
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Th ls technical point can be expressed in terms of
what I have above entitled the string theory of truth,
which is an image of what it is for a sentence to be true
that preserves, I think, the intuitions of the
correspondence theory of truth. The basic idea can be
explained in terms of the example of what it is for Fido
is a dog to be true. First, let there be an object and a
name, let the latter be: Fido. Now, take some string, tie
one end of the string to the name, and tie the other end
to the object. Second, let there be a property and a
predicate, let the latter be: is a dog. Now, take some
more string
,
tie one end of the string to the predicate,
and tie the other end to the set of all the objects that
have the property. - I'll leave aside the incisive
question of how a string can be tied to a set. - The idea
is that Fido is a dog is true just when the object tied
to Fido is an element of the set tied to is a dog . 72 This
idea can be used to show that the above reconstruction of
Putnam's argument doesn't work.
Note that strings are metaphorical substitutes for the
relations that correspond to the interpretation function
of Tarski s account of truth. If it seems ludicrous to
account for truth in terms of something as physical as
string, it is a wonder why it doesn't seem as ludicrous
to account for truth, even if it is truth relative to aformal language, in terms of something as abstract, and
therefore as intangible, as a function. I have wondered
why the string theory of truth doesn't constitute,
therefore, a reductio ad absurdum of Tarski's semantic
conception of truth, but this is yet another guestion
that I will leave aside in this work.
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reconstruction of
The first premise of the above
Putnam's argument is that: (A) if „e are bevatted, We are
bevatted brains must be false. Given the causal theory of
reference, if we were bevatted, our strings could only be
tied, so to speak, to either computer generated
phenomenal objects, or sets of computer generated
phenomenal objects. So, roughly put, the objects tied to
we would be computer generated images of us, and the set
tied to are bevatted brains would be the set of computer
generated images of bevatted brains. Moreover, We are
bevatted brains would be true just when the objects tied
to we were elements of the set tied to are bevatted
brains. Now, the assumption of Putnam's thought
experiment is that the computer generated phenomenal
world of the bevatted brains is gualitatively identical
with the phenomenal world of those of us who have
presumed ourselves to be unbevatted, and that in our
phenomenal world, it doesn't seem to us that we are
brains in vats. So, even if we were bevatted, it wouldn't
seem to us that we were. In other words, the computer
generated images of us would not be members of the set of
computer generated images of bevatted brains. It follows,
and this is the important point, that We are bevatted
brains would not be true, that is, it would be false,
which gives us Putnam's first premise.
All would be well with the above reconstruction of
Putnam's argument, if its second premise were: (B) if We
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are bevatted brains is false, it must be that one of us
is not a bevatted brain. But, this premise is not
available to Putnam. Given the reasons for his first
premise, the only available premise is this: (b') if we
are bevatted brains is false, it must be that some
computer generated image of one of us is not a computer
generated image of a bevatted brain. Since, according to
the causal theory of reference, our strings can only be
tied to computer generated phenomenal objects, or sets of
computer generated phenomenal objects, We are bevatted
brains is true just when the objects tied to we are
elements of the set tied to are bevatted brains. So, if
We are bevatted brains is false, or not true, it must be
that some computer generated image of one of us is not a
computer generated image of a bevatted brain. Of the two
premises discussed here, namely, (B) and (B'), this is,
once again, the only one available to Putnam, and even if
it is conjoined with his first premise, namely, (A), it
doesn't deliver the conclusion that he desires: some of
us must be unbevatted. So, Putnam has refuted neither
scepticism, nor metaphysical realism.
At this juncture, there are two pivotal questions.
One: Can Putnam's argument for internal realism be
successfully reconstructed? In short, I think not. Two
:
What can be appropriated from my reconstruction of
Putnam's argument that will further the task of making
sense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds and
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truths? Suspend this question for now; the answer will
emerge from an investigation into the first question.
Recall the basic structure of Putnam's argument for his
internal realism. There are three basic premises. First
,
metaphysical realism and internal realism are mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Putnam neither states
this, nor does he argue for it, but it is implicit, and
although this is dubious, I won't question it here.
Second, metaphysical realism entails scepticism. This
seems clear enough. Third, scepticism is incoherent.
Putnam's argument for this premise is, as I have argued,
flawed, but what if it isn't necessary to provide an
argument for it? Recall that for Kant, scepticism is
merely intolerable, and if his ontological or
transcendental turn dispels it, his turn is ipso facto
justified. The justification of transcendental idealism,
and the repudiation of transcendental realism, comes, in
part, with the former's seeming capacity to dispel
scepticism, and the latter's association with it. In any
case, from these premises, it follows that metaphysical
realism is false, and so Putnam's internal realism is
vindicated.
Again, the problem with Putnam's argument is
located in his ostensible refutation of scepticism. In
addition to its being formally flawed, it is, as it seems
to me, confused in that it presupposes both that a
substantive philosophical thesis, to wit, scepticism, can
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be refuted by means of trivial, and perhaps merely
formal, premises about truth and reference, and that a
substantive and deeply rooted philosophical thesis, to
metaphysical realism, can be likewise refuted. This
can't be. No substantive thesis follows from a formal
thesis, and no formal thesis contradicts any substantive
thesis. So, if there is a successful reconstruction of
Putnam's argument, it must contain at least one
substantive premise. It is difficult to see what this
premise could be. It can't be Putnam's internal realism,
that is, his thesis that "...what objects does the world
consist of? is a question that only makes sense to ask
within a theory or description ." 73 Because, internal
realism would then be a premise in an argument to
establish internal realism, and this would be evidently
circular. Or, because, internal realism would then be a
premise in an argument to establish the incoherence of
scepticism, the supposition of this incoherence would be
a premise in an argument to establish internal realism,
and so such a reconstruction of Putnam's argument would
again be irremediably circular. Allegations of
circularity aside, it should not be this, because the
metaphysical realist's intuition that the world consists
of representation independent objects is deeply rooted,
and its legitimate displacement requires a philosophical
73 RTH, p. 49.
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argument based on a substantive and equally intuitive
premise, and internal realism does not fill the bill, a
clue to the identity of the needed premise lies in this:
the intuition that scepticism is wrongheaded is at least
as deeply rooted as the metaphysical realist's intuition
that the world consists of representation independent
objects, isn't internal realism prima facie justified, if
metaphysical realism entails scepticism, and internal
realism entails that it is a deep mistake? More to the
point of the thesis that there are many actual worlds and
many truths, isn't an ontological shift that supports
this thesis prima facie justified, if without it, we face
scepticism, and with it, we escape it? But, I get ahead
of myself.
Putnam's argument could begin with the thesis that
scepticism is, so to speak, false. On the one hand, since
metaphysical realism entails scepticism, it is ruled out.
Moreover, given that it and internal realism are mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive, internal realism
follows. On the other hand, if it should turn out that
internal realism rules out scepticism, it is all the more
vindicated, since it gets that issue right, that is,
since it is, so to speak, epistemologically correct. In
short, let the substantive premise be that scepticism is
wrongheaded, or something of this sort, and internal
realism, or my hitherto elusive ontological shift, may be
vindicated. This obviously depends, however, on whether
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and
internal realism, or some version of an ontological
shift, can be shown to be epistemologically correct,
this in turn depends on what Putnam's doctrine, or this
shift, and scepticism are.
I will now focus on internal realism, and I will
begin by contrasting it with metaphysical realism, it
would make sense to ask for a theory or description
independent answer to the question: what objects does the
world consist of?, were there to be just one actual world
that consisted of a multiplicity of representation
independent objects. Representation independent objects
would be distinct from one another by virtue of the
properties that they possess, or fail to possess,
independently of whatever concepts or predicates we would
happen to possess. Roughly put, a complete enumeration of
these representation-independent objects, not to mention
all their representation-independent properties, would
constitute an answer to the Putnam's question: what
objects does the world consist of?, or, more simply: what
is there?, that made sense independently of theory and
mode of description. It is irrelevant to object that
since we could use different names or different
predicates, our description would thereby be theory or
description dependent. Any answer to Putnam's question
that employs names or predicates that do not match up
with the world's representation-independent objects and
properties must simply be wrong. Names and predicates
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that don't reflect the world's objects and properties
can't be part of a correct answer to Putnam's question.
Thus professes the metaphysical realist. How does
internal realism differ from this?
Putnam tells us that there can be no theory or
description independent answer to the question: what is
there? Recall the illustration that Putnam draws from
mereology
,
which was discussed above: If there are three
objects, how many objects are there? If we don't count
mereological sums as objects, it is clear that the answer
to this question is: there are three objects; if,
however, for any two objects, there is a third object
that is their mereological sum, and there is no null
object, then the answer is: there are seven objects. So,
are there three objects or seven? Obviously, it depends
on how one counts
,
and so Putnam concludes that the
answers to such questions are relative to either some
method of counting
,
or some theory or system of
description. According to metaphysical realism, there is
a representation independent something that gets counted
differently, but Putnam inquires: how may parts does this
something have? This question can only be answered in a
way that depends on some method of counting, and on
either the answer of three or seven, "...we have not a
neutral description, but rather a partisan
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description .
"
74 Putnam concludes, and this is essential
to his internal realism, that no theory or description
independent answer can be given to the question: what is
there?
This would seem to entail that independently of
theory or mode of description, there are no objects of
which the world consists, in short: if there were such
objects, there could be a theory or description
independent answer to Putnam's question, but since there
can be no such answer, there can be no such objects.
Moreover, since there is then little left to the world as
construed by the metaphysical realist, there is no theory
or description independent world either. But then
scepticism is thereby refuted, since it supposes that
there is such a world. This must be explained.
Putnam addresses himself to a form of scepticism
that was suggested by Descartes when he wrote that there
could be "...an evil genius, as clever and deceitful as
he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to
misleading me ." 75 The basic sceptical idea here: even if
objects were to cohere in a manner that is required for
them to be evidence for some picture of the world
,
it
would still be possible for these objects to be
74 TC, pp. 70-71. But, how could a fact about a question
be relevant to the representation dependency or otherwise
of objects? I will return to this question.
75 DESCARTES, p. 16.
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Putnam's
illusions
, and for this picture to be false
.
76
bevatted brains scenario is a cybernetic version of the
Cartesian scenario of an omnipotent and deceptive evil
genius, since it also shows how it is possible for
objects to cohere in a manner that is required for them
to be evidence for some picture of the world, and yet be
such that they are illusory, while the picture for which
they presumably provide evidence is false. Putnam rightly
sees, I think, that both scenarios presuppose some
version of metaphysical realism. It is because what is
the case is independent of us and our representations
that it is possible for objects or our representations to
lack verisimilitude, that is, to be illusory or false, no
matter what evidential virtues our representations may
happen to possess. Now, one way to escape the scepticism
suggested by these scenarios is to reject this very
presupposition. In other words, one alternative is to
maintain that what is the case somehow depends on our
representations
,
but in a way that closes, so to speak,
the gap that makes it possible for coherent objects to be
76 One might object that objects are not evidence,
because sentences are evidence for other sentences, or
something of this sort. Moreover, one might object that
objects do not cohere, because coherence is only defined
for sentences. It is evident that I mean something like
this: an object is evidence for some world picture just
when a sentence about this object is evidence for the
picture in question. Moreover, it should also be evident
that I mean something such as this: some set of objects
is coherent just when some set of sentences about them is
coherent. Et cetera.
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evidence for some world picture, and yet be such that
together, they are illusory or false. Putnam thinks that
his internal realism achieves this by establishing that
one ostensible side of this gap is a fiction. In other
words, it does this by showing that independently of
theory or mode of description, there are no objects of
which the world might consist, and so there is no world
as construed by the metaphysical realist. Consequently,
there is no world that we might fail to correctly
represent, and so Cartesian scepticism, in both its
demonic and cybernetic forms, is false.
As I noted above, the justification of internal
realism, and perhaps the justification of an ontological
shift that would support the thesis that there are many
actual worlds, could begin with the premise that
scepticism is simply wrongheaded. This would rule out
metaphysical realism, since it entails scepticism. Thus,
were internal realism and it mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive, internal realism would be justified.
Since internal realism seems to rule out scepticism, it
is all the more vindicated, since it gets this issue
right. In short, by letting the substantive premise be
that scepticism is wrongheaded, internal realism is
vindicated. Or, is it? There is, I think, an error in
this reconstruction of Putnam's justification of internal
realism. To locate this error, recall that the success of
this reconstruction depends on whether internal realism
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IS epistemologically correct, and this, in turn, depends
on what scepticism is. There is a form of scepticism that
Putnam has not considered, however, and its consideration
not only undermines the thesis that internal realism gets
scepticism right, but it undermines it by bringing us to
see that internal realism and metaphysical realism share
essentially the same conception of what it is to be an
object.
Query: does internal realism entail that
scepticism simpliciter is false? No, and so, I think,
internal realism doesn't amount to a fundamental
ontological shift that supplants the metaphysical
realist's intuitions about what it is to be an object.
For the time being, I will place aside the question of
this consequence, and I will focus on this negative
answer. To justify this answer, it is necessary to
distinguish Cartesian scepticism from another form of
scepticism that was suggested by Hume when he wrote that
"...it implies no contradiction that the course of nature
may change, and that an object, seemingly like those
which we have experienced, may be attended with different
or contrary effects." 77 For example, it is, as Hume
noted, possible for " . . .a body, falling from the clouds,
and which, in all other respects, resembles snow... [to
77 HUME, p. 35.
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have]... the taste of salt or feeling of fire "78 0r
_
it is, again as Hume noted, possible for "...all the
trees... [to]... flourish in December and January, and
decay in May and June.... "79 0r> as Kant worrie(J; it . £
possible for "...the country on the longest day... [to
be]... sometimes covered with fruit, sometimes with ice
and snow " 8 ° The Humean sceptic maintains that the
behavior of objects could go awry in any of these ways.
More generally, the basic sceptical idea here is that the
behavior of objects might fail to cohere in a manner that
is necessary for them to be evidence for any world
picture. Even if internal realism and Cartesian
scepticism are incompatible, because internal realism
rules out the gap that makes this scepticism possible,
there is still Humean scepticism, and so to answer the
above query, it is necessary to ask whether internal
realism rules out Humean scepticism.
Cartesian scepticism presupposes that what there
is in no way depends on our representations. So, there
is, in a manner of speaking, a gap between our
representations and what there is, and so any
representation might be false, even if it is ideal.
According to Putnam, since there is no theory or
78 HUME, p. 35. The parenthetic addition is due to me.
79 HUME, p. 35. The parenthetic addition is due to me.
80 CRITIQUE, p. 132, A100-101. The parenthetic addition
is due to me.
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description independent answer to the question: what is
there?, there are no representation independent objects
of which the world might consist, and so there is no
world as construed by the metaphysical realist. But,
then, Cartesian scepticism is wrongheaded, since there is
no world that we are constantly in danger of having
misrepresented. Now, there is, in Humean scepticism,
something analogous to the gap of Cartesian scepticism,
and the question for internal realism is whether it is
capable of closing it. This gap consists of the fact that
the past course of nature does not necessitate its future
course, or the past behavior of objects does not
necessitate their future behavior, or the content of our
past experience does not necessitate that of our future
experience. So, our experiences, or their objects, might
fail to cohere in a manner that is necessary for either
of them to evidentially support, or for there to be, any
world picture. Now, to justify a negative answer to the
query of the last paragraph, it is necessary to show that
internal realism does not rule out Humean scepticism.
I will proceed by contrast once more. According to
metaphysical realism, objects do not depend on our
representations, but this doesn't entail that the past
behavior of objects must cohere with their future
behavior, and so it does not entail that the behavior of
objects must cohere in a way that is necessary for them
or the things they do to be evidence for some picture of
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the world. This may be put in another way. Like Cartesian
scepticism, Humean scepticism presupposes a kind of gap,
to wit, a gap between the past and future behavior of
objects. Because of this gap, it is possible for objects
to fail to cohere, and so they may not be able to
evidentially support any vision of the world. This gap is
not closed, even if, as the metaphysical realist
maintains, the world is as objective as it can be. Put
shortly, the objectivity of the world does not ensure the
coherence of objects. So, even if metaphysical realism is
granted, Humean scepticism is not thereby refuted.
The situation is similar for internal realism.
Even if no theory independent answer can be given to the
question: what is there?, it doesn't follow that the past
behavior of objects necessitates their future behavior,
and so they may fail to cohere. This too may be put in
another way. The gap of Humean scepticism is not closed,
even if, as the internal realist maintains, the question:
what is there? has no theory independent answer. The
dependency of all possible answers to some question on
some theory or other does not ensure, by itself at least,
that objects will behave coherently. So, and this is a
pivotal point, internal realism is compatible with Humean
scepticism. Even if, as Putnam maintains, truth were some
sort of idealized rational acceptability, this
rationality would only be ideal, and so this wouldn't
rule out the possibility that objects might be so
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incoherent that no world picture would be acceptable, if
Putnam built coherence into truth in a way that
guaranteed that objects would be able to provide evidence
for some world picture, he would have then ruled out
Humean scepticism by fiat. Internal realism would rule
out Humean scepticism because it would be so defined that
the ideal of coherent objects evidentially supporting
some world picture would necessarily be realized, and a
substantial result would then rest on a gratuitous
definition. So, since internal realism does not rule out
Humean scepticism, it does not rule out scepticism
simpliciter, and this shows, I think, that Putnam's view
doesn't amount to a fundamental ontological shift that
supplants the metaphysical realist's intuitions about
what it is to be an object. Why?
Do internal realism and metaphysical realism
embrace essentially different conceptions of what it is
to be an object? As far as I can ascertain, there is, in
Putnam's exposition of internal realism, no explicit
explanation of what it is to be an object, but such an
explanation is implicit. Internal realism might fail to
get Humean scepticism right, because its conception of
what it is to be an object is not essentially different
from that of metaphysical realism. In which case, one is
entitled to suspect that internal realism and
metaphysical realism are essentially the same. In this
regard, recall, once again, Putnam's mereological
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example, and note that any answer to the question: how
many objects? is always relative to some method of
counting, but given a specific method of counting, the
answer to this question is completely determinate. This
is an ambiguous fact, if it is indeed a fact. On the one
hand, this might be because a method of counting somehow
constitutes the objects counted. In this case, since
objects would then depend on such a method, they would be
theory or mode of description dependent, and so internal
realism and metaphysical realism would embrace
essentially different conceptions of what it is to be an
object. On the other hand
,
however, this might be because
there are objects that are independent of all methods of
counting, and that somehow necessitate a specific and
determinate answer. Note well, however, that in this
case, objects are independent of us and our
representations. The important point is that there is,
then, reason to suspect that on the issue of what it is
to be an object, Putnam's internal realism does not
essentially differ from metaphysical realism.
Does it follow from the supposition that neither
internal realism nor metaphysical realism is, with
respect to Humean scepticism, epistemologically correct,
that they contain essentially the same conception of what
it is to be an object? Yes, because, in essence, they
both get Humean scepticism wrong for the same reason,
namely, it is because objects are independent of our
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cohere, in other
representations that they need not
words, internal realism doesn't get Humean scepticism
right, because although it differs from metaphysical
realism on the issue of whether there can be a theory or
description independent answer to the question: what is
there?, it doesn't essentially differ from metaphysical
realism on the question of what it is to be an object.
This must be explained. Internal realism and metaphysical
realism are both compatible with Humean scepticism. For
internal realism, this means that although there can be
no representation independent answer to the question:
what is there?, there is still a gap between the past and
the future. Even though there is, according to internal
realism, a way in which objects are representation
dependent, objects are independent in that they may still
behave in ways that make them unrepresentable, that is,
they may still behave in ways that makes it impossible to
coherently represent them. So, even given internal
realism, there is a way in which objects are independent
of our representations. For metaphysical realism, objects
are representation independent; this is essential to it.
Therefore
,
for both metaphysical realism and internal
realism, objects are representation independent, and so
they don't embody essentially different conceptions of
what it is to be an object.
What if Putnam offered the following? Suppose that
if internal realism and Humean scepticism are compatible,
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objects are representation independent. Objects are not
representation independent. Why? Because, there are no
theory or description independent answers to Putnam's
question: what is there? if there were representation
independent objects, there could be a theory or
description independent answer to Putnam's question, but
since there can be no such answer, there can be no such
objects. Therefore, internal realism and Humean
scepticism are incompatible, since internal realism is,
so to speak, true, that is, since there are no theory or
description independent answers to the question: what is
there?, Humean scepticism is wrongheaded, if Putnam did
offer this, he would then seem to have undermined the
claim that internal realism and metaphysical realism
embrace essentially the same conception of what it is to
be an object, since this claim itself rests on the
premise that internal realism is, with respect to Humean
scepticism, epistemologically incorrect. Putnam's dormant
offering rests, however, on his dubious inference from
the premise that no theory or description independent
answer can be given to the question: what is there?, to
the conclusion that objects are somehow theory,
description or representation dependent. How could a fact
about a question be relevant to the representation
dependency or otherwise of objects? Isn't is evident that
even if all the possible answers to some question about
some set of objects depends on some theory or other, it
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doesn't follow that these objects depend on some theory?
To suppose that it does follow is to have already
embraced the sort of ontological turn that I am out to
clarify.
This brings me back to a pivotal question raised
above: Can Putnam's argument for internal realism be
successfully reconstructed? I think not, because given
that internal realism is compatible with Humean
scepticism, it is also compatible with at least a modicum
of representation independence on the part of objects,
and this is compatible with Cartesian scepticism, and so
Putnam's argument, or all of its reconstructions, must
fail, why? Because the essential point (premise?) is that
internal realism is, relative to Cartesian scepticism,
epistemologically correct, but given the above, this is
just plain wrong. If internal realism and Humean
scepticism are compatible, objects are representation
independent. But, if objects do not depend on our
rePreseritations
,
there is a gap between what is the case
and what we represent it to be, that is, our
representations do not constitute the being or essence of
objects. Given this gap, however, any non-tautologous
representation might fail to represent the way things
are, and so any could be false, and so the scenarios
described in both the demonic and the cybernetic forms of
Cartesian scepticism could obtain. But, then, internal
realism and Cartesian scepticism are compatible.
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Therefore, since a conceptual keystone of Putnam's
argument is that internal realism is, with respect to
Cartesian scepticism, epistemologically correct, if a
reconstruction of Putnam's argument is an
rests on this keystone, there cannot be a
reconstruction of Putnam's argument.
argument that
successful
This brings me back to another pivotal guestion:
What can be appropriated from my reconstruction of
Putnam's argument that will further the task of making
sense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds and
truths? The lesson is this: the way to justify an
ontological turn, which will explain the thesis that
there are many actual worlds and truths, is to show that
it gets both Cartesian and Humean scepticism right. This
constitutes a test for any such turn, is there an
ontological turn that evades these forms of scepticism?
If there is, it involves a much more radical turn than
Putnam's internal realism, who himself seems to be in
need of an awakening from his own dogmatic slumbers, if
there is an escape from scepticism, it involves returning
to Kant's primordial articulation of the very ontological
turn that Protagoras, Whorf
,
Quine, Goodman and Putnam
have either failed to see, or have failed to get right.
Or, this is what I will argue. So, with the above test in
hand, I now turn to Kant to attempt to extract a viable
version of an ontological shift that will support the
thesis that there are many actual worlds and truths.
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CHAPTER 4
QUIDDITY: KANT
My project is, once again, to determine whether any
sense can be made of the theses that there are many
actual worlds, and that there are many truths. At this
stage, the proposal under consideration is that the
ontological shift of Kant's Copernican revolution can be
appropriated to bring this project to completion. How? in
his The World Well Lost
,
Richard Rorty suggests the
following:
Since Kant, we find it almost impossible
not to think of [1] the mind as dividedinto active and passive faculties, the
former using concepts to "interpret" what
"the world" imposes on the latter. We alsofind it difficult not to [2] distinguishbetween those concepts which the mind
could hardly get along without and those
which it can take or leave alone — and we
think of truths about the former concepts
as "necessary" in the most proper and
paradigmatic sense of the term. But as
soon as we have this picture of the mind
in focus, it occurs to us, as it did to
Hegel, that [3] those all important a
priori concepts, those which determine
what our experience or our morals will be,
might have been different. We cannot, of
course, imagine what an experience or
practice that different would be like, but
we can abstractly suggest that [4] the men
of the Golden Age, or the inhabitants of
the Fortunate Isles, or the mad, might
shape the intuitions that are our common
property in different molds, and [5] might
thus be conscious of a different "world"
.
1
1 Richard Rorty, The World Well Lost, The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 69 (1972) pp. 649-650. Emphasis and
parenthetic enumerations are due to me. Hereafter: WWL.
Compare A.C. Genova, Kant and Alternative Conceptual
Frameworks
,
in Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-
Kongresses, vol. 2 (1974) pp. 834-841. Also compare
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The basic idea is, I surmise, this. Suppose that we both
think and intuit, and that thinking is casting what is
intuitively given into conceptual molds. Moreover,
suppose that experience is a product of this casting, and
that a world is an ideal sum of what can be experienced.
the one hand, if there can be only one repertoire of
conceptual molds, there can be only one world. Or, this
is what Kant seems to have thought. On the other hand, if
there can be many essentially different sets of
conceptual molds, and the intuitively given can be cast
into them, so that different experiences result, then
there can be many actual worlds. Furthermore, if each
actual world were to have a complete description, there
would be, in the sense that I have explained above, many
truths
.
Rorty's suggestion involves a number of dubious
suppositions. Now, I don't find it difficult to suppose
that we both think and intuit. I know that some thinkers
think that no one thinks, but I won't pursue this issue
here. There is, however, some difficulty in supposing
that thinking is casting the intuitively given into
conceptual molds. The basic problem is that since the
casting metaphor is far less perspicuous than the
intuitions of metaphysical realism, and an essential part
of the aim of Rorty's suggestion, which is supported by
Patrick Gardiner, German Philosophy and the Rise of
Relativism
,
The Monist, vol . 64 (1981) pp. 138-154.
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the metaphor that thought is casting, is to supplant
these intuitions, the unclear supplants the clear. The
same can be said about the notion that experience is a
product of the conceptual molding of the intuitively
given. Additionally, if what it is to be a world is
characterized in terms of ideal sums and experience, it
is still an open question whether a world is the ideal
sum of (i) what is experienced, (ii) what is and can be
experienced, or (iii) what is and can be experienced plus
whatever may be connected by rules to what is and can be
experienced. Also note that the word world is ambiguous
in another way, since it can mean (i) that which imposes
on the passive faculty of sensuous intuition, and it can
mean (11) that of which we are supposed to be conscious
after the active faculty of thought has interpreted what
the world, in the just mentioned sense, has imposed on
the passive faculty of intuition. These issues aside,
there is also the dubious supposition that not only can
there be essentially different sets of conceptual molds,
but the given can be cast into them. I have already noted
Davidson's objections to the former, and the metaphysical
realist might object to the latter on the grounds that
since the given is a representation of what is itself
representation independent, that is, since the
intuitively given is, or involves, the sensuous presence
of what is itself representation independent, it comes
structured, and so it cannot be cast into alternative
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conceptual molds. To suppose that the given can be cast
in many ways is to beg an important ontological guestion.
Rorty himself objects to this account of world and
truth multiplicity because he thinks that the Kantian
picture upon which it depends itself depends on a pair of
distinctions that ought to be rejected. One is the
distinction between the given and the conceptual, and the
other is the distinction between the analytic and the
synthetic. With respect to the former, Rorty focuses on
the intuitively given, and he offers a dilemma:
Insofar as a Kantian intuition is effable,
it is just a perceptual judgment, and thus
not merely ^intuitive'. Insofar as it is
ineffable, it is incapable of having an
explanatory function.^
This needs to be elucidated. The intuitively given is
either characterless or not. On the assumption of the
i at"ter, the intuitively given possesses some character,
and so it is already conceptually molded. - If possessing
determinate features is essentially different from being
conceptually molded, as the metaphysical realist might
maintain, this is a non sequitur. I will disregard this
issue here. — But, then, since it is exactly the given
that is supposed to be conceptually molded, the given is
not the given. But, this can't be, and so the former must
be assumed, that is, it must be that the intuitively
given is characterless.
2 WWL
,
p. 650.
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If the given is characterless, it is more like
Aristotelian matter, or primary matter, than like any
determinate object, for example, this man or that horse.
For Aristotle, matter is supposed to be the stuff that
underlies change from one kind of thing into another kind
of thing, for example, the change of an apple into a man
by digestion. Aristotle asserts: " 'Matter '... is to be
identified with the substratum which is receptive of
coming-to-be and passing-away " 3 Consequently, matter
can be neither apple nor man, but it is what can be
anything. So, it can't, in and by itself, be anything
specific. If it were something specific, it would be
limited in what it can become. That Aristotle maintained
this is evidenced by his having written that:
When all else is stripped off [a thing or
substance] evidently nothing but matter
remains .... By matter I mean that which in
itself is neither a particular thing nor
of a certain quantity nor assigned to any
other of the categories by which being is
determined .... the ultimate substratum is
of itself neither a particular thing nor
of a particular quantity nor otherwise
positively characterized
. ..
.
4
Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione
,
translated by
Harold H. Joachim, in The Basic Works of Aristotle,
edited with an introduction by Richard McKeon, Random
House, New York (1941) p. 485, 320al-2 (book i, chapter
4) .
4 Aristotle, Metaphysica
,
translated by W.D. Ross, in The
Basic Works of Aristotle, edited with an introduction by
Richard McKeon, Random House, New York (1941) p. 785,
1029all-26 (book vii, chapter 3). Parenthetic remarks and
emphasis are due to me.
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Although explanation is a quite complicated thing, it
seems clear that in giving an explanation, one tells a
story about something that makes it clear why the thing
to be explained is the way that it happens to be. But,
telling a story about something involves asserting that
something has certain characteristics, which are somehow
related to the thing to be explained. This could be
unraveled further, but the point is that if the
Aristotelian conception of matter is to have any
explanatory power, it must entail that this matter has at
least some character. So, if matter is, according to the
Aristotelian conception, characterless, it can't explain
anything, including coming-to-be and passing away.
George Berkeley argued not only that the
conception of a characterless something could do no
explanatory work, but that a characterless stuff would be
nothing. With respect to the former, he put the point
well, when he wrote that:
It is said extension is a mode or accident
of matter, and that matter is the
substratum that supports it. Now I desire
that you would explain what is meant by
matter's supporting extension: say you, I
have no idea of matter, and therefore
cannot explain it. I answer, though you
have no positive, yet if you have any
meaning at all, you must at least have a
relative idea of matter; though you know
not what it is, yet you must be supposed
to know what relation it bears to
accidents, and what is meant by its
supporting them. It is evident support
cannot be taken here as taken in its usual
or literal sense, as when we say that
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pillars support a building: in what sensetherefore must it be taken? 5
On the one hand
,
matter is supposed to be characterless,
but then no sense can be given to the claims that it
supports various characteristics, and that it is the
substratum that persists through coming-to-be and
passing-away
. On the other hand
,
matter is supposed to
support various characteristics, or to be the substratum
that persists through coming-to-be and passing-away, but
since supporting things have a certain character, as do
persisting things, whatever sense can be given to these
suppositions must conflict with the view that matter is
characterless. So, not only can't such a conception of
matter explain coming-to-be and passing away, or such
characteristics with which we are acquainted, it can't
explain anything.
Moreover, with respect the point that a
characterless stuff would be nothing, Berkeley thought
that he could show that all the features that matter is
supposed to have in itself are subjective, and so they
are not possessed by matter in itself. He concludes that
since matter is then characterless, it is nothing.
Suspend the point about all the supposed features of
5 George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, in
The Works of George Berkeley: Bishop of Cloyne, vol. 2,
edited by A. A. Luce and T.E. Jessop, Thomas Nelson and
Sons Ltd, London (1949) p. 47 (section 16). Hereafter:
PHK
.
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matter being demonstrably subjective; it is this last
inference that is important here. Berkeley writes:
;
*;^at if we ;-- assert... that matter is anunknown somewhat
,
neither substance noraccident.
.you may... use the word
matter in the same sense, that other men[sic] use nothing, and so make those terms
’ * * * th ''' S what appears to meto be the result of that definition, theparts of whereof when I consider with
attention, either collectively, or
separate from each other, I do not findthat there is any kind of effect orimpression made on my mind, different from
what is excited by the term nothing
.
6
His point is somewhat obvious: the characterless is
equivalent to nothing. Moreover, this excursus should
make Rorty's point clearer: if the intuitively given were
characterless, its conception could do no explanatory
work, and it would be nothing. Now, Rorty's dilemma may
be put as follows. The intuitively given is either
characterless or not. If the given were to possess some
character, it would already be conceptually molded. But,
then, since the given is what gets conceptually molded,
the given is not the given. This can't be. So, it must be
that the intuitively given is characterless, but its
conception would be, to repeat the point just made,
incapable of doing any explanatory work, and it would be
nothing. Rorty concludes that the very idea of the given
must be rejected, and so must the distinction between the
given and the conceptual. More importantly, he concludes
PHK
,
p. 75 (section 80).
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that "...the suggestion that our concepts shape neutral
material no longer makes sense once there is nothing to
serve as this material. "7 But, then/ the suggestion^
alternative concepts might shape some neutral material in
alternative ways, and the whole Kantian based suggestion
about how there can be many actual worlds and truths,
which were delineated above, also fail to make sense.
Rorty's dilemma would lack force, if he had
somehow misallocated the Kantian picture, in other words,
his dilemma wouldn't be so pointed, if there were no
textual justification for thinking that Kant himself
maintained that experience is a product of thought
shaping or molding some conceptually neutral material
delivered by sensuous intuition. However, on the very
first page of the first edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason, Kant wrote that: "Experience is, beyond all
doubt, the first product to which our understanding gives
rise, in working up the raw material of sensible
impressions
.
" 8 Moreover, on the very first page of the
second edition of that work, he wrote:
...objects affecting our senses partly of
themselves produce representations, partly
arouse the activity of our understanding
to compare these representations, and, by
combining or separating them, work up the
raw material of the sensible impressions
7 WWL
,
p. 650.
8 CRITIQUE, p. 41, Al. Emphasis is due to me.
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ent^ti^ knowled9e of objects which istitled experience.... 9
So, there can be no doubt that Kant thought, at least
sometimes, that the understanding, that is, the faculty
of thought, produces experience by working up the
conceptually raw material of sensible impressions. There
is, therefore, some reason to think that Rorty's
suggestion doesn't involve any misallocation of the
Kantian picture. If there were some misallocation, there
might then be a reconstruction of his suggestion that is
based on an alternative reading of the Kantian picture,
and that successfully avoids his dilemma. Theodore W.
Schick, in his Rorty and Davidson on Alternate Conceptual
Schemes
,
has suggested another way to understand the
Kantian picture, and so, it is an open question whether
Rorty's suggestion can be successfully reconstructed. 10
Schick proposes an account of the given that he
claims avoids the dilemma associated with the apparently
inevitable opposition between characterless or
conceptualized. He writes:
Consider .. .the perception of an ambiguous
figure like the duck-rabbit. What we see
that figure as will be determined by what
concepts we use to organize our visual
experience
. But we cannot use any concepts
whatsoever. We cannot, for example, see
the duck-rabbit as an octopus. The best
explanation of this fact is that our
^ CRITIQUE, p. 41, B1 . Emphasis is due to me.
10 Theodore W. Schick, Rorty and Davidson on Alternate
Conceptual Schemes
,
The Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, vol. 1 (1987) pp. 291-303. Hereafter: RDACS
.
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visual experience of the figure hascertain qualities which serve to delimitthe ways m which we can see it. 11
The point is simple: the only explanation for the fact
that the duck-rabbit can't be seen as an octopus is that
the given is not characterless. But, as Schick writes,
"...to say that it [the given] has properties is not to
say that it is [or] has been conceptualized. ,,3 2
Therefore
,
the given is neither characterless nor
conceptualized, if the possession of determinate features
is essentially different from being conceptually molded,
as the metaphysical realist might maintain, then, as I
noted above, one branch of Rorty's dilemma is a non
sequitur. On the basis of this, Schick rejects the
premise of Rorty's dilemma, to wit: the given is either
characterless or not, and if not, then it is
conceptualized
.
It is unclear how Schick would make sense of the
Kantian text where it is written that "...the combination
( conjunctio ) of the manifold in general can never come to
us through the senses " 13 I will not pursue this issue
here. It is more important to explain why Schick's exit
from Rorty's dilemma can't be appropriated here.
Basically, it is because it is incompatible with Rorty's
suggestion about how there can be many actual worlds and
11 RDACS
,
p. 295. Emphasis is due to me.
12 RDACS, p. 296. Emendations are due to me.
13 CRITIQUE, p. 151, B129
.
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truths. Suppose that the given is neither characterless
nor conceptualized, or that it is, in other words,
conceptually neutral without being formless. According to
Rorty's suggestion, thinking is casting what is
intuitively given into conceptual molds. Moreover,
experience is supposed to be a product of this casting,
and a world is supposed to be an ideal sum of what can be
experienced. If there were many essentially different
sets of conceptual molds, and the intuitively given could
be cast into them, so that different experiences result,
then there would be many actual worlds. However, even if
the given can be conceptualized in many ways, and the
result is a plurality of experiences, and so a plurality
of worlds, the given will, according to Schick's claim,
possess features that will be common to all worlds, that
is, worlds as understood in the context of Rorty's
suggestion. So, there won't be a plurality of distinct
actual worlds, not to mention a plurality of truths.
It is still an open question, therefore, whether
Rorty's suggestion can assume a form that is not subject
to his dilemma. A clue to an adequate reconstruction of
Rorty's suggestion lies in an ambiguity in Schick's
phrase visual experience. It may mean (1) the reference
of someone's visual experience, e.g.
,
the ambiguous
figure, or it may mean (2) the visual experience itself
qua episode in someone's stream of consciousness. Recall
that Kant thought, at least sometimes, that the
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understanding produces experience by working up the
conceptually raw material of sensible impressions. Or, is
it that the understanding produces experience by working
up the raw material of the sensible impressions
themselves? There is a significant difference here, since
there is a significant distinction between providing raw
material and being raw material. In the first edition of
the Critique, sensible impressions seem to provide the
raw material upon which the understanding works. In other
words, the idea seems to be that sensible impressions
deliver some conceptually neutral, and perhaps
featureless, stuff that the understanding works up into
experience. In the second edition, however, sensible
impressions themselves seem to be the raw material, the
conceptually neutral stuff, upon which the understanding
works. The idea seems to be that the understanding works
up sensible impressions themselves, but in the sense that
the understanding compares, combines and separates them,
and where experience just is the concatenation of
impressions that have thereby been ordered.
So, Rorty and Schick share, I think, an
assumption. They both maintain that the given is
something other than our sensible impressions themselves.
They both believe, perhaps mistakenly, that the given is
what is delivered by our sensible impressions. In another
idiom, one might say that they both believe that the
given is the reference of our sensible impressions. Rorty
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believes, contrary to Schick, that the given cannot be
conceptually neutral without also being characterless,
and that this leads to paradox. Schick believes, contrary
to Rorty, that the given can conceptually neutral without
being characterless, and so Rorty 's dilemma can be
avoided. But, the assumption remains: the given is the
object of our sensible impressions, albeit not an object
in the everyday sense of this man or that horse.
Kant himself suggested that the given, or the raw
material of the sensible impressions, is the manifold of
sensible impressions themselves. He also suggested that
to say that the material of sensible impressions is raw
is to say something like this: the sensible impressions
themselves are uncompared, uncombined and unseparated,
and so they are unordered. Examples of this are
commonplace. For example, Socrates suspects that he has
seen Theaetetus, but he isn't sure since it may have been
Theodorus, or the whole episode may have been some sort
of illusion. This episode is a sort of raw material,
since it is uncompared, uncombined and unseparated, and
so it is unordered. In other words, this episode is raw,
because it neither fits with the rest of Socrates'
experience, nor does it fail to so fit. If this episode
can't be fit into the stream of Socrates' experience, it
will be illusory; if this episode can be so fit, then not
only did Socrates really see Theaetetus, what was once
raw material will be an experience. This anticipates what
176
IS to come, however. The pivotal point is that this nay
provide an alternative to Rorty's and Schick's
interpretations of the Kantian picture that itself nay
provide an exit fron Rorty's dilenna, and that nay also
support his suggestion about how to nake sense of the
thesis that there are nany actual worlds and truths. The
idea turns on the distinction between providing raw
material and being raw material. Let the given be the
manifold of sensible impressions themselves, and let
their being raw be equivalent to their being uncompared,
uncombined and unseparated, and consequently unordered.
Then, the given could then be conceptually neutral
without being characterless. So, Rorty's dilemma would be
obviated, since conceptual neutrality would be compatible
possession of a determinate character. But, does
this alternative account of the Kantian picture support a
reconstruction of Rorty's suggestion about how there can
be many actual worlds and truths? I will temporarily
suspend this question, and I will turn to Rorty's claim
that his suggested account of the multiplicity of actual
worlds and truths fails because the Kantian picture upon
which it depends itself depends on the untenable
distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.
With respect to the distinction between analytic
and synthetic, Rorty writes that:
...[the] suggestion that [1] the
difference between a priori and empirical
truth is merely that between the
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relatively difficult to give up and therelatively easy brings in its train thenotion that [2] there is no cleardistinction to be drawn between questions
t^rn
ea
?
lng and qilestions of fact^This, inu , leaves us... with [ 3 ] no distinctionbetween questions about alternative
'frameiorks
3"^^6^10"8 3b°Ut alte™ative
The efficacy of Rorty's remarks clearly depends on the
power of Quine's criticism of the analytic-synthetic
distinction. Although Quine proffers many criticisms of
this distinction, one important and fundamental reproach
is this. If statements could be divided into the mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive classes of analytic and
synthetic, there would be statements that are true no
matter what happens. Every statement is, according to
Quine, revisable: "...no statement is immune to
revision." 15 So, no statement is analytic, and the
distinction lacks point. How does this undercut Rorty's
suggestion about how there can be many actual worlds and
truths? Quine's point about the analytic and the
synthetic can be made, mutatis mutandis
,
about the a
priori and the empirical. If statements could be divided
into the mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
classes of those known a priori and those known through
empirical means, there would be statements that are true
no matter what course the stream of experience happened
14 WWL
,
p. 651. Emphasis, emendations and parenthetic
enumerations are due to me.
15 TDE
,
p. 43.
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to take. In short, every statement is revisable. So, no
statement is known a priori, and this distinction also
lacks point.
As Rorty understands Quine, although the analytic-
synthetic distinction can't be made in terms of the
impossibility and possibility of revision, it can be made
in terms of the degree to which it is difficult, or easy,
to revise a statement. An analytic statement is one that
is difficult to revise, and a synthetic statement is one
that is easy to revise. Within the context of fixing
belief, the distinction between a priori and empirical
statements can be made in a similar manner. A statement
knowable a priori is one that is difficult to revise, and
an empirical statement is one that is easy to revise. So,
criteria of objectivity or ostensible logical truths are
a priori
,
because they are difficult to revise; any
presumed empirical truth, such as the cat is on the mat,
is empirical, because it is easy to revise. Moreover, if
statements could be divided into the mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive classes of statements true by
virtue of meaning and those true by virtue of facts,
there would be statements that are true no matter what
happens. Since every statement is revisable, no statement
is true by virtue of meaning. The distinction between
statements true by virtue of meaning and statements true
by virtue of facts is, according to Rorty, also that
between what is difficult and what is easy to revise, and
179
the same sorts of examples apply. Rorty concludes that
there is no distinction between questions about
alternative theories and questions about alternative
conceptual frameworks. What does this mean? How is this
relevant to Rorty's suggestion?
Rorty takes his own suggestion to rest on the
premise that there can be many essentially different
conceptual schemes. The basic idea of his objection is
that the question whether one conceptual scheme is the
same as, or different than, another scheme doesn't make
sense without the notion of analyticity, or truth by
virtue of meaning. Suppose that there were alternative
conceptual schemes. There would then be at least two
conceptual schemes, and so there would be at least two
concepts, one drawn from each scheme. Consequently, there
would be at least two expressions that didn't mean the
same thing. Let these expressions be a and 8. So, there
would be an analytic truth, to wit, a is not B, or
something like this. Moreover, this would be a statement
that is immune from revision, but Rorty maintains, with
Quine, that no statement is immune from revision.
Therefore, there can be no alternative conceptual
schemes, and so Rorty 's suggestion fails.
Is Rorty right to take his own suggestion to rest
on the premise that there can be many essentially
different conceptual schemes? Is the notion of a
conceptual scheme really the one that is operative in his
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suggestion? I have discussed his suggestion in terms of
(1) the distinction between the empirical and the a
priori, (2) the distinction between the intuitively given
and conceptual molds, and (3) the distinction between the
manifold of sensible intuitions and ways of ordering this
manifold. Thus, Rorty's suggestion could be taken to rest
on anyone of the following three premises: (1) there can
be alternative a priorities by means of which the
empirical can be understood, (2) there can be many
essentially different sets of conceptual molds into which
the intuitively given can be cast, and (3) there can be
alternative ways to order the manifold of sensible
impressions. But, does Rorty's objection apply to his
suggestion when it is construed as based on any of these
three different premises?
In the first case, does the question whether one a
priori is the same as, or different than, another a
priori make sense without the notion of analyticity? If
there were an alternative a priori
,
there would be at
least two a priorities
,
but would there be at least two
expressions that didn't mean the same thing? This depends
on how one construes a priori. If an a priori is
construed as a repertoire of concepts, there would be at
least two expressions that didn't mean the same thing. In
the second case, does the question whether one repertoire
of conceptual molds is the same as, or different than,
another such repertoire make sense without the notion of
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analyticity? If there were alternative repertoires of
conceptual molds, there would be at least two conceptual
molds, but would there be at least two expressions that
didn't mean the same thing? This depends on how one
construes the conceptual mold metaphor. For what could it
be a metaphor, if not a metaphor for a conceptual scheme?
But, then, if there were alternative repertoires of
conceptual molds, there would be at least two conceptual
schemes, and so there would be at least two expressions
that didn't mean the same thing, in the third case, does
the question whether one way of ordering the manifold is
the same as, or different than, another way make sense
without the notion of analyticity? Would there be at
least two expressions that didn't mean the same thing, if
there were alternative ways of ordering the manifold?
This depends on what a way of ordering the manifold is.
Although this anticipates what its to be developed below,
a way of ordering the manifold is equivalent to an
assortment of concepts. So, if there were alternative
ways of ordering the manifold, there would be at least
two such ways, and so there would be at least two
expressions that didn't mean the same thing.
Thus, for each way of construing Rorty's
suggestion, there are at least two expressions that don't
mean the same thing, and so the rest of Rorty's objection
applies. Let these expressions be a and B. Et cetera. No
matter the manner of its construal, it seems that Quine's
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criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction shows,
mutatis mutandis, that Rorty's suggestion fails. This is
not the case. I think that the Quinean criticism is far
from undermining Rorty's suggestion. The basic idea here
is that the Quinean criticism supports Rorty's suggestion
by showing us that Kant was wrong to think that there can
only be one way to order the manifold, and by showing us
how there can be many essentially different ways. To see
this, suppose that the given is the manifold of sensible
impressions themselves, and that their being raw is their
being uncompared, uncombined and unseparated, and
consequently unordered. Or, in short, suppose that the
given is the manifold of sensible impressions, and that
their being raw is their being unordered. Then, Rorty's
suggestion is this. There can be alternative ways of
ordering the manifold of sensible impressions, and that
experience is a product of this ordering. For each way of
ordering the manifold, there is a different experience,
and that a world is an ideal sum of what can be
experienced. So, there can be many actual worlds. Et
cetera. Given Rorty's objection, a pivotal problem is to
show that it is possible for there to be alternative ways
to order the manifold of sensible impressions. To
paraphrase Quine, nothing is immune to revision in the
face of a recalcitrant manifold of sensible impressions,
and so it is possible to adopt alternative ways of
ordering the manifold. Kant would have said that our ways
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Of ordering the manifold are not subject to revision, and
it is, therefore, impossible to adopt different ways.
But, according to Quine's criticism, even our ways of
ordering the manifold are subject to revision, and so it
is possible for there to be alternative ways of ordering
the manifold. Quine's point is that if the right sensible
impressions came along, we might revise our ways of
ordering the manifold. So, Rorty has, I think,
misconstrued the import of the Quinean criticism of the
analytic-synthetic distinction; it doesn't show that
Rorty 's suggestion fails, instead it shows why one of its
pivotal premises is correct.
What, then, about Rorty's objection to his own
suggestion? Once again, here is his objection. Suppose
that (1) there were alternative conceptual schemes. Thus,
(2) there would then be at least two conceptual schemes,
and so (3) there would be at least two concepts, one
drawn from each scheme. Consequently, (4) there would be
at least two expressions that didn't mean the same thing.
(5) Let these expressions be a and 8. So, (6) there would
be an analytic truth, to wit, a is not 6
,
or something
like this. Moreover, (7) this would be a statement that
is immune from revision, but Rorty maintains, with Quine,
that (8) no statement is immune from revision. Therefore,
(9) there can be no alternative conceptual schemes, and
so (10) Rorty's suggestion fails. Where does this fail?
One place it fails, I think, is in the inference from (5)
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to (6). Doesn't this move beg the question? Part of the
point of saying that there are alternative conceptual
schemes is that concepts drawn from different schemes
can't be constituents of the same judgments, and so a
sentence such as a is not 6 is not meaningful. Just
because one can write or is not 6 doesn't mean that one
has written something that is either meaningful or
grammatical
.
If Rorty's Kantian suggestion doesn't succumb to
his own objections, what of its other defects? Recall the
questions that might be asked. Do we really intuit and
think? There are questions that arise from the
metaphorical character of some of the elements of Rorty's
suggestion. What is to be made of the metaphorical
characterization of thinking as the casting the
intuitively given into conceptual molds? Or the
metaphorical characterization of experience as a product
of the conceptual molding of the intuitively given? There
are questions that arise from an ambiguity in the word
world. Is a world an ideal sum of (i) what is
experienced, or (ii) what is and can be experienced, or
(iii) what is and can be experienced plus whatever may be
connected by rules to what is and can be experienced? Is
a world (i) that which imposes on the passive faculty of
sensuous intuition, or (ii) that of which we are supposed
to be conscious after the active faculty of thought has
interpreted what the world, in the just mentioned sense,
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has imposed on the passive faculty of intuition? There
are questions that arise from some of the substantive
assumptions of Rorty's suggestion. What reason is there
for thinking that there can be essentially different sets
of conceptual molds? Why should one think that the given
can be cast into these molds? Lastly, there is a
metaphilosophical question: By what means are the answers
to such questions to be uncovered? The uncovering process
will be, to some extent, arbitrary. I will begin by
recalling, and reflecting on, the Protagorean vision. My
aim is to uncover, and perhaps justify, a number of
theses that are central to the Kantian world picture, and
my method is to show that these theses emerge from a
number of criticisms of the Protagorean world vision.
Protagoras maintained that the world of Socrates
is the aggregate of whatever appears to him, and since
perception is the principal mode of appearance, his world
is the aggregate of what he perceives. More generally,
the aggregate of what is perceived by an individual, or
the aggregate of what appears to an individual, is her
world. Since there are many perceiving individuals, there
are many worlds. All of this is, or should be, familiar,
but there is an additional dimension. According to
Plato's reconstruction of the Protagorean vision,
perception depends on the senses in such a way that what
appears through perception is partitioned on the basis of
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an alignment between the senses and the proper objects of
the senses. Plato writes:
SOCRATES: And will you be willing to agreethat if you perceive something by means ofone power, it's impossible to perceivethat same thing by means of another? Forinstance, you can't perceive by means of
sight what you perceive by means ofhearing, or perceive by means of hearing
what you perceive by means of sight?
THEAETETUS: Of course. 16
In other words, the ideal sum of perceptual appearances,
which constitute a Protagorean world, is partitioned into
the seen, the heard, et cetera. On the one hand, some
characteristics, such as being red, stay within certain
perceptual partitions, and other characteristics, such as
the darker than relation, only seem to involve elements
that themselves stay within the confines of specific
partitions
. In other words, not only does red lie within
the perceptual partition of the seen, but if one thing is
darker than another, these two things also lie within the
perceptual partition of the seen. On the other hand, it
is important to note that not only are some seen things
different from other seen things, but some heard things
are different from some seen things, and, of course, vice
versa. The seen and the heard belong, according to the
Protagorean hypothesis, to different partitions, but in
this case, difference involves elements belonging to more
than one partition. Thus, some characteristics, or
16 THEAETETUS, pp. 66-67, 184e9-185a3.
187
features of a perceptual world, cross, so to speak,
partitions. Moreover, there is a distinction between two
types of characteristic to be made here: (l) there are
the well-behaved characteristics, viz., those that do not
cross perceptual partitions, and (2) there are the ill-
behaved characteristics, viz., those that do cross
perceptual partitions. The pivotal question is: Do ill-
behaved characteristics have a place in a Protagorean
world?
The answer to this last question must be, I think,
negative. The reason is that if a Protagorean world is an
ideal sum of what is perceived by some individual, and
the perceived is partitioned into the seen, the heard, et
cetera, then there could be no ill-behaved
characteristics. This is an important criticism of the
Protagorean vision. I also think that this implication
shows that there is something missing from the
Protagorean picture, and what is missing is an essential
element of the Kantian picture that I am attempting to
articulate in a manner that will enable me to me make
sense of the theses that there are many actual worlds and
truths
.
•Focus on the incompatibility that Plato noted,
when he wrote the following:
SOCRATES: Now take a sound and a colour.
First of all, you think just this about
them: that they both are ?
THEAETETUS : Yes.
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th?^h S: Ann ^at Sach is different fromhe other and the same as itself?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: And that both together are twoand each is one ?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that too.
SOCRATES: And you're able to raise thequestion whether they're like or unlike
each other?
THEAETETUS: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: Well now, by means of what doyou think all those things about them?
Because it's impossible to get hold of
what they have in common either by means
of hearing or by means of sight. Besides,here's another proof of the point we're
talking about. If it were possible to
raise the question whether both are salty
or not, of course you'll be able to say
what you'd investigate it with: it would
clearly be neither sight nor hearing, but
something else.
THEAETETUS: Yes, of course: the power
that's exercised by means of the tongue.
SOCRATES: Good. But what about the power
which makes clear to you that which is
common to everything
,
including these
things: that to which you apply the words
'is', 'is not', and the others we used in
our questions about them just now? What is
that power exercised by means of? What
sort of instruments are you going to
assign to all those things
,
by means of
which the perceiving element in us
perceives each of them?
THEAETETUS: You mean being and not being,
likeness and unlikeness, the same and
different
,
and also one and any other
number applied to them. And it's clear
that your question is also about odd and
even, and everything else that goes with
those. What you're asking is by means of
what part of the body we perceive them
with our minds.
SOCRATES: You follow me perfectly
Theaetetus. That's exactly what I'm
asking.
THEAETETUS: Well, good heavens, Socrates,
I couldn't say; except that I think there
simply isn't any instrument of that kind
peculiar to those things, as there is in
the case of those others. On the contrary,
it seems to me that the mind itself
,
by
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or
:
mea/is of itself
, considers the things
which apply in common to everything
.
17
Theaetetus is confused in a way that Socrates -
Plato? - either doesn't notice, or doesn't note. A sound,
a colour and a taste are presumably apprehended by three
different modes of perception, namely, those respectively
associated with the ear, the eye and the tongue. These
three characteristics are well-behaved, that is, they
don t cross perceptual partitions. Consequently, the
tongue can taste neither the colour, nor the sound, but
then it can't be used to determine whether they are
salty. So, when Theaetetus asserts that it is by means of
the tongue that he would investigate whether a colour and
a sound are salty or not, he has erred. But, this is an
important error, since it shows that there are elements
in a Protagorean world for which the Protagoreans cannot
account
.
Here are just three instances. First: there are
relations that the elements of two partitions bear to an
element of a third partition: neither colour nor sound is
salty. Second
:
there are relations that the elements of
two partitions bear to each other: sound and colour are
different. Third: there are characteristics that belong
to all partitions: both colors and sounds are, that is,
exist. There is, of course, the question of the possible
permutations, but I will not consider it here. Instead, I
17 THEAETETUS, pp . 67-68, 185a7-e4. Emphasis is due to
me
.
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Will merely note that although a Protagorean would not, i
assume, want to deny any of this, it is, on Protagorean
principles, unintelligible. Js, isn't
,
difference
,
sameness
, otherness
,
identity
,
oneness, twoness
,
likeness
, unlikeness
,
et cetera
,
are, it would seem, part
of any world, and so they are part of every Protagorean
world. Perception - understood as dependent on the senses
in such a way that what appears through perception is
partitioned on the basis of an alignment between the
senses and the proper objects of the senses - can't have
any of these characteristics as its objects.
Consequently, if Protagorean worlds are ideal sums of
what is, or can be, perceived by some individual, then
not only are they incomplete, but perception can't be the
only world constituting representation. Another sort of
representation is required to account for ill-behaved
characteristics
,
but Plato's Theaetetus does not contain
an account of the required sort of representation. 18
1 8 Perhaps the following remarks are in order. My
discussion of Protagoras has depended heavily on Plato's
text. Now, not only have I avoided the immensely
complicated problems of its interpretation, but I have
also avoided the equally complicated problem of
extracting Plato's views from his account of Protagoras.
Plato is hardly a disinterested reporter of the
Protagorean vision. It is difficult to forget that Plato
maintains that some untruths are necessary. Compare
Plato, Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1974) p. 82, 414c. So,
it might be that Plato's presentation of Protagoras is
twisted, and that he thought that this misrepresentation
is just one of a number of necessary untruths. I don't
wish to deny that philosophically interesting readings
may sometimes depend on certain twists of the text, and I
would note that a philosophically important
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In sum, Protagoras thought that for each sentient
individual, there is a manifold of perceptions, and that
the sum of the objects of these perceptions is a world.
He concluded that since there are many sentient
individuals, there must also be many worlds. The problem
is that a Protagorean world evidently contains more than
what can be given through, or constituted by, perception.
So, these worlds must be incomplete, and there must be,
if a complete world is even possible, another kind of
world constituting representation, in short, to return to
the leit motif of Rorty's suggestion, it must be that we
both perceive and think. This raises familiar questions.
What is thought? How can thought constitute what
perception cannot? Are many repertoires of world
constituting thoughts possible? it is also necessary to
say how it is that thought can constitute any segment of
a world, what a world is, and what an object is. I think
that Kant explains how thought or conception can be world
constituting, and that he gives an account of what an
object must consequently be. It might be better to say
that he gives us an account of objectivity, but there
will be more on this in the sequel. I also maintain that
reconstruction of the Protagorean thing may itself
require a certain metatwisting of the Platonic texts.
Indeed, my readings of Whorf, et alia, have been, so to
speak, systematically misleading readings, but this hasbeen in the service of the development of both a
philosophically interesting reading, and the development
of my own views. I'll not enter into these issues here.
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his story can be appropriated to show that there are many
actual worlds. So, it is to Kant's views on these matters
that I must now turn.
There is a thesis that the foregoing critigue of
Protagoras renders discernible, and that is essential to
the Kantian picture of what it is to be a world, what is
this thesis? in short, it is this: if a manifold of
perceptions has an object, it must also have a certain
unity, and this unity cannot be given through perception.
Kant thinks that the fact of this unity entails that
every event follows another event according to a rule,
and so on. Bracket this. I propose to follow up Rorty's
suggestion, and to use the Kantian story of this unity to
explain, and to argue for, the thesis that there are many
actual worlds. So the pivotal question is: what is this
unity?
In a way reminiscent of the just discussed
Platonic criticism of Protagoras, Franz Brentano remarks
that many of us definitely recognize that sound and color
are different, and so many of us are clearly capable of
comparing color and sound. He inquires: "How would this
presentation of their difference be possible if the
presentations of color and sound belonged to a different
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reality?” 19 it can't be that one simply looks, since this
would exclude the sound that is to be compared with what
is seen. It can't be that one merely listens, since this
would exclude the color that is to be compared with what
is heard. It can't be that one employs some third
perceptual modality, since this would exclude both the
color and the sound that are to be compared, unless, of
course, they one's auditory and visual perceptions were
somehow united in it. This is the first hint of the unity
that I seek to explicate.
In order to make the nature of this unity clearer,
Brentano points out that this unity of visual and
auditory perception is not at all like that of the mere
juxtaposition of the auditory perceptions of a blind man
and the visual perceptions of a deaf man. No matter how
the two men may be juxtaposed, they cannot be aware of
the relation between color and sound. Brentano thinks
that
:
...the cognition which compares them [to
wit: sound and color] is a real objective
unity, but when we combine the acts of the
blind and the deaf man, we always get a
mere collective and never a unitary real
thing . 20
He continues:
19 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint, edited by Oskar Kraus, English edition edited
by Linda L. McAlister, translated by Antos C. Rancurello,
D.B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister, Humanities Press,
New York (1973) p. 159. Hereafter: PES.
on
. .PES, p. 159. Parenthetic emendation is due to me.
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makes no difference whetherthe blind man and the deaf man are far
apart or near one another, if they livedtogether permanently in the same houseindeed, even if they had grown up together
as inseparably as Siamese twins or even
more so it would not increase the
possibility of the hypothesis one bit.Only if sound and color are presentedjointly, in one and the same reality, isit conceivable that they can be compared
with one another. 21
An important point here is that our ability to compare
such mundane things as colors and sounds, and our ability
to be aware that they are different, both rest on some
sort of unity of our visual and auditory perceptions.
Moreover, an egually important point is that this unity
is not that of the blind man and the deaf man in mere
juxtaposition. Together, they do not form, or constitute,
a unitary real thing, but instead they form a mere
collective
.
Although Brentano may have shown us that
there is a unity that needs to be explained, and that
such a unity is importantly different from the mere
collectivity illustrated by the juxtaposition of the
blind man and the deaf man, he has not himself provided,
at least in the passage under consideration, such an
explanation. So, there remains the question of what this
unity is.
The existence and essence of this unity is further
illustrated by a thought experiment that was presented by
William James. He wrote:
21 PES, p. 159.
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Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take
welve men and tell to each one word. Then
stand the men in a row or jam them in abunch, and let each think of his word asintently as he will; nowhere will there be
a consciousness of the whole sentence.
^
It is unfortunate that James does not say more about this
thought experiment, but one point is clear: James' twelve
men are importantly analogous to Brentano's blind man and
deaf man. Just as Brentano's pair can't be conscious of
the relation between color and sound, James' dozen can't
be conscious of the whole sentence in question. If there
were, in addition to Brentano's two men, a third man who
could both hear and see, he would presumably be conscious
of at least one relation between sound and color, namely,
that color is not sound. The sounds that a blind man
hears cannot be compared to the colors that a deaf man
sees, because their perceptions do not, and presumably
cannot, possess the unity of the visual and auditory
perceptions of someone who both sees and hears.
Analogously, if there were, in addition to James' dozen
men, a thirteenth man who was told the entire dozen word
sentence, he would presumably be conscious of the
22 William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. l,
Dover Publications, New York (1950) p. 160. Compare
Norman Kemp-Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of
Pure Reason', second edition, revised and enlarged, The
MacMillan Press, Ltd., (1979) p. 459, footnote 1.
Hereafter: NKS . Also compare Robert Paul Wolff, in his
Kant's Theory of Mental Activity: A Commentary on the
Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1963) pp. 105-109.
Hereafter: KTMA
.
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complete sentence of the thought experiment. A thirteenth
man would be capable of being conscious of something of
which the dozen were incapable of being conscious. The
point of James 7 thought experiment is to get us to
understand that the dozen word perceptions of the man who
has perceived the whole sentence are essentially
different from the dozen word perceptions of the twelve
men who have not perceived the whole sentence. The former
possess the unity required of perceptions through which a
sentence — or, more generally, an object — may appear,
whereas the latter do not. The dozen men can't go
through
,
take up, and connect into a single consciousness
of a single sentence their dozen individual perceptions
of one of a dozen words, since these perceptions fail to
possess the unity of the perceptions of the man who has
perceived the whole sentence. 23
Brentano and James have proffered importantly
different thought experiments, however. Brentano's point
is that different perceptual modalities must be somehow
united, if we are to be capable of comparing their
contents. So, for example, our visual and auditory
perceptions must somehow be united, if we are to be
capable of comparing sounds and colors, and recognizing
that sound is not color. James makes a similar and
perhaps deeper point: even perceptions within the same
23 Compare CRITIQUE, p. Ill; A77=B102. Also compare
CRITIQUE, p. 131; A99
.
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modality must somehow be united, if one is to be capable
of being aware of objects that have parts that are
serially presented by means of these perceptions
.
This
is, I think, what Kant meant, when he wrote: "It is only
when we have
... produced synthetic unity in the manifold
of intuition that we are in a position to say that we
know the object .
"
24 j n other words, even perceptions
within the same modality must somehow be united, if one
is to be capable of being aware of an object that is
composed of parts that are thereby perceived. So, for
example, a dozen perceptions of a dozen words must
somehow be united, if one is to be capable of being aware
of a sentence that is composed of these words.
In the context of James' point that even
perceptions within the same modality must possess some
sort of unity, if one is to be capable of being aware of
objects that are composed of parts that are serially
presented by means of these perceptions
,
reconsider the
above criticism of the Protagorean vision. A Protagorean
world contains more than what can be given through, or
constituted by, perception, namely, relations among the
objects of different perceptual modalities. So, such
worlds must be incomplete. Et cetera. This makes it seem,
however, that a Protagorean world could still contain the
objects of the individual perceptual modalities, but in
24 CRITIQUE, p. 135, A105.
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the light of James' thought experiment, this can be seen
to be mistaken. The basic reason is that everything is,
for the Protagorean, given through perception, but the
unity of the manifold of perceptions can never be
perceived, that is, can never be given through
perception. As Kant wrote in an important passage of his
first Critique: "...the combination ... of the manifold in
general can never come to us through the senses .... "25 j n
other words, the unity of the manifold of perceptions can
never be given through perception. The fundamental
mistake is that if every element of a Protagorean world
comes through perception, and the unity in question can't
be given through, or constituted by, perception
,
then the
unity that is necessary for there to be any awareness of
objects must be absent, and so there can't be any
awareness of objects.
For example, even a Protagorean would admit, I
think, that there is, and so there can be, an awareness
of such objects as twelve word sentences, but the problem
is that this is, on Protagorean principles, impossible. A
Protagorean has a place for a dozen perceptions of a
dozen words, but he has no place for the unity that these
perceptions must possess if there is to be an awareness
of a twelve word sentence, and so she can't account for
what is obvious: not only is such an awareness possible,
25 CRITIQUE, p. 151, B129.
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It is actual. Indeed, since we are actually aware of
objects such as twelve word sentences, it must be
possible for us to be aware of them. More generally, even
the perceptions of a particular modality must possess a
unity, which is as yet unexplained, if there is to be any
awareness of objects. So, the Protagorean must tell us
that we can't be conscious of the sentence of James'
thought experiment, and consequently we can't be aware of
certain sorts of object of which we are certainly aware,
but this would seem to refute it. In the light of James'
thought experiment, it can be seen that a Protagorean
world can't even contain the objects of the individual
perceptual modalities, and this too would seem to refute
it. The Protagorean vision is refuted because
perceptions, if they are to be perceptions of objects,
require a unity that cannot come through perception. And,
so, a Protagorean world depends on, if it is to contain
such objects, a unity that its own defining principles
deny it.
There are a pair of problems here, and I'm not
sure what to say about them. First, if knowledge is to be
intersub jective, and solipsism is to be avoided, must not
what seem to be separate minds be unified in some way?
Just as I can only know that color and sound are
different if my visual and auditory perceptions are
somehow unified, I can only know that your visual
perceptions are different from my auditory perceptions if
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your visual perceptions and my auditory perceptions are
somehow unified. What is wrong with this? This quickly
leads to the conclusion that there is only one mind, or
does it? Second
,
why can't unity be given through
perception? Why can't the unity of the manifold of
perceptions be perceived? Perhaps there is some
unattested Protagorean doctrine according to which
perception is able to constitute much more than is
usually supposed. A contemporary neo-Protagorean
,
Maurice
Merleau-Ponty
,
seems to find more in perception than Kant
did. He writes: "One sees the hardness and brittleness of
glass, and when, with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this
sound is conveyed by the visible glass." 26 I will bracket
these issues here.
Not only are the above described thought
experiments the basis of a number of powerful criticisms
of the Protagorean vision, but they also establish the
necessity of the unity of consciousness, and they provide
a glimpse into what this unity is. However, they don't
explain this unity, and they don't establish what follows
from the fact of this unity. On the one hand, Kant
attempted to both explain it, and divine its
consequences. On the other hand, my aim is to show that
the Kantian world picture, of which it is an essential
26 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception,
translated by Colin Smith, The Humanities Press, New York
(1962) p. 229.
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there are many actual
element
, supports the theses that
worlds, and that there are many truths. This is not a use
to which Kant would happily see his vision put, I think,
since some things that Kant writes in his first Critique
suggest that he thought that the fact of the unity
insinuated above entails that there is just one actual
world. For example, Kant thinks that since the world, or
nature, is merely an aggregate of appearances
,
and not a
thing in itself, the fact of its conformity to law is
entailed by the fact of the unity that I have been
discussing, which Kant entitles the transcendental unity
of apperception. It can, according to Kant, be known a
priori both that the events, of which the world is
composed, must conform to law, and that the world must be
unitary, that is, unitary in the sense that the law to
which its events conform imposes a unifying structure on
them, and thereby on it. In is in this context that Kant
writes about the necessary interconnection of events, and
the universal unity of the world, or nature. 27 It is,
moreover, difficult to understand how Kant could write in
this manner, if he did not believe that the
transcendental unity of apperception, which is, at this
point, little more than a title, necessitates that there
be one and only one actual world or nature.
27 Compare CRITIQUE, p. 140, A114.
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The thesis that there are many actual worlds is
not utterly alien to Kant's thought, however. At one
point in his Inaugural Dissertation, however, Kant writes
that "...a plurality of actual worlds outside one another
is not impossible by its very concept .... "28 what I hope
to show is that the a more articulated account of the
unity hinted at above can be used to define world ; the
basic idea is that a world is something like a sum of all
that can be represented through the representations that
can possess this unity. Moreover, there are many actual
worlds just when there are many sums of things that can
be represented by many manifolds of representations each
of which can possess this hitherto elusive unity.
Let me elaborate this by using Kant's terms to
give a rough account of the point of Davidson's polemic
against conceptual relativism. Davidson's insight might
be paraphrased in the following manner: were there to be
a conceptual scheme that is alternative to ours, there
would be representations that could not be united with
our representations. These alternative representations
would stand to ours as the blind man's auditory
perceptions stand to the deaf man's visual perceptions.
Just as the blind man's auditory perceptions can be
? D Immanuel Kant, On the Form and Principles of the
Sensible and the Intelligible World (Inaugural
Dissertation)
,
in Kant's Latin Writings, edited and
translated by Lewis White Beck, et alia, Peter Lang, New
York (1986) p. 174.
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man's visual
nothing to the deaf man, or just as the deaf
perceptions can be nothing to the blind man, the
representations, which are associated with an alternative
conceptual scheme, can be nothing to us. Moreover, just
as the sounds exhibited by means of the blind man's
auditory perceptions can be nothing to the deaf man, or
just as the colors exhibited by means of the deaf man's
visual perceptions can be nothing to the blind man, the
objects exhibited by means of the representations, which
are associated with an alternative conceptual scheme, can
be nothing to us. Consequently, the world of objects
exhibited by means of alternative representations is
different from the world of objects exhibited by means of
our representations, and so not only can't we know it,
but we must also conclude that it is unreal. Presumably,
a conceptual relativist wants to say both that (1) there
are other, and therefore different, worlds of objects,
and that (2) somehow they can be represented. Davidson's
point is that these two theses can't be put together.
Simply put, the intuition that underlies his point is
that any object that we can represent can't belong to a
world other than our own. The conceptual relativist must
show, therefore, how it is that worlds of objects can be
both different and something to us. Moreover, there is
the altogether different requirement that she show that
there are worlds of objects that are both different and
something to us.
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An adequate answer to Davidson's objection, and an
adequate explication of the thesis that there are many
actual worlds and truths, require, I think, an
alternative conception of what it is to be an object.
Protagoras offers us a paradigm of such an alternative
conception. Faced with the fact of conflict betwixt his
peers, Protagoras conjectured that they perceive
^eren ^- objects. If, for example, Socrates and
Theaetetus are opposed over the character of the wind,
they must be, according to Protagoras, perceiving
different winds. If Socrates and Theaetetus perceive
different winds, however, they can't be perceiving the
wind as it is in itself. What, then, are they perceiving?
The Protagorean answer to this question depends on a
reconceptualization of what it is to be an object. About
this alternative conceptualization, Plato wrote:
...black, white, or any other colour will
turn out to have come into being, from the
collision of the eyes with the appropriate
motion. What we say a given colour is will
be neither the thing which collides, not
the thing it collides with, but something
which has come into being between them;
something peculiar to each one. 29
Perception involves, according to Protagoras, two
elements. In the case of visual perception, these are (1)
the eyes, and (2) something that Protagoras - or: Plato?
— entitles motion. Color is constituted by the collision,
or interaction, of these two elements. Consequently,
29 THEAETETUS, p.19, 154a.
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color itself is neither in the motion, nor in the eyes.
As Plato puts it, color is something that is constituted,
or comes into being, between the eyes and the motion. For
each pair of eyes, therefore, there is a distinct point
that is between then and the motion, and so there is a
distinct color. So, color is peculiar to each pair of
eyes, or, in other words, color is peculiar to each
percipient. Moreover, I presume that this story applies,
mutatis mutandis
,
to any other perceptible object, for
example, tastes, sounds or textures.
With this story, Protagoras provides us with an
alternative conception of what it is to be an object. He
also provides us with the key to explain what it means to
say that objects are appearances, to wit: objects are
neither merely subjective — in the eyes, for example —
nor things in themselves — for example, some sort of
motion in itself. To say that an object is an appearance
is to say that it is between the merely subjective and
things in themselves. One could object that this notion
of being between the subjective and things in themselves
is vague, but one could make the stronger objection that
there is a way in which this story depends on essentially
anti Protagorean presuppositions: it depends on the
supposition that there are eyes and motion that are
themselves not between some eyes and motion, that is,
eyes and motion in themselves. In other words, this story
depends on the supposition of things of which man is not
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the measure. There is sense in the suggestion that man is
the measure of all those things that are between eyes in
themselves and motion in itself, since there is sense in
the idea that eyes in themselves have some role in the
constitution of this somewhat mysterious middle region.
However, eyes in themselves do not, at least within the
context of the story in question, have any role in their
own constitution. If man were the measure of all things,
he would be the measure of eyes and motion, and so they
would seem to need to be between yet further eyes and
motion. The Protagorean would seem to face, therefore,
either an infinite regress, or entities for which he
cannot account.
Let me place this problem aside, since it is not
clear whether it is the result of authentic Protagorean
doctrines, or Protagorean doctrines tainted with Platonic
poison. Although it fails, Protagoras offers us a
paradigm of an alternative conception of what it is to be
an object. A Protagorean object is somehow between
subject and object in itself, but a purified Protagorean
world picture would, I presume, eliminate all things in
themselves, whether they be subjects - eyes - or objects
— motions. But, on the supposition of such a purge, what
would things - subjects or objects - then be? One might
continue to talk in the manner of the old story, and say
that things would then be appearances
,
but this wouldn't
explain their curious status. To what, in the absence of
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the old story about eyes and motions, does saying that a
thing is an appearance amount? An answer to this question
is contained in the Protagorean thesis that the world of
Theaetetus is the aggregate of whatever appears to him,
and since perception is the principal mode of appearance,
his world is the aggregate of what he perceives.
According to Protagoras, I think, to say that objects are
appearances is to say that objects are nothing more than
objects of perception. However, as I have indicated over
the course of the last several pages, there are several
ways in which these aspects of the Protagorean vision are
defective. So, it can't be followed here. In other words,
although Protagoras offers us a paradigm of an
alternative manner of conceiving what it is to be an
object, since his alternative is based on a defective
vision, we can't decline or conjugate our Kantian
alternative on the basis of his paradigm. The Kantian
alternative has a grammar that is specific to it.
According to the Kantian world picture, what is it
to be an object? The essential idea is that an object is
an object of some representation that is somehow unified
with other representations. Since it is not clear what
this unity is, this idea is, at best, a suggestion about
how to proceed, and it is, therefore, necessary to
rethink what it is to be an object. Kant said as much as
this, when he said that "...we must make clear to
ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object of
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representations '."30 one finds confirmation of Kant's
intention in his claim that:
...it is a question for deeper enquiry
what the word 'object' ouqht to signify in
respect of appearances when these are
viewed not in so far as they are (as
representations) objects, but only in sofar as they stand for an object. 33-
By reflecting on Kant, I hope to sift out an account of
what it is for object to be an appearance, and an account
of the representations that constitute what perception
cannot. I will begin this question: what must an object
be, if there are to be many actual worlds?
Kant's conception of what it is to be an object,
which I want to appropriate for my cause, is part of his
account a priori knowledge. For example, he wanted to
explain how, and show that, we can know a priori that
every event must follow another event according to a
ru3
- e * Bracket this aspect of his world picture. In a
conceptually revolutionary passage, Kant wrote:
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our
knowledge must conform to objects. But all
attempts to extend our knowledge of
objects by establishing something in
regard to them a priori, by means of
concepts, have, on this assumption, ended
in failure. We must therefore make trial
whether we may not have more success in
the task of metaphysics, if we suppose
that objects must conform to our
knowledge. This would agree better with
what is desired, namely, that it should be
possible to have knowledge of objects a
30 CRITIQUE, p. 134, A104
.
31 CRITIQUE, p. 219, B234-235=A189-190
.
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priori, determining something in regard tothem prior to their being given. 3 ^
Kant's explanation and argument begins with what he takes
to be two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
possibilities: either (1) knowledge conforms to its
object, or (2) objects somehow conform to knowledge
.
As I
have noted above, he thought that the former option
entails scepticism. If knowledge conforms to its object,
then there is an object that exists in itself, and
knowing involves correctly representing this object as it
is in itself. As he wrote in his Prolegomena: "Should
nature signify the existence of things in themselves, we
could never cognize it either a priori or a
posteriori
.
" 33 if knowledge is supposed to conform to a
distinct and representation independent object, it must
be possible for knowledge to fail to conform, and it is
exactly this that is scepticism. Therefore, one must
choose between an intuition about the essence of
knowledge - namely, that it somehow conforms to pre-
existent objects in themselves - and an intuition about
scepticism - namely, that it is utterly wrongheaded. Kant
rejected scepticism, and so he opted to abandon the
intuition that knowledge somehow conforms to pre-existent
objects in themselves. Kant prefers to reject scepticism,
even if he must then affirm that in some manner objects
32 CRITIQUE, p. 22, Bxvi-xvii. The emphasis is added by
me
.
33 PROLEGOMENA, p. 38.
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conform to knowledge. What, then, are objects? The desire
for a priori knowledge, not to mention knowledge
simpliciter, can only be satisfied by renouncing the
intuition that knowledge conforms to its object, and the
affirming that objects somehow conform to knowledge. The
idea is not that there is first an object, and then there
is someone who knows, and finally the object changes so
as to conform to this person's knowledge. For example,
the idea is not that there is first an apple, and then
Socrates knows that it is an orange, and finally the
apple changes into an orange so as to conform to
Socrates' knowledge. But, then, what is the idea? What
can it possibly mean to say that objects conform to
knowledge ? What is Kant's conception of what it is to be
an object?
There are a number of sites where Kant works out
the details of his alternative conception of what it is
to be an object. In my attempt to appropriate this
conception, I will mainly draw from the Transcendental
Deduction in A, or, more specifically, the Subjective
Deduction
,
although I will also consider, in an
incidental manner, the Second Analogy . 34 On the reading
34 The project of articulating Kant's account of what it
is to be an object could be immense. To avoid the obvious
problems, not only will I focus on an account that can be
found in the above mentioned texts, but I will work, more
or less without question, within the framework of the
reading provided by Robert Paul Wolff in his KTMA.
Compare pp. 100-134, 154-164, and 260-280.
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taken up here, these two sites contain Kant's
justification for the thesis that, in the words of the
Subjective Deduction
, "...all appearances stand in a
thoroughgoing connection according to necessary
laws...." 35 or, in the words of the principle of the
first edition version of the Second Analogy: "Everything
that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes
something upon which it follows according to a rule." 35
More generally, the conclusion of Kant's argument is that
if there is a consciousness that possesses the unity
described above, it must be possible for there to be
authentic empirical knowledge. In other words, the
conclusion is that the unity of consciousness is a
sufficient condition for both the possibility and the
actuality of empirical knowledge of objects in space and
time. For my purposes, what is important about this
argument is that it is intertwined with an account of
what it is to be an object — or more accurately perhaps,
an account of objectivity - and this is exactly what I
hope to appropriate from Kant. In the following, I will
attempt to disentangle the elements of his conception of
what it is to be an object, and put them together in a
way that I think supports the thesis that there are many
actual worlds and truths. How do I plan to do this?
35 CRITIQUE, p. 140, A113-114.
36 CRITIQUE, p. 218, A189.
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The elements of Kant's conception of what it is to
be an object, not to mention the justification of this
conception, are mostly to be found in the Subjective
Deduction. This text is, or appears to be, an
inconsistent muddle, however. One conjecture that has
been offered to explain this is the historical thesis
that Kant more or less capriciously arranged four groups
of his writings — each of which dates from a different
period, and each of which is incompatible with the other
three — into the Subjective Deduction. This is, of
course, the famous patchwork thesis. 37 Whereas the
patchwork thesis explains the apparent muddle of the
Transcendental Deduction by means of a thesis that
concerns the manner of its composition, Wolff explains
the ostensible disarray of Kant's text with a thesis that
concerns the manner of its exposition. His idea is that
sine-® Kant couldn't be sure that the readers of the first
Critique would have read his previous works, it was
necessary for him to explain at least three previous
stages of his thought. In other words, his strategy for
explaining the doctrines of the Subjective Deduction was
to begin by explaining a number of earlier accounts of
the transcendental unity of apperception that he had
considered, but rejected. It is only in the Second
Analogy, which forms, so to speak, a fifth stage, that
37 Compare NKS
,
pp. 202-234.
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Kant presents his most fully developed position. For my
purposes, what is important is that each of these five
stages is intertwined with an account of what it is to be
an object; and it is this account that I hope to
appropriate in order to make sense of the theses that
there are many actual worlds, and that there are many
truths. Moreover, an important feature of the last four
stages is that each includes a criticism of the
doctrines, including the various conceptions of what it
is to be an object, upon which the analysis of the
preceding stage depends. By the fifth and last stage,
namely, the Second Analogy, Kant has provided both an
alternative conception of what it is to be an object, and
a justification of this conception. Such a justification
is obviously essential to any attempt to make sense of
the theses that there are many actual worlds, and that
there are many truths. So, an important part of the task
of making sense of these two theses can be accomplished
by following Kant through the argument of the Subjective
Deduction
,
and subsidiarily, the Second Analogy.
Although it might seem that good sense would now
counsel me to turn to a discussion of the doctrines and
argument of stage one, a preparatory discussion of two
further premises of Kant's argument is necessary, that
is, premises in addition to the already discussed premise
that consciousness possesses the unity described in
James' thought experiment. The first premise is that
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representations have two importantly different aspects.
On the one hand
,
a representation is an episode in
someone's conscious life. For example, my perception of a
cat is an episode in my conscious life. As such, it has a
date, and it has a place in a sequence of other such
episodes. For example, it might be that I perceived the
cat at 10:06 AM, on September 6, 1993. Moreover, it might
be that I perceived the tree before I perceived the cat,
and that I perceived the cat before I perceived the dog.
So, I first perceived the tree, then secondly the cat,
and finally the dog. On the other hand, representations
refer to, or represent, objects that are not themselves
representations. For example, my perception of a cat
refers to, or represents, a cat that is not itself a
perception. As Kant wrote in the Subjective Deduction:
"All representations have, as representations, their
object...." 38 Wolff glosses this fragment of a passage in
the following manner:
...this referential function [of
representations] exists whether or not
there really is some object to be
represented. It is precisely because the
concept of a unicorn purports to represent
that we can call it fictitious. 39
Mutatis mutandis, Hamlet's perception of his father's
ghost has a referential function, even if his father's
ghost fails to exist; it is precisely because Hamlet's
38 CRITIQUE, p. 137, A108.
39 KTMA, p. 109. Emendation is due to me.
215
perception of his father's ghost purports to represent
that we can all it an illusion. But, Hamlet's perception
does not purport. People purport, not their perceptions.
So, although it might be that Hamlet purports, his
perceptions do not. Moreover, it is far less than
felicitous to say that there is something that is the
object of Hamlet's perception, but it doesn't exist.
Although this can't be made precise at this point
in my discussion, there are good reasons to think that it
is incorrect to say, as Wolff says that Kant says, that
representations function referentially
,
when there is no
object to be represented. First, this runs counter to the
intuition that it is deeply wrongheaded to say that there
is something that is the object of Hamlet's perception,
but it doesn't exist. Second, it runs counter to a
distinction that Kant is at pains to make in the Second
Analogy
,
to wit, the distinction between subjective
representations
,
which don't function referentially
,
and
objective representations
,
which do so function. Note,
however, that there is an intuition behind Wolff's gloss:
it is precisely because Hamlet's perception seems to be a
perception of his father's ghost that it can be said that
it is an illusion. In other words, if Hamlet didn't
visually perceive anything at all, there would be little
point to saying that he had been the victim of an
illusion, as opposed to being unconscious. Perhaps this
merely means that Hamlet's perception has a sense, but no
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reference
,
although this would require rethinking the
notion of reference. So, when Kant claims that every
representation has its object, this need mean no more
than every representation, qua representation, has a
sense. There is, then, no need to be saddled with the
completely infelicitous thesis that there is something
that is the object of Hamlet's perception, but it doesn't
exist. A paradigm might be this: although the word
unicorn has a sense, it has no reference. So, one can
say, on Kant's behalf, that although Hamlet's perception
has a sense, it has no reference. Moreover, this
preserves the distinction, which is made in the Second
Analogy
,
between subjective representations and objective
representations
. Both subjective and objective
representations have a sense, but only the latter have a
reference. The important Kantian move is to explain
objective representations in terms of a certain sort of
relation among representations, instead of a relation
between a representation and a utterly distinct object.
Thus, in addition to the premise that consciousness must
possess the unity illustrated by James' thought
experiment, there is this first important premise:
representations have two aspects: (1) they are episodes
in our conscious lives, and (2) they have, qua
representations, a sense. 40
40 There is a problem with this, however. An essential
Kantian thesis is that the manifold possesses the unity
illustrated by James' though experiment because its
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an essential feature
The second premise concerns
of knowledge, it is an answer to the question: What
characteristic distinguishes knowledge from imagination?
In short, the pertinent characteristic is, according to
Kant, necessity. Now, there are a number of analyses of
the relevant form of necessity, but let me prescind from
them here. The premise in question only concerns the deep
relation between knowledge, imagination and necessity,
not the nature of this necessity. The basic intuition
here is that since not all assertions are true, if I
assert something, I have not ipso facto asserted
something true. Similarly, if I assert something, I do
not ipso facto assert something that I know. For example,
if I assert that the cat is blue, it is not ipso facto
true that the cat is blue; similarly, if I assert that
the cat is blue, I do not ipso facto know that the cat is
blue. This is related to, if not the same as, the belief
constraint
,
which I have discussed above: to say or
believe something is not ipso facto to say or believe
something true. In imagining a cat, there is a certain
elements are subsumable under rules. If the distinction
between an objective and a subjective representation is
the distinction between a representation that can and one
that cannot be subsumed under rules that connect it with
other representations, then only a fragment, that is, a
proper subset, of the elements of the manifold is
subsumable under rules, else all representations are
objective. So, the explanation of the unity of
consciousness can't be that the elements of the manifold
are subsumable under rules. I'm not sure what to say
about this, and so I will, in this work, suspend the
questions that it raises.
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amount of free play. I can imagine a black cat, but I can
also imagine a blue cat, a green cat, and even a grue
cat, which would be a cool cat indeed. This free play and
the necessity in question here are opposites. There is
little, if anything at all, about an imagined cat that
constrains the imaginative ascription of color to it; in
the case of a real cat, however, there is something that
constrains the true and faithful ascription of color to
it, namely, the cat itself, or so one might presume. In
the latter case, the act of forming a true judgment about
the cat, or knowing the cat, would seem to be constrained
by the existence and essence of the cat. This begs an
important question, however, to wit; how is the necessity
or constraint in question here to be explained? To
describe such a necessity in terms of the existence and
essence of some cat in itself is to foreclose the
possibility of describing and explaining it in terms of
something else, for example, some relation among
representations. This latter explanation can only be,
however, a forethought of what is to come. The point,
which needs to be made at this juncture, is that an
essential characteristic of knowledge is necessity or
constraint, but it is also important to prescind from any
specific explanation of this necessity. In other words,
at this point, it is necessary to prescind from
explaining or describing this necessity in terms of some
relation between the relevant representations and some
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object m itself, or in terms of some relation among
representations simpliciter
.
Before I proceed to my discussion of the first
stage of the Subjective Deduction
,
I will first note that
and why I have articulated the second premise in a way
that is partly different from the manner in which Wolff
has put it. He writes:
What is the defining mark of knowledge
that sets it off from mere subjective
fancy? The answer... is necessity.
Knowledge is the assertion of a necessary
between the subject and the predicate of ajudgment .... [When I
know] ... I ... [assert ].. .that there is an
objective connection among these
properties [which are presumably denoted
by the aforementioned subject and
predicate], such that I must connect them
in my judgment. 41
I presume that Wolff would also want to assert that there
are cases in which when one knows, one asserts that there
is an objective connection between some thing and some
property; for example, when I know that the cat is black,
I assert that there is an objective connection between
the cat and the property of being black. Be this as it
may, this is somewhat misleading. It is important to note
that this necessity, or this must, is not the necessity
of analyticity. In other words, it is not necessary to
connect the relevant subject with the relevant predicate
because there is some sort of logical or semantic
41 KTMA, pp. 112-113. Parenthetic emendations are due to
me
.
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connection between them. Moreover, in this case, the
necessity in question cannot be explicated in terms of
truth in all possible worlds. For example, given a black
cat, the necessity of connecting the cat with is black is
not to be understood in terms of the cat's being black in
all possible worlds. This is a mistake; the cat's being
black is - I suppose - a contingent matter. So, I suspect
that Wolff has made the point of the second premise in a
somewhat misleading way, that is, misleading relative to
an audience that is euphoric with a certain view of
necessity. In sum, the second premise might be put this
way: when I know, not only must I assert that there is a
connection among certain properties, or among some thing
and some property, et cetera, but this connection must be
such that I must connect them in my judgment. However,
the second premise might also be put this way: to assert
something is not ipso facto to assert something that one
knows. With these two premises in hand, it is now
possible to turn to stage one of the Subjective
Deduction .
Kant desires to show that empirical knowledge of
objects in space and time is not only a possibility, but
it is an actuality. One version of Kant's argument rests
on the premise that a manifold of perceptions of objects
must possess the unity depicted in the above thought
experiments, especially that of James. It is, moreover,
mixed with an account of this unity. His strategy is to
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explain the nature of this unity by explaining why it is
that the manifold of perceptions possess it. At this
stage of things, the conjecture is that the manifold of
perceptions is unified because each perception is
directed to a unitary object that is both distinct from,
and independent of, perception. In the case of James'
thought experiment, for example, the reader's dozen
perceptions of a dozen words are unified because each
perception is also directed to a unitary and distinct
sentence. However, a perception that is directed to an
object cannot fail to be empirical knowledge. There are
two reasons for this. First, a perception that fails to
be directed to an object also fails to be knowledge. In
the case of James' thought experiment, any perception
that is directed to the sentence in question is
inevitably an empirical knowledge of it. Second, since a
representation that is directed to an object is
constrained or necessitated by this object, it is
knowledge. Recall that a pivotal premise of Kant's
argument is that an essential characteristic of knowledge
is necessity or constraint. When one knows, not only must
one assert that there is a connection among certain
properties, or among some thing and some property, et
cetera, but this connection must be such that one must
connect them in one's judgment. In sum, a representation
that is directed to a constraining object is ipso facto
knowledge. Therefore, given the premise that the manifold
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of perceptions possesses the unity described in Janes'
thought experiments, and given the above described
explanation of this unity, it follows that empirical
knowledge is actual, and so it is possible . The essential
idea here is that the mere fact of the unity of
consciousness implies that the contents of consciousness
are directed to objects, which itself implies both the
actuality and the possibility of empirical knowledge.
Prescinding from the guestion of the merits of
this argument, it is clear that it is intertwined with an
account of what it is to be an object. Since this account
rests on the assumption that there is a distinct and
unique object that is representation independent, it is
obviously inconsistent with the thesis that there are
many actual worlds, and so it is obviously not useful to
the advocate of this sort of plurality. Notwithstanding,
this account has a problem that is independent of the
thesis that there are many actual worlds, and that an
advocate of this plurality can exploit to motivate Kant's
conception of an object, which he must do, since he can't
appeal, as Kant does, to the presumably desirable result
of a unique a priori knowledge. As Kant himself points
out
:
...it is easily seen that this object must
be thought only as something in general =
x, since outside our knowledge we have
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nothing which we could set over against
this knowledge as corresponding to it. 42
The explanandum is the unity of our perceptions, and the
explanans is, at least at this stage of things, the
distinct, unitary and perception independent object of
these perceptions. 43 The essential point of the
aforementioned problem is that if it should turn out that
no content can be given to the concept of this object
,
it
will be unable to play any role in the suggested
explanation of the unity of consciousness. Now, this is
exactly what Kant, not to mention this advocate of a
multiplicity of actual worlds, thinks: "...this object
must be thought only as something in general = x...." 44
It is thought that the concept of a distinct and
representation independent object, that is, an object =
x, must remain contentless, but why think this? Because,
Kant answers, "...outside our knowledge we have nothing
which we could set over against this knowledge as
corresponding to it." 45 It might seem that Kant's answer
here is the mere tautology that we know nothing outside
of what we know that is (1) other than what we know, and
42 CRITIQUE, p. 134, A104.
43 To avoid the repetitive use of the prolix phrase
unique
,
distinct and representation independent object,
or any one of a number of equally prolix phrases, I shall
often make use of much more compact phrases such as
unique object, distinct object, utterly distinct object,
independent object, et cetera.
44 CRITIQUE, p. 134, A104.
45 CRITIQUE, p. 134, A104.
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(2) could be the object = x. Of course, we know nothing
outside of what we know, not to mention that we know
nothing that is both outside of what we know, and that
has any specifiable feature whatsoever, including these
two. What, then, is the point of this tautology? Does
Kant think that the above discussed account of the unity
of consciousness is, in some manner, incompatible with
this tautology? Does he think that this tautology is
incompatible with the conception of what it is to be an
object that is concomitant with this account? In what
manner is this tautology related to the pivotal thesis
that this conception of what it is to be an object is
necessarily empty? Does Kant even think that the last
quoted remark is a tautology? In short, why think that
the concept of a distinct and representation independent
object is necessarily empty?
The essential point here is that if the concept of
the utterly distinct object, or the object = x, must be
empty, then one can't explain the unity of
representations by virtue of their directedness to such
an object. Why this conditional? Because if no content
can be given to the concept of something, there is
nothing to be said about it, and so it can't figure in
any explanation of anything. Once again, in giving an
explanation, one tells a story about something that makes
it clear why the thing to be explained is the way that it
happens to be; telling a story about something involves
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asserting that something has certain characteristics,
which are somehow related to the thing to be explained.
So, if the concept of this thing is to have any
explanatory power, it must not be necessarily empty. So,
if the concept of the object = x must be empty, it can't
explain anything. Although written in the context of his
discussion of private languages, this is, I think,
Wittgenstein's point, when he wrote: "Here I should like
to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else
moves with it, is not part of the mechanism ." 46 Be this
as it may, Kant's reason for this antecedent — the
concept of the utterly distinct object must be empty —
is, at best, cryptically expressed. He wrote:
...outside our knowledge we have nothing
which we could set over against this
knowledge as corresponding to it . 47
. . .we have to deal only with the manifold
of our representations .... 48
...that x (the object) which corresponds
to them [our representations] is nothing
to us [that is, has none of the properties
of a knowable object] - being, as it is,
something that has to be distinct from all
our representations .... 49
46 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, the
English text of the third edition, translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York (1958)
p- 95e, section 271.
47 CRITIQUE, p. 134, A104 .
48 CRITIQUE, p. 135, A105 .
49 CRITIQUE, p. 135, A105 . Emendations are due to me.
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It is unclear how any of this gets one to the conclusion
that the concept of a distinct and perception unifying
object is necessarily empty. The fundamental idea is, i
am conjecturing, this: if it were possible to give
content to the conception of the object = x, it would be
possible to compare a situation in which some instance of
this conception is represented with a situation in which
some instance of this conception is not represented. And,
it is clearly impossible to make this sort of comparison.
In other words, to give content to this concept, one must
compare situations in which the distinct object is and is
not represented, but it is impossible to do this.
Ralph Barton Perry has expressed this point better
than any other thinker that I know. He wrote:
To determine roughly whether a is a
function of Jb, it is convenient
[necessary?] to. . .compare situations in
which b is and is not present. But where b
is 'I know,' it is evidently impossible to
obtain a situation in which it is not
present without destroying the conditions
of observation. 50
To give content to the conception of the object = x, that
is, the conception of the distinct and representation
independent object that unifies the manifold of
consciousness, it must be possible to compare the
represented object with the unrepresented object. This is
impossible, since comparison is a form of representation.
50 Ralph Barton Perry, The Ego-Centric Predicament
,
The
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods,
vol . 7 (1910) p. 8. Emendation is due to me.
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Suppose that Socrates wants to compare a situation in
which some stone is represented with a situation in which
the stone in question is not represented. So, he sets up
the following three step experiment. First, he sets up a
situation in which the stone is represented. Perhaps he
gives it an intent stare. Second, he sets up a situation
in which the stone is not represented. Perhaps he locks
it away in a box that is impervious to even the stares of
the gods. Third, he compares the stone in the first
situation with the stone in the second situation. On the
one hand, because of the design of the experiment, to
wit, the second step, the stone in the second situation
cannot be, and so is not, represented
. On the other hand,
because of the design of the experiment, to wit, the
third step, the stone in the second situation must be,
and so is, represented . In other words, according to the
third step of the experiment, Socrates compares the stone
in the first situation with the stone in the second
situation; thus, the stone in the second situation is
compared, and so it is represented. Thus, the design of
the experiment is contradictory, and so Socrates can't
get what he wants. In other words, it shows that it is
impossible to compare an object qua represented with the
same object qua unrepresented, and so it is impossible to
give content to the concept of a utterly distinct object.
The conception of the unique and distinct object to which
all of our representations are directed, and which is
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supposed to explain the unity of consciousness, is,
therefore, necessarily empty, it can only be the concept
of an object = x. There is a necessary incompleteness,
emptiness or vacuity here, since it is, so to speak,
impossible to solve for x. Recall that if the concept of
the utterly distinct object, or the object = x, must be
empty, the transcendental unity of apperception can't be
explained by means of the supposition that every act of
consciousness — perceptual or otherwise — is directed to
a unitary
,
distinct and representation independent
object. Consequently, such a conception can't explain the
unity of consciousness.
There is another way to make this point about the
necessary emptiness of the concept of the unique and
representation independent object. Henry E. Allison has
contrived the idea of an epistemic condition
,
which he
defines as a condition that is "...necessary for the
representation of an object or an objective state of
affairs." 51 To extend Allison's idea, let me define an
epistemic property as a property that is necessitated by
representability
. So, the set of epistemic properties may
be defined as the set of all properties, F, such that it
must be the case that if x is representable, or knowable,
x has F. I suspect that this is the sort of idea that
51 Henry E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An
Interpretation and Defense, Yale University Press, New
Haven (1983) p. 10. Emendation is due to me.
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Kant was attempting to bring to his reader's attention,
when he wrote that "...the representation is a priori
determinate of an object, if it be the case that only
through the representation is it possible to know
anything as an object." 52 The idea here is, I think, that
it can be known a priori that something has some
property, F, just when it is necessarily the case that if
it is knowable
,
or representable, it has F. Suppose that
a knowable or representable object must be capable of
being both intuited and thought. Then, it can be known a
priori that something has some property, F, if it is
necessarily the case that if it can be intuited or
thought, it has F. For example, Kant maintains that since
every outwardly intuitable object must have location in
space, and since Euclid's geometry describes the
structure of space, it can be known a priori that its
axioms must describe all outwardly intuitable objects. 53
52 CRITIQUE, pp. 125-126, A92=B125.
53 It is doubtful whether Kant's most thought out
position is that it can be known a priori that the
structure of space is Euclidean. It is true that Kant
writes as if it is aim to show that certain geometric
principles, for example, ".. .there ...[ is ].. .only one
straight line between two points...," are strictly
universal and necessary. CRITIQUE, p. 69, A24. However,
it is only in the first edition of the Critique that Kant
proffers the argument that geometry is a priori because
such principles are necessary. It is as if Kant realized
that such an argument goes further than transcendental
reflection is permitted to go, and that the truly
critical doctrine only shows how there can be a priori
knowledge of space, not that some specific geometric
principle is an instance of such knowledge. Similarly,
Kant only intends to show that every event follows
another event according to a rule, not that this event
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For similar reasons, we can know a priori that every
intuitable object will be temporal, and we can know a
priori that every event must follow another event
according to a rule. This is what Kant desired to show,
but it follows, moreover, that the concept of the
distinct object, to which representations are assumed to
correspond, is necessarily contentless
,
and this is what
I desire to show.
In the light of this idea of an epistemic
property, a distinct and representation independent
object may be defined as a knowable or representable
object minus its epistemic properties. Now, the pivotal
point is that the concept of such an object must be
empty. Since a utterly distinct object doesn't possess
the properties necessary for its representation, it is
obviously unrepresentable. It is, however, only by
representing an object that I can give content to its
concept. Therefore, the concept of the utterly distinct
object, that is, the concept of the object minus its
epistemic properties, must be empty. In other words, the
follows that event according to this specific rule. He
doesn't think that it is possible to show, for example,
that lung cancer follows smoking according to a rule that
is far beyond my ability to state. In The Transcendental
Exposition of the Concept of Space, Kant writes as if his
only aim is to show how there can be strictly universal
and necessary truths about space. He wrote that the
concept or a priori intuition of space is "...a principle
from which the possibility of other a priori synthetic
knowledge can be understood." CRITIQUE, p. 70, B40. I
will ignore this issue here.
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all my
concept of the unique and distinct object to which
representations correspond, and by which they are
unified, must remain empty, therefore. So, since the
concept of a utterly distinct object must be contentless,
it can play no explanatory role in accounting for the
unity of consciousness.
Let me put this pivotal point in yet a third
manner. The essence of the idea of the essential
emptiness of the concept of the distinct and
representation independent object appears to be made
manifest by an intuitive metaphor for the Kantian world
picture. As H.J. Paton has written:
It is impossible to invent any exact
parallel for this revolutionary doctrine
[that is, the doctrine that space and time
are imposed on objects by the nature of
our sensibility], but if we looked at
everything through blue spectacles, we
could say that the blueness of things, as
they appeared to us, was due, not to the
things, but to our spectacles. In that
case the spectacles offer a very rough
analogy to human sensibility in Kant's
doctrine
.
54
A . C . Ewing approvingly cites this metaphor. He writes:
Space and time... are those factors in our
sense-experience which are due to
ourselves and not to things-in-themselves
acting on us. Because they are contributed
by ourselves we can tell a priori that all
objects which we experience will conform
to them, just as when we use blue
spectacles we can tell a priori that
everything we see will look blue. This
54 H.J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, volume
one, Humanities Press Inc., New York (1936), p. 166.
Emendation is due to me. Hereafter: KME
.
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account of the a priori carries with itthe implication that we can have a prioriknowledge only of appearances not of
reality, just as from the premiss that I
wear blue spectacles I could infer notthat all the physical objects I see really
will be blue, but that they will look blueto me. 30
If this were a good metaphor, it would certainly help to
make sense of the thesis that there are many actual
worlds and truths. If there were many pairs of
differently colored spectacles, and an actual world were
some sort of sum of all the things that could be seen
through such a pair of spectacles, then there would be
many actual worlds. Moreover, if each had a complete
description, there would be many truths. There are,
however, a number of ways in which the blue spectacles
metaphor fails. Here are four. It falsely presupposes
that (1) the only sense is sight, and that (2) blueness
is as universal as space or time. It also wrongly
presupposes that just as it is impossible to imagine
something that is neither spatial nor temporal, (3) it
must be impossible to imagine something that fails to be
at least some shade of blue. Moreover, it mistakenly
55 A . C . Ewing, A short Commentary on Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
(1938) p. 30. Compare Richard E. Aquila, Representational
Mind: A Study of Kant's Theory of Knowledge, Indiana
University Press, Bloomington (1983) pp. 68-69. It is
remarkable that Wolff nowhere mentions the metaphor of
the blue tinted spectacles, given his unequivocal remark
that: "A serious philosophical argument cannot be based
on a metaphorical premise." KTMA
,
p. 101.
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presupposes that (4) it must be, in effect, impossible to
remove the blue tinted spectacles.
[ 1 ] Paton also thinks that the blue tinted spectacles
metaphor fails. He continues:
By abstraction we could think the concept
of blueness, but we could never intuit the
one infinite blue of which all blues are
necessarily parts; yet unless we can do
so, blue is not really analogous to
space.
. . .We could see no necessity why
every blue area as such should be a part
of a wider blue area. We could indeed see
the necessity why every area should be
part of a wider area, but this would have
nothing to do with its blueness. 56
What is Paton's criticism here? An essential premise of
Kant's argument for the conclusion that space is an a
priori intuition is the thesis that what we might take to
be diverse spaces are necessarily parts of one all
encompassing space. In the case of the blue tinted
spectacles, however, what we might take to be diverse
patches of blue are not necessarily parts of one all
encompassing blue. This is another way in which the
metaphor of the blue tinted spectacles falters. It fails
to snare the quiddity of the Kantian analysis of a priori
concepts such as the category of causality. Since space
and time are, in the Kantian scheme of things,
intuitions, space and time are passive, and so it takes
no cognitive effort, such as judgment, to impose them on
the manifold. So, they are much like the blue tint of the
56 KME
,
p. 169.
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spectacles, that is, the blue tint is imposed on the
manifold without any effort — cognitive or otherwise — of
the subject who wears them. To be imposed on the
fold
,
a category, such as causality, does reguire
cognitive effort on the part of the subject, that is, a
subject must judge. So, even if the blue spectacles
metaphor did capture the Kantian doctrines about space
and time, it would get something quite wrong about the
categorial contribution of the subject. Now, I will
pursue none of these criticisms here. Instead, I will
suspend the disanalogies
,
and I will attempt to show that
the concept of the unique, utterly distinct and
representation independent object is, on the weak and
fragile understanding provided by this metaphor,
necessarily empty.
As I have already noted, if the blue tinted
spectacles metaphor is to have any force, sight must be
the only sense. Moreover, since it must be impossible to
remove the blue spectacles, blueness must be universal as
space or time. Such suppositions are, however, false, but
suspend this. Focus instead on the fact that the force of
the blue spectacles metaphor also depends on the concept
of the far side object, that is, the concept of the
object on the eyeless side of the blue spectacles
.
In
other words, the force of the blue spectacles metaphor
depends on there being a distinct and spectacles
independent object. I can imagine the actuality of the
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just cited conditions, but I cannot imagine this without
there being a far side object, or, in other words, I
cannot imagine this without there being a distinct and
spectacles independent object. Within the context of this
metaphor, however, it can be seen that it is conseguently
impossible to give any content to the concept of the far
side object, or the concept of the distinct and
spectacles independent object. To be able to give content
to the concept of the far side object, it must be
possible to remove the blue spectacles. Ex hypothesi
,
however, it is impossible to remove the blue spectacles,
and no content can be given, therefore, to the concept of
the far side object. In short, the concept of the far
side object, that is, the concept of the distinct and the
spectacles independent object, is necessarily empty. So,
to the extent that the blue spectacles metaphor captures
the essence of the Kantian world picture, it is clear
that the concept of the distinct and representation
independent object is itself necessarily empty, and
therefore incapable of explaining the unity of
consciousness
.
According to the Kantian world picture, our
representational capacities are our only paths to what
there is, and these capacities are necessarily invariant.
In terms of the metaphor of the blue tinted spectacles,
it is only by means of, or through, such spectacles that
we have access to what there is, and they are invariant
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in the sense that they can't, by assumption, be removed.
Objects must, according to Kant, be representable, and
the world is an ideal sum of representable objects. As
Kant expressed this idea in a work subsequent to his
first Critique, "...'nature' [or: the world] is... the sum
total of all things insofar as they can be objects of our
senses and hence objects of experience » 57 To extend
the metaphor, the world is the sum of all things insofar
as they can be seen through the blue tinted spectacles.
Moreover, every representable object must be, if it is to
be represented, represented through such capacities.
There are, consequently, strictly universal and necessary
features of every representable object, namely, the
epistemic properties, and so it is impossible to know or
r®P^esent an object that did not possess these epistemic
properties. To extend the metaphor further, every visible
object must be, if it is to be seen, seen through the
blue tinted spectacles. There is, consequently, a
strictly universal and necessary feature of every visible
object, namely, being some shade of blue, which is
analogous to any one of the epistemic properties, and so
it is impossible to see an object that is not blue. Thus,
the parallel between the blue spectacles and the Kantian
57 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science, translated James W. Ellington, Hackett
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1985) p. 3. The
emphasis and the emendation are due to me, and note well
that this is not the same as saying that a world is a sum
of actually represented objects.
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a priori goes this far, and it goes a bit further, it is
impossible to give any content to the concept of the far
side object. To give content to this concept, it is
necessary to access the far side object without the
mediation of the blue tinted spectacles. Ex hypothesi
,
however, such access is impossible, and so no content can
be given to the concept of this object. In short, the
concept of the far side object is necessarily empty. In
terms of the Kantian world picture, no content can be
given to the concept of the distinct and representation
independent object If it were possible to give content to
this concept, it would be possible to access this object
without in any way representing it. Such access is
impossible, and so no content can be given to this
concept. In short, the concept of the distinct and
representation independent object is necessarily empty.
There is another way in which the first version of
Kant's argument fails, which reinforces the point just
made. It might also be said that the idea of an object,
which is opposed by both Kant and those who affirm that
there are many actual worlds, is the idea of a distinct
and representation independent thing that necessitates
the order and consistency of our representations or
perceptions. Such an utterly distinct object is supposed
to necessitate this order and consistency by being the
orderly and consistent thing to which our experience
corresponds. As Kant wrote:
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Now we find that our thought of the
relation of all knowledge to its object
carries with it an element of necessity;
the object is viewed as that which [1]prevents our modes of knowledge from being
haphazard or arbitrary, and which [2]determines them a priori in some definite
fashion. For in so far as they are to
relate to an object, they must [3]
1 necessarily agree with one another, that
is, must [4] possess that unity which
constitutes the concept of an object .^ 8
According to this idea, an object has at least two
essential features. An object is (1) that which is
distinct from and independent of our representations, and
(2) that to which our representations correspond. An
object consequently has a four additional features. An
object is (3) that which prevents our representations
from being haphazard or arbitrary, (4) that which
determines our representations (a priori) in some
definite fashion, (5) that by virtue of which our
representations cohere or agree with one another, and (6)
that by virtue of which our representations possess that
unity which constitutes the concept of an object, or
directed to an object. How is it that such an account of
what it is to be an object explains the order and
consistency of the stream of consciousness? The essential
idea of the realist's answer is that if our perceptions
are perceptions of orderly, consistent, distinct and
perception independent objects, they must themselves be
58 CRITIQUE, pp. 134-135, A104-105. Emphasis and
emendations are due to me.
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orderly and consistent. On the one hand, there is an
intuition to be had here, but this is, according to the
stricter standard of logical validity, just a non
sequitur. Why? Because, suppose that our perceptions are
perceptions of orderly, consistent, distinct and
perception independent things; not only doesn't it follow
that our perceptions are themselves perception distinct,
but it doesn't follow that our perceptions are themselves
perception independent. It isn't clear what sense can be
made of the thesis that our perceptions are independent
of our perceptions. Mutatis mutandis, it doesn't follow
that our perceptions must themselves be orderly and
consistent. It might be that the intuition can be
developed in a manner that ameliorates the transgression
of the logical standard in question, but I will not
pursue this possibility here. On the other hand, the
essential reason why this answer is wrongheaded is that
it presupposes as much as it attempts to explain, to wit,
that the objects that are distinct from our perceptions
are themselves orderly and consistent. Let me explain
this
.
Consider, in the style of James' thought
experiment, an ordinary object such as a book. Such an
object is discovered through a series of perceptions over
a period of time. An important fact of our common
experience is that the turning of a page never precedes,
or, at least, it has not yet preceded, the discovery that
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one's book is, after a long history of book like
behavior, a hippogryph or chimera. In other words, our
perceptions of ordinary objects such as books are both
orderly and consistent. What explains this? According to
the answer in question here, it is because that which is
discovered, or perceived, on the turning each page, is a
book that is both distinct from, and independent of, our
perceptions of it. Perceptions are orderly and
consistent
,
because they are directed to an orderly
,
consistent and distinct and representation independent
object. This, however, is hardly an explanation. If one's
perceptions of a book could go awry, even the distinct
and representation independent book in itself could go
awry. In other words, if the turning of a page could
precede the perception of something entirely fantastic,
the book in itself might be such that its page aspects
precede its fantastic aspects. Certain apparently chaotic
trains of perceptions can't be ruled out by appealing to
an orderly and consistent book in itself, since this
presupposes that such a book can't conduct itself in
chaotic manner. More generally, any reason to suspect the
order and consistency of the stream of perception is,
mutatis mutandis
,
a reason to suspect the order and
consistency of supposedly distinct and representation
independent objects.
A similar point can be made about the unity of
consciousness and the unity of the object. The essential
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idea is that if one is puzzled about the oneness of
consciousness, one should also be puzzled about the
oneness of the object. Both Kant and those who affirm
that there are many actual worlds oppose the conception
of what it is to be an object that underpins the
supposition that the unity of consciousness is explained
in terms of a unitary and representation independent
thing. Such an object is supposed to necessitate this
unity by being the unitary thing to which our
representations or perceptions correspond. The pivotal
question is: how does such a conception of what it is to
be an object explain the unity of the stream of
consciousness? The realist answers that: were our
perceptions directed to some unitary thing, they would
themselves be unitary in the manner made clear - I hope -
by James' thought experiment. Although there is an
intuition here, this is just a non sequitur . As I noted
above, even if our perceptions were directed to
perception independent things, it wouldn't follow that
our perceptions themselves would be perception
independent. Mutatis mutandis
,
it doesn't follow from the
premise that our perceptions are directed to a unitary
thing that our perceptions must themselves be unitary. I
will ignore the possibility that the relevant intuition
could be developed in a manner that ameliorates the non
sequitur . Instead, I will focus on the reason why this
answer is wrongheaded, namely, it presupposes as much as
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it attempts to explain, to wit, that representation
independent objects are themselves unitary. Let me
explain this.
In the case of James' thought experiment, an
object, to wit, a sentence, is discovered through a
series of perceptions over a period of time. The point of
James' thought experiment is that these perceptions are
possess a certain kind of unity. This raises two
questions: (1) what is this unity? and (2) what explains
it? In the first stage of Kant's argument, the premise is
that the nature of this unity is best understood in terms
of its explanation, and the essential idea is that there
is a unitary and perception independent object, and the
manifold of consciousness is directed to it. In short,
our perceptions possess the unity of James' thought
experiment because they are directed to an unitary and
representation independent object. In the context of the
above discussed explanation of the presumed order and
consistency of consciousness, I noted that postulating an
orderly and consistent object was hardly an explanation.
Similarly, postulating a unitary object is hardly an
explanation of the unity of consciousness. If the unity
of our representations needs to be explained, the unity
of the representation independent thing in itself also
needs to be explained. In other words, if the unity of
our perceptions of the various aspects of some object
needs to be explained, the unity of these aspects also
243
needs to be explained. For example, if the unity of our
perceptions of the various words of some sentence needs
to be explained, the unity of these words also needs to
be explained. The disunity of our perceptions can't be
ruled out by appealing to the unity of an object in
itself
,
since this presupposes both that such an object
is unified, and that it is obvious what the object's
unity is. Neither of these is obvious, however. Any
reason to think that the unity of consciousness needs to
be explained is, mutatis mutandis, also a reason to think
that the unity of objects in themselves needs to be
explained
.
Kant's alternative account of the order and
consistency of the stream of perceptions, which he
entitles the transcendental unity of apperception
,
shifts
the conceptual focus from the concept of the object as it
is in itself to the concept of objectivity . The basic
idea is that an objective representation is one that
stands in rule governed relations with other
representations, and that objects are what objective
representations represent. To say that representations
are objective is to say that they are subject to a rule,
and so it is necessary to connect them in some one
definite manner; to say that representations necessarily
stand in certain temporal relations is to say that they
are objective. As Kant wrote:
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If we enquire what new character relation
to an object confers upon our
representations, what dignity they thereby
acquire, we find that it results only in
subjecting the representations to a rule,
and so in necessitating us to connect themm some one specific manner; and
conversely
,
that only in so far as our
representations are necessitated in a
certain order as regards their time
relations do they acquire objective
meaning [ Bedeutung ]
.
59
Kant maintains, moreover, that objects must, on this
analysis, have the third through the sixth of the
features cited above, yet it need not be supposed that
objects are either distinct, or that they are that to
which our representations correspond. Although this shift
is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Kant's concept
of an object, it is precisely this that I hope to
appropriate in order to give sense to the thesis that
there are many actual worlds.
The fact of the necessary emptiness of the concept
of the utterly distinct and representation independent
object provides the advocate of a plurality of actual
worlds with at least a partial justification of Kant's
alternative conception of what it is to be an object.
Kant believed that his conception of what it is to be an
object is justified because it delivers the desideratum
of unique a priori knowledge, but the advocates of a
plurality of actual worlds maintain that there is no
59 CRITIQUE, p. 224, A197=B242-243 . Emendation is due to
me. It might make better sense here to translate
Bedeutung as reference .
245
unique a priori, or, in other words, there are many sets
of categories. So, what motivates their acceptance of the
Kantian conception of what it is to be an object? Here is
one answer: it is the only coherent alternative to what
is a necessarily empty account of what it is to be an
object. What, however, is the Kantian alternative to
conceiving of objects as distinct and representation
independent? Kant begins to answer this question in the
second stage of the argument of the Subjective Deduction.
The argument of the first stage is, in short,
flawed, and it is the aim of the subsequent stage to
ameliorate it. In fact, the aim of each of the last three
stages - or last four stages, if the Second Analogy is
counted as a stage — is to both correct some flaw in the
doctrine and the argument of the preceding stage, and to
advance to a more adequate doctrine and argument. Be this
as it may, at this point, I will assume that what has
been said is sufficient to secure the thesis that the
concept of the unique, utterly distinct and
representation independent object is necessarily empty.
Not only does the conception of such an object have no
explanatory value, but there are then no unique, distinct
and representation independent objects. This is, I
suppose, what Kant meant, when he wrote:
That a concept, although itself neither
contained in the concept of possible
experience nor consisting of elements of a
possible experience, should be produced
completely a priori and should relate to
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an object, is altogether contradictory and
impossible. For it would then have no
content, since no intuition corresponds to
it; and intuitions in general, through
which objects can be given to us,
constitute the field the whole object, of
possible experience
.
The importance of this is situated in its providing the
advocate of a plurality of actual worlds with a
justification for accepting Kant's alternative conception
of what it is to be an object: it is the only coherent
alternative to what is a necessarily empty account of
what it is to be an object. This once again raises the
question of what this alternative account is, and this,
in turn, brings me back to my project of disentangling
the Kantian account of what it is to be an object from
the last three stages of the Subjective Deduction
,
and
this brings me to the argument and doctrines of the
second stage of this text.
There is an ambiguity in the explanation of the
unity of consciousness that is offered in the first stage
of the text at hand. First: one might say that the
manifold of representations is unified because each
representation is directed to an unique, distinct and
representation independent object. Second: one might say
that the manifold of representations is unified because
each representation can be subsumed under a concept,
namely, the concept of being directed to a unique,
distinct and representation independent object. In other
60 CRITIQUE, p. 129, A95.
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words, one might say that the manifold is unified because
each of its elements can be subsumed under the concept of
being of a unigue and utterly distinct object. This is
equivalent to saying the manifold of representations is
unified because the concept of a unique and utterly
distinct object applies to each of its elements, that is,
each element of the manifold is a representation of a
unique and utterly distinct object. Therefore, there are
two incompatible explanations of the unity of the
manifold: (l) because each representation is directed to
a utterly distinct object, or (2) because each
representation can be subsumed under a concept, namely,
the concept of being directed to a utterly distinct
object. These are two essentially different explanations.
The difference here is between explaining the unity of
the manifold of representations (1) in terms of something
that is not itself a representation, namely, some utterly
distinct object = x, and (2) in terms of something that
is itself a representation, namely, the concept of being
directed to some utterly distinct object. The second
explanation contains the essence of the explanation of
unity that is proffered in the second stage of the
Subjective Deduction: the manifold of representations is
unified because there is a concept that applies to every
representation
.
With just the addition of this as yet undeveloped
account of unity, however, there is enough conceptual
248
stuff to articulate and construct the argument of the
second stage of the Subjective Deduction. A pivotal
premise of this argument is that consciousness is one.
Another premise is that there is only one alternative to
explaining the unity of consciousness in terms of the
transcendental object = x, to wit: the contents of
consciousness are unified because they can be subsumed
under a concept, namely, the concept of being directed to
some object = x. In other words, consciousness is one
because the manifold of representations can be subsumed
under the concept of an object = x. Yet another premise
is that the categories define the concept of an object =
x, that is, they define the concept of being directed to
an object. Moreover, since any representation that is
directed to an object is ipso facto knowledge, any
representation to which the categories apply is
knowledge. So, since consciousness is one, the elements
of the manifold of representations can be subsumed under
the categories. Therefore, the contents of my
consciousness constitute knowledge.
It is not clear what conception of an object is at
work in this argument. Since the unity of the manifold of
representations is explained in terms of something that
is itself a representation, namely, the concept of being
directed to some object, that is, the categories, it
might seem that objects — transcendental or otherwise —
become irrelevant or superfluous. This is not true.
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Although objects do not figure in the explanation of the
oneness of consciousness, they don't thereby become
irrelevant, but they do become secondary in the sense
that what it is to be an object comes to be understood in
terms of the manifold of representations that can be
subsumed under the categories. This is the fundamental
shift that I have hitherto sought. Instead of thinking of
the unity of consciousness in terms of an utterly
distinct object in itself, Kant thinks of the unity of
consciousness in terms of the subsumption of our
representations under the categories, and he thinks of
objects in terms of what such representations represent.
There is a crude analogy between this and two ways
of understanding the conceptual relationship between
truth and reality. According to one understanding of the
conceptual relationship between truth and reality,
reality is conceptually prior to truth, and a true
statement is a statement that corresponds to some segment
of a representation independent reality. This is realism.
According to an essentially different understanding of
the conceptual relationship between truth and reality,
truth is conceptually prior to reality, and reality is
that to which all the true statements correspond.
Analogously, although we intuitively think that time and
space are conceptually prior to clocks and rulers, and
that clocks and rulers measure some pre-existent time and
space, we might invert this conceptual relation, and to
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think of clocks and rulers as conceptually prior to tine
and space. We might come to think that time and space are
what clocks and rulers measure. In other words, we might
think that time and space are defined in terms of clocks
and rulers, and not vice versa.
There is, however, little or no reason to think
that the categories define the concept of being directed
to an object. So, there is virtually no reason to believe
that the categories define objectivity, that is, the
concept of being directed to an object, and there is, in
effect, no reason to believe that the second stage
explanation of the unity of consciousness succeeds. Most
importantly, there is little or no reason to accept the
conception of an object with which the argument of the
second stage is entangled. Not much sense can be given to
the idea of the fundamental shift of the second stage,
and its concomitant conception of what it is to be an
object, unless it is clear how subsumption under the
categories unifies the manifold of representations. It
can't be the mere fact that there is a concept that
applies to every element of the manifold, since there
would then be many concepts that would unify the
manifold, for example, the concept of being a
representation. It seems clear that Kant would not have
wanted to say that the manifold is unified because each
of its elements is a representation. Here, to pursue the
relevant conception of what it is to be an object, and to
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pursue the third stage of the Subjective Deduction, it is
necessary to introduce an additional premise, which is
the basis of Kant's analysis of the unity of
consciousness. This most important premise is, as Kant
wrote, that: "...a concept is always, as regards its
form, something universal which serves as a rule." 61 in
short, a concept is a rule.
The plan is to explain the unity of consciousness
in terms of the notion of a rule and several notable
features of rule-directed activities. If an activity is
rule-directed, then (1) it proceeds, vis-a-vis some rule,
correctly or incorrectly, (2) it has stages that are
determined by some rule, and (3) it has stages that
belong together by virtue of some rule, and that are set
off from other events that may be accidentally conjoined
with it. In other words, rule-directed activities (1)
proceed correctly or incorrectly, (2) have stages, and
(3) cohere. The last characteristic is the most
important: rule-directed activities have stages that
belong together
,
and that are set off from events with
which they may be fortuitously federated. As Wolff
writes
:
The third significant characteristic of a
regulated activity is its coherence. All
the parts or stages of the activity belong
together by virtue of the rule, and are
set off from other activities which may be
61 CRITIQUE, p. 135, A106.
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accidentally associated with it, for
example by occurring at the same time. 62
Consider counting. It is a rule—directed activity that
proceeds correctly or incorrectly. It has stages. Most
importantly
,
there is a way that the activity of counting
coheres, and is thereby one. In other words, counting has
stages that belong together by virtue of a rule, namely,
adding one, and that are set off from other events that
may be accidentally associated with it, for example,
tapping one's foot as one adds one.
The above noted facts about rules are not
sufficient to remedy the defects of the argument of the
second stage, and so to develop that of the third stage.
It is also necessary to distinguish two kinds of
activity: there are activities that yield rules, and
there are activities that yield something other than a
rule. In the latter case, the activity is first-order. In
the former case, if the activity yields a rule that
directs a first-order activity, it is a second-order
activity. More generally, if an activity yields a rule
that directs an activity of the n-th order, it is an
activity of the n+l-th order. Corresponding to this
hierarchy of activities, there is a hierarchy of rules.
First-order rules direct first-order activities; second-
62 KTMA, p. 123. Emphasis is due to me. It seems to be
that the notions of belonging together and being set off
are as vague as the notion of the unity of consciousness
that Kant wishes to explain, but I will not pursue this
issue here.
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order rules direct second-order activities; et cetera. I
will, and need, only focus on first and second order
rules. The pivotal point here is that this distinction
between these first two orders of rules corresponds, or
is identical with, Kant's distinction between empirical
concepts and the categories. The distinction between
first and second order rules is the distinction between
empirical concepts and categories. In other words,
empirical concepts are first-order rules, and the
categories are second-order rules. It is now possible to
give an account of the unity of consciousness upon which
the argument of the third stage of the Subjective
Deduction depends, and that will facilitate the
explication of Kant's conception of what it is to be an
object. Its basic idea is guite simple; the manifold of
consciousness is one because its elements can be subsumed
under a rule that unifies them.
As with the arguments of the first two stages of
Subjective Deduction
,
a pivotal premise of the argument
of the third stage is that consciousness is one. Another
premise is that consciousness is one because its elements
— representations — can be subsumed under a rule that
unifies them. Yet another premise is that the categories
are, given the above analysis of the categories and
rules, the rules for making the rules under which the
manifold is subsumed. So, the manifold of representations
can be subsumed under the categories. Moreover,
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representations that can be subsumed under the
categories, which are rules, stand in necessary relations
with other representations. Thus, the manifold of
representations stand in necessary relations with one
other. Further, given the above analysis of knowledge,
representations that stand in necessary relations with
other representations are objective, that is, they are
knowledge. So, the manifold of representations are
objective, that is, they are knowledge.
Kant ends the Subjective Deduction with a fourth
argument that he thinks establishes the above cited
conclusion that "...all appearances stand in a
thoroughgoing connection according to necessary
laws...." in short, the argument is this. Consciousness
is one, and it is one because its elements can be
subsumed under a rule. So, the manifold of contents of my
consciousness must be subsumable under a rule. By
definition, however, a law just is a rule under which a
manifold must be subsumed. Therefore, the contents of
consciousness, that is, appearances, are connected by a
necessary law. Be this as it may, given my aim of making
sense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds and
truths, it is more important to extract and articulate
the Kantian conceptions of what it is to be an object and
63 CRITIQUE, p. 140, A113-114
.
255
what it is to be a world that are intertwined with this
argument
.
What is an object? An object is not a utterly
distinct thing in itself. The concept of such an object
is necessarily empty, and so it can do no philosophical
work. Moreover, if the objects of knowledge were utterly
distinct, not only could there be no a priori knowledge,
but there could be no empirical knowledge. As Kant wrote:
"Should nature [the world] signify the existence of
things in themselves, we could never cognize it either a
priori or a posteriori . " 64 Most importantly, given my aim
in this work, utterly distinct objects don't help to make
sense of the thesis that there are many actual worlds and
truths. There are really two issues here. First, there is
the question of what it is for a mental content to
represent an object; second, there is the question of
what it is to be an object. With respect to the former,
Wolff writes:
To say that mental content R represents
object 0 is to say that R is one of a
variety (=manifold) of mental contents
which has been, or can be, reproduced in
imagination according to the rule which is
the concept of O. 65
This is only a somewhat less lucid paraphrase of Kant's
words, when he wrote:
64 PROLEGOMENA, p. 38. Emendation is due to me.
65 KTMA
,
pp. 133-134.
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If we enquire what new character relation
to an object confers upon our
representations, what dignity they thereby
acquire, we find that it results only in
subjecting the representations to a rule,
and so in necessitating us to connect them
in some one specific manner.... 66
The idea here is simple: a representation refers to an
object just when it can be subsumed under a rule — that
itself conforms to the rules for rules, namely, the
categories - that necessarily connects it with other
representations. What, then, is an object? Let an
objective representation be a representation that refers
to an object, that is, a representation that can be
subsumed under a rule — that conforms to the categories —
that necessarily connects it with other representations.
Then: something is an object just when it is represented
by an objective representation. Now, it is just a short
step to the relevant Kantian conception of a world: a
world is just a sum of all objects, that is, a sum of all
that is represented by some manifold of objective
representations
.
The pivotal question is this: how does this
contribute to my project of making sense of the thesis
that there are many actual worlds? To answer this
question, I must introduce two additional premises.
First : every representation is tensed. In other words,
time is the form of consciousness. Second : every
representing being is a practical being. These are not, I
66 CRITIQUE, p. 224, A197.
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think, dubious premises. First, consider the import of
the first. In conjunction with the conclusion of the
fourth stage of the Subjective Deduction
,
it has an
important consequence, namely, a world consists of a
series of causally related events. In short, a world is
necessarily temporal. This is the conclusion of the
Second Analogy
.
The argument of the Second Analogy has three
premises: consciousness is one, consciousness is one
because its elements can be subsumed under rules, and
objective representations are exactly those that are, or
can be, subsumed under rules. Obviously, then, the
elements of the manifold of consciousness can be subsumed
under rules. Now, since representations are tensed, the
rules under which they are subsumed are themselves
tensed, that is, they state that representations of one
type temporally follow representations of some other
type. Consequently, the elements of the manifold of
consciousness are have a temporal order that is imposed
on them by virtue of their subsumption of tensed rules.
In other words, since time is the form of consciousness,
the elements of the manifold of my consciousness must
possess a rule-determined temporal-order. Now, an element
of the manifold of consciousness is objective just when
it falls under a rule that determines its place in a
temporal sequence of representations. So, since objects,
or events, are what objective representations represent,
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every event temporally follows another event according to
a rule.
One consequence of this is that a world consists
of all the events that possess an order that is imposed
by tensed rules. Another consequence of this is that a
time is a sequence of events that possesses an order that
is imposed by tensed rules. To see the relevance of the
second of the two premises that I noted above, it is
necessary to distinquish between two kinds of time. This
is the distinction between isotropic and anisotropic
time. The former might be best explained by contrasting
time with space. Disregarding the obvious empirical
questions, space itself has no direction. North and south
are but local directions, and the same is true for up and
down. Although these oppositions may be defined in terms
of the earth and its physical properties, they have no
meaning outside the framework they can provide. To say
that space is isotropic is to say that the contents of
the universe and their physical properties do not define
a spatial direction. To say that space is isotropic is to
say that it has in and of itself no direction.
As space is isotropic, time is isotropic. To say
that time is isotropic is to say that it has in itself no
direction, that is, the contents of the universe and
their physical properties do not provide a physical
correlate for temporal direction. Thus, time is isotropic
just when no criterion — physical or otherwise — can be
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given for the proposition that one event is before
another. Although the guantity of chocolate is - in
principle, I suppose - measurable, it is not true to say
that one event, A, is earlier than another event, B, just
when the quantity of chocolate at the time of A is less
than the quantity of chocolate at the time of B. More
generally, to say that time is isotropic is to say that
there is no measurable feature of the world which is such
that one event, A, is before another event, B, just when
its quantity at the time of A is less than its quantity
at the time of B. Now, time is anisotropic just when
there is a correlate for the later than relation.
Let me make the following aside. It might seem
that entropy is an essential part of the definition of
the later than relation. It is not difficult to suppose
that entropy is, at least in principle, a measurable
feature of the world. So, one might conjecture that: one
event, A, is later than another event, B, just when the
quantity of entropy at the time of A is greater than the
quantity of entropy at the time of B. Presumably, this is
based on the second law of thermodynamics, to wit: "No
change occurring in an isolated system can result in a
decrease in the entropy of the system." 67 There are two
problems with this. First, it the above conjecture
67 Bas C. Van Fraassen, An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Time and Space, Columbia University Press, New York
(1985), p. 89. Hereafter: IPTS.
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requires the space of events to be the entire universe,
but it is not clear that the universe is an isolated
system. The second problem is that the above is a crude
version of the second law that has been supplanted by a
statistical version, to wit: "A change occurring in an
isolated system will most probably lead to a state of
greater or equal entropy.'' 68 As Van Fraassen concludes,
"...we cannot simply define later than as the direction
of change to higher entropy in most cases." 69 I don't
know whether this is right. My aim is to note the issues
raised by these considerations. Since they transcend the
scope of this work, I will not pursue them here.
Now, time is anisotropic just when there is a
determinable correlate for the later than relation. Even
if physics can't provide a correlate for this relation,
it doesn't follow that there is no such correlate.
Dilthey suggests that there is a determinable correlate
for the temporal direction of human events. He wrote:
...the parts of filled time are not only
qualitatively different from each other
but, quite apart from their content, have
a different character according to whether
we look from the present back to the past
or forward to the future. 70
68 IPTS
,
p. 92.
69 IPTS, p. 93.
70 W. Dilthey, Selected Writings, edited, translated and
introduced by H.P. Rickman, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1976) p. 209. Quoted by Wolff, NT, p. 216.
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The past can be regretted, but it cannot be the object of
intention or purpose. The future can be the object of
intention or purpose, but it cannot be regretted.
Consequently, human events are such that there is a
difference between past and future, and so there is a
determinable correlate for the later than relation. To
say this, however, is to say that human time, that is,
the sequence of human events, is anisotropic.
Although Dilthey's observation establishes the
fact that human time is anisotropic, it doesn't explain
this fact. This is where the second premise, which I
noted above, becomes relevant. Recall that this is the
premise that: every representing being is a practical
being. Or, in other words, every representing being is
purposive being. Crudely put, the idea here is that
purposes impose an anisotropic structure on time . 71 A
purposive being sets out to get things done, and there
is, therefore, always a distinction between things done
and things to be done. Consequently, when a purposive
being represents itself, its representation will always
be asymmetrically divisible into at least two parts. A
world consists of all the temporally ordered sequence of
events that are the senses of some manifold of objective
71 This is not my idea, rather it is an idea articulated
by Wolff in NT. I add an argument for the conclusion that
the premise that purposes impose an anisotropic structure
on human time in conjunction with the Kantian account of
what it is to be a world implies that there are many
actual worlds.
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representations. Moreover, a time just is such a a
sequence of events. Thus, since a representing being is a
purposive being, the time within which a representing
being exists is anisotropic
.
To draw my conclusion that there are many actual
worlds, it is necessary to add one last premise: not all
representing beings have the same purposes. If different
representative beings set out to get different things
done, the times within which they exist will be
asymmetrically divided in different ways. Consequently,
since each time will be structurally different, they will
not be congruent, and so they will not be the same. In
other words, since there are many purposes, there are
many times. Since a world is a sum of what is in a time,
there are many actual worlds. Now, since each such world
is the sum of what is represented by some manifold of
objective representations, each such has a complete
description, and so there are many truths.
The preceding argument has taken my reader down a
long and tortuous road. So, it may serve my readers well,
if I repeat the summary that I presented at the begining
of this essay.
(1) There are many representing beings.
[ Premise
.
]
(2) The set of representing beings
partitions into many non-empty classes.
[ Premise
.
(3) For each such class of representing
beings, there is a set of purposes, and
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each set of purposes is incompatible with
every other such set. [Premise.]
(4) For each class of representing beings,
there is an ideal sum of representations
that has an asymmetric structure imposed
by the set of purposes associated with the
class of representing beings in question.
[Premise.
]
(5) There is no ideal sum of
representations that includes or subsumes
all the ideal sums of representations that
are associated with the various classes of
representing beings. [3,4]
(6) There are many ideal sums of
representations. [2,4,5]
(7) For each ideal sum of representations,
there is an actual world. [Premise.]
(8) There are many actual worlds. [6,7]
(9) There are many truths. [6,8]
With this, I can bring this work to a close.
264
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allison, Henry E. Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An
Interpretation and Defense, Yale University Press, New
Haven ( 1983 ) .
Aquila, Richard E. Representational Mind: A Study of
Kant's Theory of Knowledge, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington (1983).
Aristotle. De Generations et Corruptions
,
translated by
Harold H. Joachim, in The Basic Works of Aristotle,
edited with an introduction by Richard McKeon, Random
House, New York (1941) pp. 470-531.
Aristotle. Metaphysica
,
translated by W.D. Ross, in The
Basic Works of Aristotle, edited with an introduction by
Richard McKeon, Random House, New York (1941) pp. 681-
926.
Bennett, Jonathan. Review of J.L. Mackie. Self-Refutation
- A Formal Analysis
,
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol.
30 (1965) pp. 365-366.
Berkeley, George. The Principles of Human Knowledge
,
in
The Works of George Berkeley: Bishop of Cloyne, vol. 2,
edited by A. A. Luce and T.E. Jessop, Thomas Nelson and
Sons Ltd, London (1949) pp. 19-113.
Brentano, Franz. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,
edited by Oskar Kraus, English edition edited by Linda L.
McAlister, translated by Antos C. Rancurello, D.B.
Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister, Humanities Press, New
York (1973).
Brings jord, Selmer. Are There Set-Theoretic Possible
Worlds?, Analysis, vol. 45 (1985) p. 64.
Burnyeat, M.F. Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato's
Theaetetus
,
The Philosophical Review, vol. 85 (1976) pp.
172-195.
Carroll, John B. Introduction, in Benjamin Lee Whorf
,
Language, Thought, and Reality, edited and with an
introduction by John B. Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase,
The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1956) pp. 1-34.
Davidson, Donald. On the Very Idea of a Conceptual
Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation,
reprinted with corrections, Clarendon Press, Oxford
(1986) pp. 183-198.
265
Davidson, Donald. The Method of Truth in Metaphysics
,
inInquiries into Truth and Interpretation, reprinted with
corrections, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1986) pp. 199-214.
Davson-Galle
,
Peter. Self
-refuting Propositions and
Relativism, Metaphilosophy, vol. 22 (1991) p. 175-178.
de Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics,
edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechechaye with the
collaboration of Albert Riedlinger, translated and
annotated by Roy Harris, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois
(1986)
.
Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy,
translated from the Latin by Donald A. Cress, Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis (1979).
Devitt, Michael. Realism and Truth, Princeton University
Press, Princeton (1984).
Devitt, Michael and Sterelny, Kim. Language and Reality:
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, The M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge (1987).
Dilthey, W. Selected Writings, edited, translated and
introduced by H.P. Rickman, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1976).
Ewing, A.C. A short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1938).
Field, Hartry. Realism and Relativism
,
The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 79 (1982) pp. 553-567.
Fine, Arthur. The Natural Ontological Attitude
,
in
Scientific Realism, edited with an introduction by
Jarrett Leplin, University of California Press, Berkeley
(1984) pp. 83-107.
Gardiner, Patrick. German Philosophy and the Rise of
Relativism
,
The Monist, vol. 64 (1981) pp. 138-154.
Genova, A.C. Kant and Alternative Conceptual Frameworks,
in Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses , vol. 2
(1974) pp. 834-841.
Gibson, Jr., Roger F. Enlightened Empiricism: An
Examination of W.V. Quine's Theory of Knowledge,
University of South Florida Press, Tampa (1988).
Goodman, Nelson. Of Mind and Other Matters, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge (1984).
266
Goodman, Nelson. On Starmaking
,
Synthese, vol. 45 (1980')
pp. 211-215. uyauj '
Goodman, Nelson. The New Riddle of Induction in FactFiction, and Forecast, fourth edition, Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge, Mass. (1983) pp. 59-83.
Goodman, Nelson. The Structure of Appearance, third
edition, with an introduction by Geoffrey Heilman, D.
Reidel Publishing Company, Boston (1977).
Goodman, Nelson. Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett Publishing
Company, Indianapolis (1978).
Goodman, Nelson and Elgin, Catherine Z. Reconceptions in
Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Hackett
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1988).
Grim, Patrick. There Is No Set of All Truths
,
Analysis,
vol. 44 (1984) pp. 206-208.
Grim, Patrick. On Sets and Worlds: A Reply to Menzel
,
Analysis, vol. 46 (1986) pp. 186-191.
Haack, Susan. Deviant Logic: Some Philosophical Issues,
Cambridge University Press, London (1974).
Haack, Susan. Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge (1978).
Hemple, Carl G. Philosophy of Natural Science, Prentice
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1966).
Hobbes, Thomas. Elements of Philosophy
,
in The English
Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, first collected and
edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., vol. 1, reprint
of the edition of 1839, Scientia Aalen, London (1962).
Hume, David. Enquiries concerning the human understanding
and concerning the principles of morals, edited by L . A
.
Selby-Bigge, second edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford
(1902)
Hunter, Geoffrey. Metalogic: An Introduction to the
Metatheory of Standard First Order Logic, University of
California Press, Berkeley (1973).
Iseminger, Gary. Putnam's Miraculous Argument, Analysis,
vol. 48 (1988) pp. 190-195.
James, William. The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1,
Dover Publications, New York (1950).
267
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, translated byNorman Kemp Smith, St. Martins Press, New York (1965).
Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science, translated James W. Ellington, Hackett
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1985).
Kant, Immanuel. On the Form and Principles of the
Sensible and the Intelligible World (Inaugural
Dissertation)
,
in Kant's Latin Writings, edited and
translated by Lewis White Beck, et alia, Peter Lang, New
York (1986) pp. 135-192.
Kant, Immanuel. Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-
1799
,
edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1967).
Kant, Immanuel. Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics
That Will Be Able To Come Forward As Science, translated
by Paul Carus, extensively revised by James W. Ellington,
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1977).
Kemp-Smith, Norman. A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of
Pure Reason', second edition, revised and enlarged, The
MacMillan Press, Ltd. (1979).
Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E. and Schofield, M. The Presocratic
Philosophers, second edition, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1983).
Lakoff, George. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What
Categories Reveal about the Mind, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago (1987).
Leonard, Henry S. and Goodman, Nelson. The Calculus of
Individuals and Its Uses, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol . 5 (1940) pp. 45-55.
Lewis, David. Putnam's Paradox, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 62 (1984) pp. 221-236.
MacIntyre, Jane. Putnam's Brains, Analysis, vol. 44
(1984) pp. 59-61.
Mackie, J.L. Self-Refutation - A Formal Analysis, The
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14 (1964) pp. 193-203.
Marlowe, Christopher. Doctor Faustus, edited and
introduced by Sylvan Barnet, Signet, New York (1969).
Martin, Laura. ' Eskimo words for snow': A case study in
the genesis and decay of an anthropological example
,
American Anthropologist, vol. 88 (1986) pp. 418-423.
268
Matthen, Mohan. Perception
,
Relativism
,
and Truth:
Reflections on Plato's Theaetetus 152-160, Dialogue vol
24 (1985) pp. 33-58.
Meiland, Jack W. Is Protagorean Relativism Self-
Refuting?
,
Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 9 (1979)
pp. 51-68.
Mendelson, Elliott. Introduction to Mathematical Logic,
third edition, Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole Advanced Books and
Software, Pacific Grove, California (1987).
Menzel, Christopher. On Set-Theoretic Possible Worlds,
Analysis, vol. 46 (1986) pp. 68-72.
Merleau-Ponty
,
Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception,
translated by Colin Smith, The Humanities Press, New York
(1962)
.
Merrill, G.H. The Model-Theoretic Argument Against
Realism, Philosophy of Science, vol. 47 (1980) pp. 69-81.
Murray, Stephen O. Snowing canonical Texts, American
Anthropologist, vol. 89 (1987) pp. 443-444.
Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere, Oxford University
Press, New York (1986).
Neurath, Otto. Protocol Sentences, in Logical Positivism,
edited by A.J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe (1959) pp.
199-208.
O'Connor, D.J. The Correspondence Theory of Truth,
Hutchinson University Library, London (1975).
Passmore, John. Philosophical Reasoning, Basic Books, New
York (1969).
Paton, H.J. Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, volume one,
Humanities Press Inc., New York (1936).
Peirce, Charles Sanders. The Fixation of Belief, in
Philosophical Writings of Peirce, selected and edited
with an introduction by Justus Buchler , Dover
Publications, New York (1955) pp. 5-22.
Perry, Ralph Barton. The Ego-Centric Predicament
,
The
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods,
vol. 7 (1910) pp. 5-14.
Plato. Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube, Hackett
Publishing Company, Indianapolis (1974).
269
Plato. Theaetetus, translated with notes by John
McDowell, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1973).
Pullum, Geoffrey K. The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax
,
in
The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax and Other Irreverent
Essays on the Study of Language, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago (1991) pp. 159-171.
Putnam, Hilary. A Defense of Internal Realism
,
in Realism
with a Human Face, ed. James Conant, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge (1990) pp. 30-42.
Putnam, Hilary. Models and Reality, The Journal of
Symbolic Logic, vol. 45 (1980) pp. 464-482.
Putnam, Hilary. Model Theory and the ' Factuality' of
Semantics
,
in Reflections on Chomsky, edited by Alexander
George, Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1989) pp. 213-232.
Putnam, Hilary. Realism and Reason, Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Associations,
vol. 50 (1977) pp. 483-497.
Putnam, Hilary. Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge (1981).
Putnam, Hilary. The Many Faces of Realism: The Paul Carus
Lectures, Open Court, LaSalle (1987).
Putnam, Hilary. Truth and Convention: On Davidson'
s
Refutation of Conceptual Relativism, Dialectica, vol. 41
(1987) pp. 69-77.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Empirical Content, in Theories
and Things, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1981)
pp. 24-30.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Epistemology Naturalized
,
in
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia
University Press, New York (1969) pp. 69-90.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. On Empirically Equivalent
Systems of the World, Erkenntnis, vol. 9 (1975) pp. 313-
328
.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. On the Reasons for
Indeterminacy of Translation, The Journal of Philosophy,
vol. 67 (1970) pp. 179-183.
270
Quine, Willard Van Orman. On what there is, in From a
Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays,
second edition, revised, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts (1980) pp. 1 - 19 .
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Reply to Roger F. Gibson
,
Jr.,
in The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, The Library of Living
Philosophers, vol. xviii, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn and
Paul Arthur Schilpp, Open Court, La Salle (1986) pp. 155 -
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Things and Their Place in
Theories, in Theories and Things, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge (1981) pp. 1-23.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. To Chomsky, in Words and
Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine, D. Reidel
Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland (1969) pp. 302-311.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Two dogmas of empiricism
,
in
From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical
Essays, second edition, revised, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1980) pp. 20-46.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Word and Object, The M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge (1960).
Rorty, Richard. The World Well Lost, The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 69 (1972) pp. 649-665.
Scheffler, Israel. The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman,
Synthese, vol. 45 (1980) pp. 201-209.
Schick, Theodore W. Rorty and Davidson on Alternate
Conceptual Schemes, The Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, vol. 1 (1987) pp. 291-303.
Schultz, Emily A. Dialogue at the Margins: Whorf,
Bakhtin, and Linguistic Relativity, The University of
Wisconsin Press, Madison (1990).
Tarski, Alfred. The Concept of Truth in Formalized
Languages, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, second
edition, edited and introduced by John Corcoran,
translated by J.H. Woodger, Hackett Publishing Company,
Indianapolis (1983) pp. 152-278.
Trigg, Roger. Reason and Commitment, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge (1973).
Tymoczko, Thomas. In Defense of Putnam's Brains,
Philosophical Studies, vol. 57 (1989) pp. 281-297.
271
Van Fraassen, Bas C. An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Time and Space, Columbia University Press, New York
( 1985)
.
Van Kirk, Carol A. Kant's Reply to Putnam, Idealistic
Studies, vol. 14 (1984) pp. 13-23.
White, F.C. Self-Refuting Propositions and Relativism
,
Metaphilosophy, vol. 20 (1989) pp. 84-92.
Whorf
,
Benjamin Lee. An American Indian Model of the
Universe
,
in Language, Thought, and Reality, edited and
with an introduction by John B. Carroll, forward by
Stuart Chase, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1956) pp. 57-
64 .
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. Gestalt Technique of Stem
Composition in Shawnee, in Language, Thought, and
Reality, edited and with an introduction by John B.
Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase, The M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge (1956) pp. 160-172.
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. Languages and Logic, in Language,
Thought, and Reality, edited and with an introduction by
John B. Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase, The M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge (1956) pp. 233-245.
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. Science and Linguistics
,
in
Language, Thought, and Reality, edited and with an
introduction by John B. Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase,
The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (1956) pp. 207-219.
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. The Punctual and Segmentative
Aspects of Verbs in Hopi
,
in Language, Thought, and
Reality, edited and with an introduction by John B.
Carroll, forward by Stuart Chase, The M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge (1956) pp. 51-56.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, the
English text of the third edition, translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York
(1958) .
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
,
translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, and with an
introduction by Bertrand Russell, F.R.S., Routledge &
Kegan Paul, London (1961).
Wolff, Richard D. and Resnick, Stephen A. Economics:
Marxian versus Neoclassical, The Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore (1987).
272
Wolff, Robert Paul. Kant's Theory of Mental Activity: ACommentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique
of Pure Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
(1963).
Wolff, Robert Paul. Narrative Time: The Inherently
Perspectival Structure of the Human World, in Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, Volume 15, The Philosophy of the
Human Sciences, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E.
Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, University of
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (1990) pp. 210-223.
273

